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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation summarizes three papers concerned with decision-making impairments in a 
substance-based and a non-substance-based addictive disorder. In Paper I, it was observed that 
subjects with alcohol use disorder (AD) and subjects with gambling disorder (GD) show 
similarly reduced loss aversion. Both groups, however, showed different neural correlates of 
this reduced loss aversion: While AD subjects showed different functional activity in dorsal-
lateral-prefrontal cortex compared to healthy controls (HC), GD subjects showed different 
amygdala-orbital-frontal and amygdala-medial-prefrontal connectivity. Paper II and III 
investigated whether behavior and neural activity in a loss aversion task is modulated in GD 
subjects, as has been observed in similar studies in AD subjects. The data showed that GD 
subjects can be distinguished from HC subjects using a behavioral pattern of increased cue-
induced gamble increase when gambling-related cues are presented in the background. On 
neural level (Paper III), GD subjects could be distinguished from HC subjects by neural 
correlates of cue-induced changes in gambling behavior in a network of amygdala, nucleus 
accumbens and orbital-frontal cortex. Since the focus of the studies was GD, an addiction that 
is independent of substance abuse, the results suggest that reduced loss aversion and increased 
cue-induced changes in gambling behaviors, two phenomena related to substance-based 
addictions, are not dependent on a substance of abuse but rather on learned characteristics or 
even on predisposing traits of addictive disorders. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Diese Dissertation fasst drei wissenschaftliche Arbeiten (Artikel) zusammen, welche sich mit 
veränderten Entscheidungsprozessen bei substanzgebundenen- und substanzungebundenen 
Abhängigkeitserkrankungen beschäftigen. In Artikel I wurde beobachtet, dass Probanden mit 
Alkoholkonsumstörung (AD) und Probanden mit Glücksspielstörung (GD) eine ähnlich 
reduzierte Verlustaversion gegenüber gesunden Kontrollen (HC) aufweisen. Beide Gruppen 
zeigten jedoch unterschiedliche neuronale Korrelate dieser reduzierten Verlustaversion: 
Während AD-Probanden eine unterschiedliche funktionelle Aktivität im dorsal-lateralen-
präfrontalen Kortex im Vergleich zu HC aufwiesen, zeigten GD-Probanden eine veränderte 
funktionelle Konnektivität zwischen Amygdala und orbito-frontalem Kortex (OFC) bzw. 
medial-präfrontalem Kortex. In den Artikeln II und III wurde untersucht, ob das Verhalten und 
die neuronale Aktivität bei einer Verlustaversionsaufgabe bei GD-Probanden moduliert wird, 
wie dies in ähnlichen Studien bei AD-Probanden beobachtet wurde. Tatsächlich konnten GD-
Probanden von HC-Probanden auf Grundlage ihrer veränderten Glücksspielannahme während 
der Präsentation spielbezogener Hinweisreize unterschieden werden. Auf neuronaler Ebene 
(Artikel III) konnten GD-Probanden von HC-Probanden durch die neuronalen Korrelate der 
reizinduzierten Veränderungen im Spielverhalten in einem Netzwerk aus Amygdala, Nucleus 
Accumbens und OFC unterschieden werden. Da in den Studien der Fokus auf 
Glücksspielabhängigkeit lag, also auf einer Abhängigkeit, welche unabhängig von 
Substanzmissbrauch existiert, deuten die hier diskutierten Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass 
verminderte Verlustaversion, sowie erhöhte reizinduzierte Veränderungen im 
Entscheidungsverhalten – welches beides bekannte Phänomene von Substanzabhängikeiten 
sind – nicht durch Substanzmissbrauch zustande kommen. Beide Phänomene scheinen 
vielmehr erlernte Merkmale oder sogar prädisponierende Faktoren von 
Abhängigkeitserkrankungen zu sein. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Gambling disorder (GD) has been classified as the first behavioral addictive disorder alongside 
alcohol use disorder (AD) in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5 
(DSM-5) because both patient groups show similar clinical symptoms (e.g. craving for the 
addictive behavior despite known negative consequences, as well as tolerance and loss of 
control) (American Psychiatric Association & DSM-5 Task Force, 2013). Further, both groups 
show poor performance and similar neurobehavioral patterns in decision-making tasks where 
money or other values are at stake (Bechara, 2005; Clark, 2014; Leeman & Potenza, 2012; 
Redish, 2004). Both AD and GD are thus characterized by reduced aversion against negative 
consequences of the addictive behavior and impaired value-based decision-making. 
Accordingly, loss aversion, as defined in economics, should be reduced in both GD and AD. 
Loss aversion is the tendency to be more sensitive to the magnitude of possible losses than 
possible gains when facing mixed gambles (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). A mixed 
gamble has a possible gain and a possible loss outcome, each associated with a probability of 
50% (e.g. a coin flip gamble). Healthy subjects usually need to be offered a possible gain that 
is at least double the size of the possible loss before they agree to such a gamble (Abdellaoui, 
Bleichrodt, & L’Haridon, 2008). Loss aversion is a ubiquitous conservative strategy to guard 
against the expected negative feelings associated with losses when faced with mixed gambles 
(Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2006). Given their clinical picture, patients suffering 
from GD or AD should show similarly reduced loss aversion. Interestingly, loss aversion has 
not yet been directly compared in GD and AD in a neurobehavioral study. 
Besides impaired decision making, cue reactivity has been a crucial concept in understanding 
addictive disorders including GD (Goudriaan, de Ruiter, van den Brink, Oosterlaan, & 
Veltman, 2010; Leyton & Vezina, 2013; Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2001; Schacht, Anton, 
& Myrick, 2013; Vezina & Leyton, 2009; Wölfling et al., 2011). In addictive disorders, through 
classical (i.e. Pavlovian) conditioning, any formerly neutral stimulus can become a salient 
stimulus (i.e. a cue) if it has been repeatedly paired with the effects of the addictive behavior 
(e.g. gambling) (Geier, Pauli, & Mucha, 2000; Mucha, Geier, Stuhlinger, & Mundle, 2000; 
Potenza et al., 2003). The increased reaction to addiction-related cues is termed cue reactivity 
and is critical in explaining a range of behaviors related to addictive disorders, such as arousal 
increase, attentional bias, craving, and relapse (A. Beck et al., 2012; Anne Beck et al., 2009; 
Carter & Tiffany, 1999; Field, Munafò, & Franken, 2009; Goudriaan et al., 2010; Heinz, Beck, 
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Grüsser, Grace, & Wrase, 2009; Heinz et al., 2003; Leyton & Vezina, 2012, 2013; Schacht et 
al., 2013; Wölfling et al., 2011). 
Treatment of addictive disorders focuses on identifying the individual cues that induce craving 
for the addictive behavior (Bowen et al., 2014; Courtney, Schacht, Hutchison, Roche, & Ray, 
2016; Turner, Welches, & Conti, 2014). Impaired decision making, like reduced loss aversion 
in addictive disorders, may in fact be driven or exacerbated by addiction-related cues. Cue-
induced changes in ongoing instrumental behaviors are termed Pavlovian-to-Instrumental 
Transfer (PIT) effects (Cartoni, Balleine, & Baldassarre, 2016; Genauck, Huys, Heinz, & Rapp, 
2013). However, while there are already several studies that have shown an increased effect of 
contextual cues on instrumental behavior in substance use disorders (Corbit & Janak, 2007, 
2016; Corbit, Nie, & Janak, 2012; Garbusow et al., 2016; Krank, O’Neill, Squarey, & Jacob, 
2008; Schad et al., 2018), there are few studies that have investigated how specific categories 
of cues influence value-based decisions in GD subjects, and, as of current knowledge, none 
which have investigated PIT in GD in the context of loss aversion. This is surprising because 
loss aversion reflects a cardinal symptom of addiction, namely an impairment in anticipating 
the negative consequences of the addictive behavior. Having a thorough understanding of what 
may decrease loss aversion in addicted patients could help us improve diagnosis, identify 
patients at risk for relapse and improve therapy. Further, investigating PIT and loss aversion in 
gambling disorder on neural level, allows us to separate brain changes that are behaviorally 
derived from those that are due to substance abuse. Hence, in the current dissertation, three 
original papers will be summarized that investigate loss aversion and its neural underpinnings 
in GD and AD, as well as the PIT effect on loss aversion in GD on behavioral and neural levels. 
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BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Impaired decision-making in addictive disorders 
In line with the theories of addiction describing addiction as a disorder of increased impulsivity 
and impaired functioning of the reflective system (Bechara, 2005; Goldstein & Volkow, 2011), 
GD and AD subjects both show increased delay discounting (devaluing rewards in the future 
compared to immediate rewards) (Bernhardt et al., 2017; Bobova, Finn, Rickert, & Lucas, 
2009; Wiehler & Peters, 2015) and both make riskier choices on the Iowa Gambling Task (a 
more complex risk-taking task) (Barry & Petry, 2008; Wiehler & Peters, 2015). To further 
investigate risk-taking behavior and its neural correlates in behavioral addictions compared to 
substance use disorders (SUDs), such as AD, it has been proposed to also investigate the loss 
aversion facet of value-based decision-making (Cocker & Winstanley, 2015). 
Loss aversion in addictive disorders 
Loss aversion is explained by a steeper slope of the linear mapping from the objective loss 
values to the subjective loss values compared to the slope of the linear mapping from the 
objective gain values to the subjective gain values (Abdellaoui et al., 2008; Tom, Fox, Trepel, 
& Poldrack, 2007; Wakker & Deneffe, 1996). In GD subjects, loss aversion seems to be 
reduced (Brevers et al., 2012; Lorains et al., 2014), but there are also studies that have found 
no mean difference in loss aversion between GD and HC subjects (Gelskov, Madsen, Ramsøy, 
& Siebner, 2016; Takeuchi et al., 2015). In AD subjects, loss aversion is also reduced 
(Bernhardt et al., 2017). On a neural level, it has been found that healthy subjects’ activity of a 
network of brain regions (dorsal and ventral striatum, (ventral) medial, and (dorso)-lateral 
prefrontal cortex, i.e. (V)MPFC and (D)LPFC, anterior cingulate cortex, i.e. ACC, orbito-
frontal cortex, i.e.  OFC, and the dopaminergic midbrain region, Fig. 1) increases with 
increasing amounts of gain involved in the gambles. Parts of this network (striatum, VMPFC, 
ventral ACC and medial OFC) showed decreasing activity with increases in loss. This parallels, 
on a neural level, the behavioral phenomenon of loss aversion (Tom et al., 2007). 
So, while there are behavioral loss aversion studies in addiction focusing on a single diagnosis, 
we conducted a neuro-behavioral loss aversion study across addiction diagnoses to improve 
our understanding of decision-making impairments in addiction. We investigated whether GD 
and AD subjects show similarly reduced loss aversion, whether loss aversion correlates with 
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addiction severity, and whether loss-related modulation of brain activity is reduced in both GD 
and AD in a network of midbrain, striatum and prefrontal areas. 
Cue reactivity in gambling disorder and alcohol use disorder 
Another family of theories postulates that addiction is a disorder of incentive sensitization 
(Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2008). In line with those, GD and AD patients show increased 
activity in a network of aforementioned brain areas when presented with addiction-related cues: 
ventral striatum (VS), amygdala, parahippocampal gyrus, prefrontal cortex (DLPFC, MPFC, 
and OFC), as well as ACC and insula (A. Beck et al., 2012; Crockford, Goodyear, Edwards, 
Quickfall, & el-Guebaly, 2005; Goudriaan et al., 2010; Heinz et al., 2009, 2004; Jasinska, Stein, 
Kaiser, Naumer, & Yalachkov, 2014; Papachristou, Nederkoorn, Giesen, & Jansen, 2014; van 
Holst, van Holstein, van den Brink, Veltman, & Goudriaan, 2012). Importantly, these areas are 
known to be involved in reward processing and decision-making. Moreover, in AD, neural cue 
reactivity has been related to subjective craving and relapse risk (A. Beck et al., 2012; Heinz 
et al., 2004), and in GD, with increased arousal and increased craving for gambling (Kushner 
et al., 2007; Meyer & Bachmann, 2011; Wölfling et al., 2011). 
Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer in substance-use-disorders 
Cue reactivity, i.e. the heightened reactivity towards addiction-related cues may actively 
change a patients’ behavior disadvantageously, because stimuli that have repeatedly been 
paired with rewards may later enhance unrelated instrumental behavior when presented in 
extinction (Holmes, Marchand, & Coutureau, 2010). Such Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer 
(PIT) effects (Cartoni et al., 2016; Genauck et al., 2013) exist in the general population 
(Prévost, Liljeholm, Tyszka, & O’Doherty, 2012; Talmi, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2008) and 
lead to real-world consequences. For example, changing the ambient music in a supermarket 
may increase sales (Areni & Kim, 1993).  
PIT experiments measure the effect of value-charged cues on instrumental behavior even 
though the cues have no objective relation to the instrumental behavior. For example, certain 
cues presented in the background of a gamble task could increase the likelihood of gamble 
acceptance or of the sensitivity to the possible gains, especially in GD subjects. In line with 
this, in animal PIT experiments, alcohol-related cues have been observed to enhance lever 
pressing and other unrelated instrumental behaviors (Corbit & Janak, 2007; Glasner, Overmier, 
& Balleine, 2005; Krank et al., 2008). Additionally, drugs of abuse seem to enhance PIT 
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effects: Using cocaine-naïve and cocaine-experienced rats, it has been observed that cocaine-
experienced rats shows stronger PIT effects even during the presentation of sucrose-associated 
cues (Saddoris, Stamatakis, & Carelli, 2011). This was mediated by a stronger PIT-related 
response in the Nucleus Accumbens (NAcc, i.e. ventral striatum, or VS). Garbusow et al. 
(2016) used a PIT task where stimuli were associated with money gains (CS+) or money losses 
(CS-) in AD and HC patients. AD patients showed stronger PIT effects on an unrelated object 
collecting task when CS+ were presented in the background. This effect was driven by AD 
patients who relapsed within three months after the scanning session and mediated by PIT-
related VS activity. 
Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer in gambling disorder 
Concerning GD, Miedl et al. (2014) studied the effect of gambling cues presented during a 
delay discounting task in problem gamblers. They observed that cues with high post-
experimental ratings for gamble craving increased delay discounting of rewards. This was, 
mediated by VS and midbrain activity, similar to the study by Garbusow et al. (2016) in AD 
subjects. This suggests that gambling-related cues may modulate the reward tracking processes 
by the VS and by the midbrain which leads to transiently more delay discounting. Miedl et al. 
(2014) suggested that this might be a neural signature of relapse risk, as was then seen in the 
study by Garbusow et al. (2016). In another study it has been observed that delay discounting 
is reduced in GD subjects if the immediate reward option was associated with a negatively 
associated stimulus (Dixon & Holton, 2009) and that it increases in natural gambling 
environments (Dixon, Jacobs, & Sanders, 2006). In the three mentioned studies the focus was 
only on gambling-related and not on other emotional cues, and there was no investigation 
concerning PIT effects on loss aversion. Further, the three mentioned studies did not compare 
their results to control groups. 
So, while GD subjects may be influenced by contextual gambling-related cues, putatively 
related to changes in dopaminergic meso-cortico-limbic functioning, we investigated whether 
GD subjects can be readily distinguished from HC subjects by neurobehavioral patterns 
associated with changes in loss aversion induced by gambling but also by other emotional cues. 
Neural underpinnings of cue-induced changes in decision-making, as measurable by functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), may be based on dopamine releases under the expectancy 
of reward resulting in a specific modulation of prefrontal functioning, enhancing attention, 
signal-to-noise ratio and eliciting stress coping mechanisms (Robbins & Arnsten, 2009). Since 
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cue reactivity in SUDs is associated with increased activity in OFC, VMPFC and amygdala 
(Jasinska et al., 2014), and since prefrontal-striatal projections form multiple feedback-loops 
(Draganski et al., 2008), it may be that cue reactivity also in GD patients changes prefrontal 
functioning, thus leading to changes in decision-making. 
The advancement of PIT research in a behavioral addiction is particularly promising because 
it allows us to disentangle the purely neuro-psychological from the substance-related effects of 
addiction. After all, increased PIT and decreased loss aversion may be consequences of 
substance abuse (Bernhardt et al., 2017), or a consequence of learning (Heinz, 2017, p. 113ff.) 
or even innate traits (Barker, Torregrossa, & Taylor, 2012). Understanding PIT in GD better 
will further allow us to better estimate relapse risk (Garbusow et al., 2016) and improve therapy 
tools to prevent relapse (Bouchard, Loranger, Giroux, Jacques, & Robillard, 2014). 
Research questions 
This dissertation aims to answer the following research questions: 
1. Is loss aversion similarly reduced in both GD and AD compared to HC?
2. Does loss aversion correlate with symptom severity in GD and AD?
3. What are the neural underpinnings of loss aversion in GD and AD?
4. Can PIT effects during a loss aversion task distinguish GD from HC subjects? If yes,
which PIT effects are most important?
5. Can the neural correlates of PIT effects during a loss aversion task distinguish GD from
HC subjects? If yes, which ones are the most important ones?
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Fig. 1: Anatomical regions involved in (affective) decision-making. Colored gray matter masks on canonical gray 
matter template (Statistical Parametric Mapping 12). A: view onto left prefrontal cortex. Dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC, i.e. Brodman Areas 8, 9, 10, 46 within middle frontal gyrus) shaded in cyan. B: View onto medial 
temporal areas: left Amygdala, right Nucleus Accumbens/Ventral Striatum (NAcc, VS). Medial prefrontal areas 
are also visible (Ventral Medial Prefrontal Cortex, VMPFC), as well as left Orbitofrontal Cortex (OFC). In analyses, 
all areas were always considered bilaterally. 
Figure produced using MRICROGL (https://www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricrogl/) 
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16306. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-16433-y  
The paper is an open access publication. The paper aimed to answer these research questions: 
1. Is loss aversion similarly reduced in both GD and AD compared to HC?
2. What are the neural underpinnings of loss aversion in GD and AD?
3. Does loss aversion correlate with symptom severity in GD and AD (the lower loss
aversion, the higher the severity)?
Introduction and Hypotheses: 
We were interested in whether loss aversion is similarly reduced in GD, a behavioral addiction, 
and AD, a substance-based addiction. Since GD and AD are both considered addictive 
disorders according to the DSM-5 we wanted to directly compare GD and AD on behavioral 
and neural level. We expected to observe reduced loss aversion in GD and AD subjects, as well 
as a correlation of loss aversion with disorder severity in both disorders. We expected an altered 
gain and loss-related modulation of neural signal in GD and AD subjects in a network of 
multiple regions of interest (ROIs, among those NAcc, DLPFC, amygdala, OFC), as well as 
certain functional connectivity changes among those ROIs (Basten, Biele, Heekeren, & 
Fiebach, 2010; Litt, Eliasmith, & Thagard, 2008).  
Methods: 
In the study, 19 GD subjects (active slot machine gamblers), 15 matched AD patients 
(detoxified, abstinent) and 17 matched healthy controls (HC) completed a loss aversion task in 
a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) setting to measure Blood-Oxygenation-
Level-Dependent (BOLD) signal during task performance. Subjects had 20€ for wagering. On 
each trial, subjects saw a mixed gamble, involving a possible gain and a possible loss 
(probability P = 0.5 each). Subjects rated how willing they were to accept the gamble (Fig. 2). 
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Figure 2: The loss aversion task. One trial is depicted. Subjects first saw a fixation cross with variable inter-trial-
interval (ITI). Subjects then saw a gamble involving a possible gain and a possible loss. Position of gain and loss 
was counterbalanced (left/right). Gain was indicated by a ‘+’ sign and loss by a ‘−’ sign. Subjects had 4s to make 
a choice between four levels of acceptance (English levels here only used for illustration; in German “ja”, “eher 
ja”, “eher nein”, “nein” were used). Directly after decision, the ITI started. If subjects failed to make a decision
within 4s, ITI started and trial was counted as missing. M… mean; CI… 95% Confidence Interval. (Figure and
caption taken from Genauck et al. (2017)) 
Analyzing the behavioral data, the dependent variable was choices (collapsed to yes versus no). 
Predictors were gain, loss, and group membership as fixed effects sources. Subjects were 
included as a source of random effects on all fixed effects, including the intercept in a 
generalized linear model with random effects as implemented in the lme4 package in R (Bates, 
Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). The group-specific fixed effect loss aversion parameter λ 
was then defined as: 
λ = −βloss/βgain 
Note that a decrease in loss aversion might arise by a unilateral decrease in loss sensitivity or 
a unilateral increase in gain sensitivity. Symptom severity scores (in AD two scales, in PG 4 
scales) were Pearson correlated with log(λ) within each group. Bootstrapped one-sided p-
values (the lower loss aversion, the higher the severity score) were computed for each 
correlation and False-Discovery-Rate corrected for multiple testing at an alpha level of 0.05 
(Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). 
Imaging analyses mirrored the behavioral analyses on a single-subject level on the predictor-
side, however with BOLD response as dependent variable per voxel. Second-level analysis was 
then focused on group differences in neural gain and loss sensitivity and, exploratively, on 
respective functional connectivity group differences (McLaren, Ries, Xu, & Johnson, 2012) in 
the meso-cortico-limbic network of the brain. 
Results: 
The HC group showed a fixed effect of λ of 1.89 (AD group: 1.23, GD group: 1.09). HC’s loss 
aversion was significantly greater than that of both GD and AD (HC > GD, pboot = 0.014; 
HC > AD, pboot = 0.042). GD and AD did not differ in loss aversion (GD > AD, pboot = 0.636, 
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power assuming observed effect is true: 9.6%; power assuming GD and AD differ like HC and 
GD: 92.5%). Both GD and AD patients showed reduced loss aversion due to reduced 
behavioral loss sensitivity while behavioral gain sensitivity was not different compared to HC 
subjects in both groups. In GD subjects log(λ) correlated significantly with the gamblers beliefs 
questionnaire score, r = −0.63, pboot,FDR = 0.030. No such correlation was observed in AD. 
Neural sensitivity to loss differed between groups. With rising losses, HC subjects showed a 
stronger reduction of activity in the right DLPFC than did AD patients at voxel [48,49,5], 
(DLPFC, BA46), pFWE = 0.001, t = 5.47, p < 0.001, pFWE = 0.040, k = 713. Post-hoc T-Tests 
comparing HC and GD, as well as GD and AD, yielded no correctable results. There were no 
significant group differences in neural gain sensitivity. In exploratory analyses, GD subjects 
showed a stronger gain-related functional connectivity from left amygdala to left posterior 
OFC, [−29 14 –20], pFWE = 0.017, k = 12, meaning that with rising gains correlation of the 
BOLD signal between amygdala and OFC increased in GD subjects more strongly than in HC 
subjects. In GD subjects we found that loss-related functional connectivity from left amygdala 
to VMPFC was weaker in GD subjects than in HC subjects, [−1 56 –6], pFWE = 0.024, k = 44, 
meaning that with rising losses correlation of the BOLD signal between amygdala and VMPFC 
increased in HC subjects more strongly than in GD subjects. 
Discussion and Conclusion: 
Loss aversion was reduced in both GD and AD subjects. This reduction was due to reduced 
behavioral loss sensitivity. AD subjects showed altered loss-related DLPFC reactivity. GD 
subjects showed enhanced gain-related amygdala-OFC connectivity, and reduced loss-related 
amygdala-VMPFC. The neural differences to HC subjects might reflect disturbed cost-benefit 
calculations when assessing gambles in both groups. Loss aversion correlated with symptom 
severity only in GD. Accordingly, the increase of loss aversion has been related to GD therapy 
status (Brevers et al., 2012; Giorgetta et al., 2014). The used task and its neural correlates may 
thus prove valuable for diagnosis and computerized treatment of GD (Wiers et al., 2014). 
Concerning our research questions, loss aversion is indeed similarly reduced in GD and AD. 
However, loss aversion correlates with symptom severity only in GD. In AD, altered DLPFC 
functioning seems to be the underpinning of reduced loss aversion, while in GD this seems to 
be altered limbic-prefrontal functional connectivity. This challenges the notion of complete 
neuro-behavioral congruence of substance-use disorders and behavioral addictions. 
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Paper II 
Genauck, A., Andrejevic, M., Brehm, K., Matthis, C., Heinz, A., Weinreich, A., Kathmann, 
N., Romanczuk-Seiferth, N. (2019). Cue-induced effects on decision-making distinguish 
subjects with gambling disorder from healthy controls. Addiction Biology (in press). 
https://doi.org/10.1111/adb.12841   
This paper is an open-access publication and aims at answering the following research question 
of my dissertation: 
4. Can PIT effects during a loss aversion task distinguish GD from HC subjects? If yes,
which PIT effects are most important?
Introduction and Hypotheses: 
Substance-based addictive disorders have repeatedly been associated with an increase in the 
effect that Pavlovian conditioned stimuli exert on instrumental behavior (i.e. increase in 
Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer, PIT). There are, however, few studies, which investigate 
this cue-dependency of decision-making in non-substance-based addictive disorders, such as 
gambling disorder (GD). We expected that a decrease in loss aversion when gambling cues 
were shown in the background of a gambling task would distinguish GD from HC subjects.  
Methods: 
30 GD subjects and 30 matched HC subjects were included in the study. Subjects completed a 
loss aversion task using mixed gambles, i.e. gambles entailing both possible gain and loss on a 
computer screen. Concurrently, we showed gambling and other emotional cues in the 
background of the gambles (Fig. 3, affective loss aversion task). We classified subjects based 
on patterns in the choice data. We designed an algorithm that selects, via nested cross-
validation (Arlot & Celisse, 2010) and regularization (Zou & Hastie, 2005), among multiple 
possible decision-making models entailing loss aversion and its modulation by cue categories. 
We used cross-validation and validation on an independent second sample to assess the 
generalization power of the algorithm. 
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Figure 3: The affective loss aversion task. One trial is depicted. A: behavioral sample. B: fMRI validation sample 
(see also Paper III). Subjects first saw a fixation cross with varying inter-trial-interval (ITI, 2.5s to 5.5s, up to 8s in 
fMRI version; not displayed here). Subjects then saw a cue with different affective content (67 of 67 gambling 
related, 45 of 31 with positive consequences of abstinence, 45 of 31 with negative consequences of gambling, 
45 of 24 neutral images) for about 4s. Subjects were instructed to remember the cue for a paid recognition task 
after all trials.  Then a gamble involving a possible gain and a possible loss was superimposed on the cue. Subjects 
were instructed to shift their attention at this point to the proposed gamble and evaluate it. In the current 
example, a coin toss gamble was offered, where the subject could win 32 Euros or lose 11 Euros (50/50 
probability). Position of gain and loss was counterbalanced (left/right). Gain was indicated by a '+' sign and loss 
by a '-' sign. In the behavioral sample, subjects had 4s to make a choice between four levels of acceptance (yes, 
somewhat yes, somewhat no, no; here translated from German version that used “ja, eher ja, eher nein, nein”). 
In the fMRI sample, subjects had to wait 4s (jittered) before the response options were shown. Direction of 
options (from left to right or vice versa) was random. Directly after decision, the ITI started. If subjects failed to 
decide within 4s (in fMRI study, 2.5s), ITI started and trial was counted as missing. ca.: circa, RT: reaction time; 
Note that in Paper II and Paper III that task is called affective mixed gamble task for consistency reasons. (Figure 
and caption adapted from Fig. 1 in Genauck et al. (in press)) 
Results: 
The classification algorithm yielded an area under the receiver-operating curve (AUC-ROC) 
of 68.9% (pboot = 0.002) (Fig. 4B). The most often selected model was the “acceptance rate per 
category” model (90.7% of the rounds). On 95.8% of the rounds a model was selected that 
incorporated PIT, i.e. an effect of cue category on decisions, on 9.3% loss aversion was 
involved (when adjusting for cue repetition and cue category this number climbed to about 
48%). The algorithm never chose a model that incorporated the shift in loss aversion per 
category and loss aversion shifts due to category did not differ between groups. GD subjects 
showed significantly higher acceptance rate during gambling cues than HC subjects (HC: 49%, 
GD: 68%, pWaldApprox = 0.003). Validating the estimated classifier in the independent sample, 
the classifier yielded an AUC-ROC of 65.0% (pboot = 0.047). 
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Figure 4: Behavioral results. A: Empirical mean acceptance rate with 95% CI’s. Means were computed over 
subjects’ means in the categories. Mean acceptance rate was significantly higher in GD subjects during gambling 
stimuli (p = 0.004). CIs are bootstrapped from category means of subjects. B: Assessment of AUC-ROC of 
classifier: Plot shows density estimates of the area under the receiver-operating curve when running the baseline 
classifier (red) / the full classifier (turquoise) 1000 times to predict the class label of 60 subjects. The green line 
shows the mean AUC performance of the estimated classifier across CV rounds. C: Classifier validation on fMRI 
sample. Plot shows the estimated density of AUC-ROC under random classification. The green line shows the 
performance of the combined 1000 classifiers on the behavioral data of the fMRI study. D: Winning model for 
classification. Standardized regression parameters and their confidence intervals (percentiles of distribution 
estimated across model estimation rounds). The algorithm mainly used the shift in acceptance rate in response 
to gambling cues in order to detect GD subjects.  (Figure and caption adapted from Fig. 2 in Genauck et al. (in 
press)) 
Discussion and Conclusion: 
Our results suggest that in GD subjects gambling cues facilitate gambling when GD subjects 
face mixed gambles. PIT in the context of an affective loss aversion task seems thus 
characteristic for GD compared to matched HC subjects. However, we did not observe that 
cues specifically shift loss aversion. We saw that gambling cues especially lead to increased 
gambling. To our knowledge this is the first study using machine learning and out-of-sample 
validation to test the relevance of PIT effects in GD. 
Concerning the research questions in this dissertation thesis, PIT effects indeed characterize 
gambling disorder and it is the presence of gambling stimuli that exert a facilitating effect on 
gamble decisions in GD subjects. However, it is not the shift of loss aversion that is relevant 
but the shift of overall gamble acceptance. In a further study, we have focused on testing 
16 | D i s s e r t a t i o n s s c h r i f t  A .  G e n a u c k  
whether also the neural underpinnings of PIT during a loss aversion task in GD lend themselves 
to classify GD versus HC subjects (see Paper III).   
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Paper III 
Genauck, A., Matthis, C., Andrejevic, M., Ballon, L., Chiarello, F., Duecker, K., Heinz, A., 
Kathmann, N., Romanczuk-Seiferth, N. (2018). Neural correlates of cue-induced changes in 
decision-making distinguish subjects with gambling disorder from healthy controls. BioRxiv, 
498725. https://doi.org/10.1101/498725 (abridged version under review at Addiction Biology 
and attached to this synopsis) 
This is an open access pre-print publication and it treats the following research question: 
5. Can the neural correlates of PIT effects during a loss aversion task distinguish GD from
HC subjects? If yes, which are those?
Introduction and hypotheses:  
Both substance use disorders (SUD) and gambling disorder (GD) feature an increase in cue-
dependent decision-making (Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer, PIT). PIT studies in SUD as 
well as in healthy subjects have shown that this modulatory effect is associated with altered 
communication between Nucleus Accumbens (NAcc), amygdala, and prefrontal areas, such as 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether these neural correlates are 
related to the neurotropic effects of substance abuse, or rather related to learning processes 
and/or other determinative factors like congenital traits inherent to addiction. We have hence 
examined whether network activation patterns during a PIT task are also altered in GD, an 
addictive disorder not comprising substance abuse. We hypothesized that a neural PIT pattern 
could distinguish GD from HC subjects. Testing this hypothesis improves our comprehension 
of the neural processes linked to GD and of addiction-related PIT in general. 
Methods: 
We tested 30 GD and 30 HC subjects who performed an affective loss aversion task in a 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner (Fig. 3B). Gambling and other 
affective cues were presented in the screen’s background along task trials, enabling us to record 
multivariate neural PIT signatures concentrating on a network of NAcc, amygdala and OFC 
(Garbusow et al., 2016; Litt et al., 2008; Prévost et al., 2012; Talmi et al., 2008). Using cross-
validated elastic net regression (Whelan et al., 2014), we trained a classifier on these neural 
PIT signatures (Fig. 5). The PIT contrasts reflected fMRI signals that correlated with 
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acceptance of gambles modulated by cue category in the background (Garbusow et al., 2016; 
Schad et al., 2018). 
Figure 5: Classifier building algorithm with cross-validation (CV) to estimate generalization error. Nested CV 
was used for tuning the hyperparameters of the elastic net regression (Varma & Simon, 2006; Zou & Hastie, 
2005). This was done repeatedly with different nested CV folds (10 times, 10-fold nested CV) to estimate a robust 
mean model within each repetition of classifier estimation. (Figure and caption taken from Genauck et al. (2019)) 
Results: 
As expected, and as seen in Paper II, GD subjects exhibited stronger PIT than HC subjects, as 
they demonstrated a greater increase in acceptance of gamble offers when gambling cues were 
presented in the background (GD subjects, ∆% = 44; HC subjects, ∆% = -8, pWald = 0.003). 
Classification based on neural PIT signatures produced a significant AUC-ROC of 0.70 (p = 
0.013). The most important predictor was negative-cues-PIT-related functional connectivity 
from amygdala to anterior OFC, with a negative sign (Fig. 6). This means, for any given subject 
it holds that the stronger not accepting gambles is associated with increase in correlation 
between amygdala and anterior OFC during presentation of negative cues, the less likely that 
subject is a GD person (but rather is a HC subject). In other words, GD subjects showed lower 
such functional connectivity than HC. The next top three predictors were gambling-cues-
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related functional connectivity from NAcc to amygdala (positive sign), positive-cues-related 
functional connectivity from amygdala to lateral OFC (positive sign). 
Figure 6: Estimated predictor importance. Points and quantiles are estimated predictor importances, a = Cov(X) 
* w (where Cov(X) is the covariance matrix of predictors and w the weight vector, (Haufe et al., 2014)) with 95%-
quantiles over 1000 classifier estimation rounds. The larger the absolute size of predictor importance the
stronger the predictor adds to distinguishing HC from GD in the classifier. Colored bars show t-values of simple
between-group t-tests (GD>HD). Significant t-tests are highlighted (Welch-test, p < 0.05, two-sided).
Delimitations are at 1.96 and -1.96 to mark points of statistical significance for t-test. Importance values/t-values
are grouped by the kind of fMRI predictor: cue reactivity related, PIT related, Psychological-physiological-
interaction (i.e. PPI) related. PPIs are further grouped by seed region and target extraction (e.g. “to OFC”). PIT: 
pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer; OFC: orbital frontal cortex; AOFC, LOFC, POFC, MOFC: anterior, lateral, 
posterior, medial orbital frontal cortex; R: right (Figure and caption taken from Genauck et al. (2019)) 
Discussion and Conclusion: 
Concerning the initial research questions for Paper III, GD and HC subjects are indeed 
discriminable by PIT-related neural signatures comprising, among others, of amygdala-NAcc-
OFC functional connectivity. To our knowledge, this is the first study to use machine learning 
and cross-validation to test whether neural correlates of PIT may classify GD versus HC 
subjects. These results propose that neural PIT signatures in addiction do not have to depend 
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on the neurotropic effects of substance abuse, but on learning processes or perhaps on 
congenital neural markers. 
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DISCUSSION 
The articles summarized here set out to answer research questions concerning neural-
behavioral disturbances related to decision-making and cue-induced changes in decision-
making across behavioral and substance-based addiction. In Paper I, we saw that reduced loss 
aversion is a common trait for both a substance-based addictive disorder (alcohol use disorder, 
AD) and a behavioral addictive disorder (gambling disorder, GD). We observed that the neural 
correlates of reduced loss aversion seem to be different in GD and AD. In Paper II, we further 
observed that transient changes in decision-making due to addiction-related cues during a loss 
aversion task characterize GD subjects compared to HC. In Paper III, concluded that neural 
correlates of PIT in a network between amygdala, NAcc, and OFC lend themselves to classify 
GD and HC subjects. Cue-induced changes in decision-making hence seem to be a trait of GD 
just as they are of substance-based addiction.  
Loss aversion 
In Paper I, loss aversion was reduced in both GD and AD subjects. In both groups, this reduced 
loss aversion was due to loss sensitivity, not gain sensitivity. Note that so far, no study in the 
field of loss aversion in GD and AD has reported gain and loss sensitivity separately (Bernhardt 
et al., 2017; Brevers et al., 2012; Gelskov et al., 2016; Lorains et al., 2014; Takeuchi et al., 
2015). Our study thus offers a more complete description of the basis of reduced loss aversion 
in addiction. Reduced DLPFC activity was observed in HC subjects when faced with increasing 
losses while the opposite was observed in AD subjects. AD subjects thus appeared to allocate 
more executive resources for the option selection task when gambles were associated with 
higher and higher possible loss (Elliott, 2003). In line with this, DLPFC has been observed to 
be a helpful target region in transcranial direct current stimulation in AD subjects (da Silva et 
al., 2013). GD subjects did not significantly differ from HC subjects in their DLPFC activity. 
In that sense, AD and GD seem to differ. However, direct comparison of GD and AD subjects 
failed to reach significance. Future studies should readdress this direct comparison with larger 
samples. GD subjects showed a correlation of reduced loss aversion with gamblers beliefs, i.e. 
cognitive distortions associated with gambling. AD subjects did not show correlation with AD 
severity scores. Given that another study using a much larger sample of AD versus HC subjects 
also did not find a correlation of loss aversion and addiction severity, it may be that loss 
aversion is a behavioural feature more relevant to GD (Bernhardt et al., 2017). 
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Only GD subjects showed altered neural functional connectivity. They showed a stronger gain-
related functional connectivity from amygdala to posterior OFC compared to HC. According 
to the ANDREA model (Litt et al., 2008), this may mean that amygdala enhances the 
representation of gain values in the OFC, the larger the possible gain. This could lead to 
decreased loss aversion because losses are becoming less salient with gains increasing. We 
further saw that the functional loss-related connectivity between amygdala and VMPFC 
(Basten et al., 2010) was stronger in HC subjects than in GD subjects. This perhaps points to 
decreased production of loss-related salience signals in GD subjects, possibly disturbing proper 
cost benefit evaluation. Our results support the notion that GD might be associated with 
changes in task-relevant communication between brain areas of the reward system (Peters, 
Peper, Van Duijvenvoorde, Braams, & Crone, 2017; van Holst, Chase, & Clark, 2014). 
Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer Effects 
For eliciting Pavlovian-to-Instrumental-Transfer (PIT) effects, we used three different 
experimental cue conditions: images that are commonly used to advertise for gambling or show 
gambling situations, images of positive effects of gambling abstinence, and images of negative 
effects of protracted gambling. GD subjects gambled more during the presentation of gambling 
cues in the background of a gamble task which distinguished them from HC subjects. This 
relates to findings in AD and cocaine dependence studies where subjects show an increase in 
drug-cues-elicited PIT (Corbit & Janak, 2007; Saddoris et al., 2011). Note, however, that there 
have also been other results, where AD subjects showed a decrease in instrumental behavior 
when presented with alcohol stimuli (Schad et al., 2018). The important difference between the 
study by Schad et al. (2018) and Paper II is that in the latter GD subjects were active gamblers 
and in the former AD subjects were recently detoxified patients with a wish to stay abstinent. 
In the study by Schad et al. (2018), drug cues were putatively seen as unpleasant having a 
negative effect on ongoing instrumental behavior, probably as a protective factor in the desire 
to generally avoid alcohol and any behavior related to it. In Paper II, negative-cue-related and 
positive-cue-related PIT contributed also to the trained classifier to discriminate GD from HC. 
This underlines that PIT across multiple salient cue categories is relevant for characterizing 
addicted subjects (Garbusow et al., 2016) and that multiple cue categories can contribute to 
relapse risk. 
When trying to classify subjects, our algorithm most often chose the acceptance-per-category 
model (ac), preferring it to detect GD subjects in independent test subjects. We saw that mainly 
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increased gambling when faced with gambling cues was indicative of the subject belonging to 
the GD group. Contrary to what we expected, the algorithm did not select a model that included 
the modulation of gain and loss sensitivity by cue categories, i.e. changes in loss aversion in 
response to cue categories. We also did not see significant differences in gain (or loss) 
sensitivity-by-cue interactions in univariate group comparisons. The algorithm only sometimes 
selected models that assessed overall loss aversion parameters, again plus a category-dependent 
shift with respect to cue categories. Hence, the mere shift of gamble acceptance during the 
presentation of gamble cues best distinguishes GD and HC subjects during an affective loss 
aversion task. 
Neural correlates of the Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer effects 
On a neural level, we used an elastic net regression algorithm on fMRI data to build a logistic 
regression classifier. Our results show that neural PIT patterns, based on SUD/PIT literature 
and recorded during an affective loss aversion task, hold information that allows us to classify 
new subjects into GD and HC, with cross-validation performance of AUC-ROC = 0.70. This 
is a similar classification performance on out-of sample data to that seen in other studies using 
MRI data for classification in the field of addictive disorders and basic neuroscience research 
(Guggenmos et al., 2018; Pariyadath, Stein, & Ross, 2014; Seo et al., 2018, 2015; Whelan et 
al., 2014). 
Exploratively, we saw that GD subjects showed weaker negative-cues-related but stronger 
gambling-cues-related functional connectivity between amygdala and OFC (Litt et al., 2008). 
This may mean that GD subjects do not profit as much from the inhibiting effects of negative 
cues mediated by a amygdala-OFC connectivity, while gambling cues lead to an increase in 
gambling via a NAcc-amygdala and amygdala-OFC connectivity. Moreover, note that the 
classifier assigned significant predictor importance to multiple other functional fMRI signals 
related to cue reactivity, but especially PIT, within a network of NAcc, amygdala and OFC.  
It has been observed already that the NAcc/VS region in GD subjects is characterized by altered 
structure (Koehler, Hasselmann, Wüstenberg, Heinz, & Romanczuk-Seiferth, 2015) and 
function (Koehler et al., 2013; Linnet, Peterson, Doudet, Gjedde, & Møller, 2010; Miedl et al., 
2014; Reuter et al., 2005; Romanczuk-Seiferth, Koehler, Dreesen, Wüstenberg, & Heinz, 
2015). The same is true for amygdala’s structure (Elman et al., 2012; Takeuchi et al., 2019, 
2017) and function (Genauck et al., 2017), as well as for OFC’s structure (Li et al., 2018) and 
function (Cavedini, Riboldi, Keller, D’Annucci, & Bellodi, 2002; Goudriaan et al., 2010). Our 
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study adds to these findings by considering the functions of these structures concurrently and 
in a network. 
To our knowledge, Paper III describes the first study to use fMRI classification for 
investigating a behavioral addiction, namely GD, and the disorder’s neural basis of increased 
PIT. We have observed that it is possible to characterize a non-substance related addiction to a 
considerable degree by a single neuro-functional signature, namely a neural PIT signature in a 
network of amygdala, NAcc and OFC, derived from PIT and SUD literature. This implies that 
addictive disorders in general may be associated with PIT-related neural changes, independent 
of a substance of abuse. This means that neural PIT changes may be a product of addiction-
related learning (Heinz, 2017, p. 113ff.) and neural plasticity or even of an innate trait (Barker 
et al., 2012). 
Strengths and Limitations 
The main strength of Paper I is that it is the first paper to compare a substance-based and a 
non-substance-based disorder with respect to clinically relevant decision-making parameters 
on behavioral and neural levels. However, the small sample sizes and the fact we tested only 
males warrants pertinent replication studies. 
The main strength of Paper II is that it rigorously tested a wide model space to check which 
modeling of loss aversion and PIT, best differentiates between GD and matched HC. Paper II 
has established that PIT, in the context of mixed gambles, is relevant to characterize GD. 
Moreover, we do not know of any study which has investigated the importance of behavioral 
PIT effects in classifying addicted subjects using out-of-sample prediction. 
The main strength of Paper III is that we have used a classification approach to assess the 
usefulness of known neural PIT contrasts to characterize GD in out-of sample data (being the 
first such study, to our knowledge). Our results, therefore, have not only explanatory value in 
elucidating the basis of increased PIT in GD, but also predictive value, given that they are 
likely to be found in new samples of GD and matched HC subjects (Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017). 
However, in machine learning, small and homogeneous samples (by design but also by 
selection bias) lead to simpler classifiers because more subtle effects do not have enough data 
to support them. Hence, the modulation of loss aversion by cues might after all play some role 
in distinguishing GD from HC given a larger and less homogeneous GD-HC data set. 
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Outlook and conclusion 
Clinical implications 
We saw that reduced loss aversion and PIT may well be learned effects and not necessarily 
related to the effects of substance abuse. This is also a hopeful message, because therapy based 
on re-learning through practice can then be particularly fruitful in GD and addictive disorders 
in general (Rezapour, DeVito, Sofuoglu, & Ekhtiari, 2016). GD and AD patients may learn to 
focus more consciously on the gains and losses of their decisions, understand about the 
automaticity of their decisions and practice to make more advantageous decisions even under 
stressful or cued situations. However, our results cannot rule out that increased PIT is an innate 
trait (Barker et al., 2012). While there is some evidence that reduced loss aversion is rather a 
consequence of at least AD rather than a predisposition (Bernhardt et al., 2017), for GD 
longitudinal studies are needed, (Seo et al., 2018; Whelan et al., 2014). 
Directions of further studies 
In future studies, it will be important to understand if decreased loss aversion and increased 
PIT effects are common to all addictive disorders. For such studies, bigger sample sizes with 
more subtypes of addicted subjects are needed (Lorains et al., 2014; Milosevic & Ledgerwood, 
2010). More variance in covariates (gender, smoking, comorbidity, age, education etc.) should 
be allowed. The question would be: if loss aversion and PIT effects vary with respect to those 
covariates and subtypes. Classification problems could be formulated with regards to 
diagnosis, assignment to treatment, prediction of treatment success, and prediction of relapse. 
New longitudinal studies, like e.g. the IMAGEN study (Whelan et al., 2014), should include 
PIT and loss aversion tasks to elucidate whether they are risk markers for developing an 
addictive disorder aside of e.g. personality markers such as extraversion and neuroticism (Seo 
et al., 2018). 
Final summary and conclusion 
We have observed that AD and GD subjects show similarly reduced loss aversion. Both groups, 
however, show different neural correlates of this reduced loss aversion: While AD subjects 
show different functional activity in DLFPC compared to HC, GD subjects show different 
amygdala-OFC and amygdala-VMPFC connectivity. GD subjects further show increased PIT 
with respect to gambling cues during an affective loss aversion task. On a neural level, GD 
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subjects can be distinguished from HC subjects by neural correlates of PIT in a network of 
amygdala, NAcc, and OFC. Since we have investigated GD, our results suggest that reduced 
loss aversion and increased PIT, two phenomena related to addiction, are not dependent on a 
substance of abuse but rather are learned characteristics or predisposing traits of addictive 
disorders. 
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Reduced loss aversion in 
pathological gambling and alcohol 
dependence is associated with 
differential alterations in amygdala 
and prefrontal functioning
Alexander Genauck  1,2, Saskia Quester1,3, Torsten Wüstenberg1, Chantal Mörsen1, Andreas 
Heinz1 & Nina Romanczuk-Seiferth  1
Diagnostic criteria for pathological gambling and alcohol dependence (AD) include repeated addictive 
behavior despite severe negative consequences. However, the concept of loss aversion (LA) as a 
facet of value-based decision making has not yet been used to directly compare these disorders. We 
hypothesized reduced LA in pathological gamblers (PG) and AD patients, correlation of LA with disorder 
severity, and reduced loss-related modulation of brain activity. 19 PG subjects, 15 AD patients and 17 
healthy controls (HC) engaged in a LA task in a functional magnetic resonance imaging setting. Imaging 
analyses focused on neural gain and loss sensitivity in the meso-cortico-limbic network of the brain. 
Both PG and AD subjects showed reduced LA. AD subjects showed altered loss-related modulation of 
activity in lateral prefrontal regions. PG subjects showed indication of altered amygdala-prefrontal 
functional connectivity. Although we observed reduced LA in both a behavioral addiction and a 
substance-related disorder our neural findings might challenge the notion of complete neuro-behavioral 
congruence of substance-use disorders and behavioral addictions.
Value-based decisions are ubiquitous in every-day life. They can be anything from short-term and mundane (tea 
or coffee) to long-term and life changing (law or medical school). In all of these decisions we need to incorpo-
rate magnitude, delay and probability of possible rewards and losses to compute subjective values of the availa-
ble options1. Several psychiatric disorders have been linked to altered neurobehavioral processes of value-based 
decision-making2–5. Pathological gambling (PG) and alcohol dependence (AD) have been classified as addictive 
disorders alongside each other in the DSM-5 because they show similar neurobehavioral patterns and impair-
ments when performing value-based decision-making tasks and because they show similar clinical symptoms 
(e.g. craving, tolerance, loss of control)6–9. Diagnostic criteria of PG and AD also overlap when it comes to the 
core features of both disorders. These include reduced aversion against negative consequences of the addictive 
behavior. Accordingly, loss aversion (LA), a form of magnitude discounting in value-based decision-making, 
might be affected in both PG and AD. However, to our knowledge, LA has not yet been concurrently investigated 
and directly compared in these disorders.
LA is the tendency to be more sensitive to the magnitude of possible losses than possible gains when facing 
mixed gambles10. In the case of a mixed gamble having exactly one possible gain outcome with probability 0.5 and 
one possible loss outcome with probability 0.5 (e.g. a coin toss gamble), healthy subjects usually need to be offered 
a possible gain which is at least double the size of the possible loss before they agree to gamble11.
Reduced LA in PG subjects has been observed before12–14. Yet, our study is the first to investigate the neu-
ral basis of differences in LA between PG, AD and HC subjects by investigating differences in behavioral and 
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neural sensitivity to possible gains and losses during the decision-making process. Further, we are not aware of 
any studies investigating LA in AD subjects. However, there have been studies in other substance-use-disorder 
(SUD) samples (e.g. cocaine and cannabis dependent subjects) which found mostly reduced LA15–19]. Yet, these 
studies have not reported which differences in behavioral and neural gain and loss sensitivity were the basis for 
differences in LA. In the current study, we expect reduced LA in both PG and AD. This decrease in LA may be 
due to decrease in behavioral loss sensitivity and/or increase in behavioral gain sensitivity. We further expect that 
different levels of LA are correlated with different levels of PG and AD symptom severity. This is because other 
facets of value-based decision-making, namely delay and probability discounting, have been found correlated 
with PG and AD symptom severity20–22.
LA differences have so far been mostly attributed to differences in neural loss sensitivity in cortical and 
limbic areas23–26, which we expect to see as well. In that vein, it has been suggested that possible losses pro-
duce a cost signal in dorso-lateral-prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) enhancing the representation of loss values 
in orbitofrontal-cortex27. In line with this, the DLPFC has been implicated as necessary for avoiding risky 
choices28,29. In healthy subjects, DLPFC and the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) have been found cor-
related with a cost-benefit signal in an fMRI study30. The two areas seemed to be most active if gains were sub-
jectively larger than gains and least active when losses were subjectively bigger than gains. According to this, we 
hypothesize: With increasing losses HC subjects should show stronger decrease in DLPFC activity than both PG 
and AD subjects.
LA studies in healthy subjects have observed that apart from DLPFC a whole network of brain areas is increas-
ing activity with gains and decreasing activity with losses25,31. Studies on reward anticipation in PG and AD 
additionally suggest altered striatal functioning for explaining reduced LA in PG and AD subjects32–37. Studies 
on factors influencing LA, such as focal brain damage23, sleep deprivation24, emotion regulation38 and modu-
lation39, as well as studies on cognitive control40,41 imply additional brain areas for explaining inter-individual 
differences in LA. We thus test for altered Blood-Oxygenation-Level-Dependent (BOLD) reactivity in PG and 
AD subjects with respect to both gains and losses in a LA network of interest (NOI) encompassing the regions of 
interest (ROIs) DLPFC, ventro-lateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), orbito-frontal cortex (OFC), amygdala, insula, 
VMPFC, striatum, midbrain, and dorsal raphe nucleus (DRN).
Materials and Methods
Loss aversion task. We used an established task to measure LA31. Subjects were each told that they had 20€ 
for wagering. On every trial, subjects were presented with a mixed gamble, involving a possible gain and a pos-
sible loss with probability P = 0.5 each. Subjects were asked to indicate willingness to accept the gamble (Fig. 1). 
Gambles were created by randomly drawing with replacement from a matrix with possible gambles consisting of 
12 levels of gains (14, 16, …, 36) and 12 levels of losses (−7, −8, …, −18). This matrix is apt to elicit LA in healthy 
subjects31. 144 gambles were presented. We informed subjects that after the scanning session five of their gamble 
decisions with ratings of “rather yes” or “yes” would be randomly chosen and played for real money.
Sample. Subjects had to be male, right-handed, and eligible for fMRI scanning. AD patients were diagnosed 
by a psychiatrist according to ICD-10 and DSM-IV criteria. The psychiatrist confirmed that AD patients did not 
fulfill the criteria for PG. AD patients were recruited from an in-patient detoxification ward. AD detoxification 
took place on average 42 days before scanning (CIboot95% = [28, 60]). PG subjects were recruited via internet adver-
tisement and notices in casinos. PG subjects were diagnosed using the German short questionnaire for gambling 
behavior (KFG)42 by a trained psychologist (SQ). Otherwise, any known history of a neurological disorder or 
a current psychological disorder (except alcohol abuse for the AD group and tobacco dependence for all three 
groups) as assessed by the screening of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-I) 
lead to exclusion from the study. PG subjects additionally completed the Yale Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale 
adapted for PG (PGYBOCS) to measure severity of gambling behavior over a recent time interval43, as well as 
Figure 1. The loss aversion task31. One trial is depicted. Subjects first saw a fixation cross with variable inter-
trial-interval (ITI). Subjects then saw a gamble involving a possible gain and a possible loss. Position of gain 
and loss was counterbalanced (left/right). Gain was indicated by a ‘+’ sign and loss by a ‘−’ sign. Subjects had 
4s to make a choice between four levels of acceptance (English levels here only used for illustration; in German 
“ja”, “eher ja”, “eher nein”, “nein” were used). Directly after decision, the ITI started. If subjects failed to make a 
decision within 4s, ITI started and trial was counted as missing. M… mean; CI… 95% Confidence Interval.
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the Gambling Symptom Assessment Scale (G-SAS)44 as another symptom severity scale. AD patients completed 
the Alcohol Dependence Scale (ADS) as a severity measure45 and the Obsessive Compulsive Drinking Scale as a 
craving measure (OCDS)46. All subjects completed the Gamblers’ Beliefs Questionnaire (GBQ) asking for belief 
in gambling persistence to achieve wins and for gambling illusions47. Symptom severity measures were chosen 
to check if the LA score relates to clinical symptom severity48. There were 6 subject dropouts (1 misunderstand-
ing of task instructions, 5 technical error). Within the group of PG subjects, 17 indicated slot machines as their 
primary gamble and 2 indicated sports betting. There was one PG subject that had a history of diagnosed alcohol 
dependency but no current alcohol dependency. For further information on administered questionnaires, see 
Supplementary Information. The final sample consisted of 19 PG, 15 AD and 17 HC subjects (Table 1).
Procedure and data acquisition. All subjects gave written informed consent. The study was conducted 
in accordance with the latest version of the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the Ethics Committee of the 
Charité - Universitätsmedizin Berlin. All subjects underwent T2*-sensitive Gradient-Echo Echo-Planar scanning 
during task completion and a T1-weighted structural scan. See Supplementary Information for further descrip-
tion of scanning sequences used.
Analysis of behavioral data. Gain and loss variables were down-sampled, yielding a 4-by-4 gamble matrix. 
Losses were used as absolute values. Gains and losses were centralized. Choices of subjects were dichotomized 
to “yes” and “no” and entered into a mixed effects logistic regression in the framework of the Generalized Linear 
Variable
Group Test Statistics
HC PG AD MAIN HC HC AD
M SD NA M SD NA M SD NA
EFFECT <> <> <>
GROUP AD PG PG
p p p p
Age 38.8 11.5 0 32.9 10 0 45.4 10.2 0 <0.01a 0.08a 0.10a <0.01a
Cigarettes per day 5.9 7.8 0 6.4 8.4 0 13.6 10.1 0 0.06b — — —
Intelligence 18.6 4.6 0 17.9 3.4 0 17.3 4.6 0 0.55b — — —
Years of education 16.3 3.4 0 14.1 3.3 0 16.6 4.7 0 0.07b — — —
Years in school 11.3 1.6 0 11 1.7 0 11.3 1.9 0 0.78b — — —
Impulsivity I 66 9 0 82 13 0 75 8 0 <0.01a 0.03a <0.01a 0.09a
Impulsivity II 59 8.8 0 73 11.1 0 66 7.3 0 <0.01a 0.03a <0.01a 0.07a
Depression 3.8 4.8 1 12.5 9 0 12.7 7.9 0 <0.01b <0.01b <0.01b 0.66b
Debt (yes/no) 5/11 — 1 14/4 — 1 9/4 — 2 0.02c 0.07c 0.01c 0.69c
Debt (euros) 01) — 6 30001) — 4 45001) — 5 <0.01b <0.01b <0.01b 0.36b
Personal income2 985 305 0 795 478 1 1033 863 0 0.36b — — —
Handedness 81.9 39.3 0 65.3 66.6 0 76 51 0 0.91b — — —
PG severity I 2.1 2.8 0 33.2 9.9 0 1.73 6.7 1 <0.01b 0.04b <0.01b <0.01b
PG severity II 2.2 2.9 0 21.2 9.4 0 0.37 1.29 0 <0.01b 0.02b <0.01b <0.01b
Gamblers beliefs 1.6 0.8 0 2.4 0.5 0 1.4 0.6 2 <0.01b 0.41b <0.01b <0.01b
PG illusions 1.6 0.8 0 2.4 0.6 0 1.4 0.6 2 <0.01b 0.50b <0.01b <0.01b
PG persistence 1.5 0.8 0 2.4 0.6 0 1.3 0.8 2 <0.01b 0.50b <0.01b <0.01b
PG craving 10.8 1.6 1 24.6 6.8 0 10.9 2.6 0 <0.01b 0.68b <0.01b <0.01b
AD craving 0.6 1.2 1 1.3 2.2 0 5.3 4.5 0 <0.01b <0.01b <0.26b <0.01b
AD severity — — — — — — 19 6.7 0 — — — —
Table 1. Differences between groups in demographic and clinical data. PG, pathological gambling; AD, 
alcohol dependence; NA, number of missing values due to technical error or refusal by subject to answer, 
replaced by median of respective group, except in Debt variables; M, mean; SD, standard deviation; Intelligence 
measured by Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale matrices test; Depression measured by Beck’s Depression 
Inventory II; Impulsivity I measured by Barrat Impulsiveness Scale 10; Impulsivity II measured by BIS-11, 
i.e. BIS-10 dropping items 19,26,27,29; Handedness measured by Edinburgh Handedness Inventory; PG 
severity I measured by Kurzfragebogen Spielsucht (short gambling questionnaire); PG severity II measured by 
Gambling Symptom Assessment Scale (G-SAS); Gamblers beliefs measured by Gamblers Beliefs Questionnaire 
(GBQ); Illusions measured by illusions subscale of GBQ; persistence measured by GBQ persistence subscale; 
PG craving measured by Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale for Pathological Gambling; AD craving 
measured by Obsessive Compulsive Drinking Scale; AD severity measured by Alcohol Dependence Scale; 
see Supplementary for references of questionnaires; ap-value of general linear model (GLM) with group as 
predictor, or p-value of respective contrast; bold: significant difference; bp-value of Kruskal-Wallis Rank Sum 
Test with group as predictor or for respective contrast; cFisher’s Exact Test for Count Data; 1)median; 2)if subject 
refused answer, household income divided by the number of persons living in the household was used; in case 
of GLM’s, assumption of normal distribution of residuals was not rejected according to Shapiro-Wilk Test. 
Assumption of equality of variances between groups was tested using Bartlett Test of Homogeneity of Variances; 
if either failed, Kruskal-Wallis Rank Sum Test test was used.
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Model using the lme4 package in R49. We chose mixed effects modeling because it yields less outlier-prone 
subject parameters. Several LA models were considered and the following one was chosen, because of good 
fit and because it allowed us to disentangle general acceptance rate, behavioral gain and loss sensitivity (see 
Supplementary Methods). Predictors were gain, loss, and group membership as fixed effects sources. Subjects 
were included as a source of random effects on all fixed effects, including the intercept. The group specific fixed 
effect LA parameter λ was then defined as:
λ β β= − / (1)loss gain
Here, βloss and βgain are the regression weights for the group specific fixed effects of behavioral gain and loss sensi-
tivity, respectively. Subjective utilities of gains and losses were assumed to increase linearly with increasing gains 
and losses11. All statistical analyses of the behavioral data were conducted using R (version: 3.2.2)50.
To test for an effect of group the LA model with group was compared with the LA model without group. A sig-
nificant effect of group was assumed if the chi-square difference test was significant (p < 0.05) and if the Aikaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) value of the model with group was lower than of the LA model without group 
as predictor. Parametrically bootstrapped p-values (pboot) for post-hoc contrasts for λ, βloss and βgain (HC > PG, 
HC > AD, PG > AD, PG < AD) were obtained by running 1000 simulations of the model without group as pre-
dictor. To test whether effects were robust against adjusting for group differences in covariates of no interest, 
the analysis procedure was repeated with age as an additional predictor51, where group and age were allowed to 
modulate the intercept, as well as βloss and βgain. Symptom severity scores (AD: ADS, OCDS; PG: KFG, PGYBOCS, 
G-SAS, GBQ) were Pearson correlated with log(λ) in PG and AD groups. In each group bootstrapped p-values 
were computed for each correlation coefficient and FDR corrected for multiple tests (2 in AD and 4 in PG) at an 
alpha level of 0.0552.
Analysis of imaging data. Imaging analyses were performed in SPM12 running on Matlab (R2014a). 
Please see Supplementary Methods for description of preprocessing of MRI data. The preprocessed fMRI 
single-subject data was modeled using a boxcar function denoting times of gamble presentation (task-on regres-
sor) and three linearly scaled task-on regressors (gain and loss parallel to behavioral analysis plus Euclidean 
distance based on aggregated gamble matrix31). Note that this model is completely in parallel with the behavioral 
model – only the dependent variable differs. In the behavioral model it is choice, in the neural model it is BOLD 
activity. The regressors were convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function, downsampled to 
match the number of EPI scans and entered into a GLM. For further details on the single-subject model, please 
see Supplementary Methods.
Contrast images for gain (“neural gain sensitivity”) and loss (“neural loss sensitivity”) of all participants were 
subjected to two separate one-way ANOVAs with group as predictor and assumption of non-equal variance 
between groups. Main effect (ME) group F-Test images were computed for gain and loss and thresholded at 
p < 0.05, minimum cluster extent k = 10. Group main effect F-test maps were then corrected for family-wise error 
(FWE) at peak level using small volume correction (SVC) with our network of interest (NOI, see Supplementary 
and online.nii file) as small volume. Note, that since the group comparison hypotheses were the same in all of the 
regions within the NOI it is the most stringent approach to perform one SVC for the whole NOI in the neural gain 
and neural loss sensitivity analysis, respectively. Then all possible one-sided post-hoc T-test images to compare 
HC, PG, AD were computed and peak-level FWE corrected using the NOI. Significant peak voxels from post-hoc 
T-tests were only considered if the FWE corrected F-Test before yielded the respective voxel also as significant.
Since gray matter density (GMD) in both AD and PG has been observed different from HC53,54, and since 
there were significant group differences in a covariate of no interest, all found group differences in post-hoc T-test 
at voxels with significant SVC correctable F-Test were checked for stability by rerunning the analyses with local 
GMD and age using robust Biological Parametric Mapping (rBPM) with Tukey’s biweight error function using 
the BPMe toolbox51,55,56 (small shifts of peak voxels within the respective ROI were allowed) (see Supplementary 
Methods).
Exploratory analyses. To further explore the neural basis of group differences in behavioral loss aversion we 
tested for functional connectivity group differences in our NOI. We computed functional connectivity maps using 
generalized psycho-physiological interaction analysis (gPPI)57,58 using seed regions according to the affective neu-
roscience of decision through reward-based evaluation of alternatives (ANDREA) model27 and the connectivity 
model by Basten et al.30. Obtained gain-related and loss-related functional connectivity parameters reflected how 
correlation of the signal between the signal of the respective seed region and all other voxels was changing with 
respect to rising gains, or losses, respectively. Connectivity maps were submitted to all possible one-sided T-tests 
comparing HC, PG, AD. Significant AD > PG or AD < PG results were only reported if in the same connectivity 
and peak voxel PG and AD also significantly differed from HC. For FWE correction we used target anatomical 
ROIs, as implied by the connectivity models (Table 2).
Connectivity maps were computed for every left and right seed region separately, except for right VS because 
of signal loss (23 maps). All target ROI FWE correction was done for left and right separately. Found group differ-
ences in functional connectivity were checked for stability against adjusting for age using ancova analysis in SPM. 
Only results are reported which survived adjustment for age.
To further explore the neural basis of the relationship of symptom severity with behavioral LA within groups, we 
correlated symptom severity (AD: ADS, OCDS; PG: KFG, PGYBOCS, G-SAS, GBQ), with neural gain sensitivity, 
neural loss sensitivity, as well as with neural loss aversion maps25,31. We used our NOI for SVC on the ensuing 
one-sample T-test maps. Neural loss aversion (nLA) maps were computed by subtracting in every subject the 
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
5SCIeNtIFIC RepoRts | 7: 16306  | DOI:10.1038/s41598-017-16433-y
neural gain sensitivity image from the negative neural loss sensitivity image (-loss - gain; since losses were entered 
as absolute values in single-subject model)25,31.
Availability of materials and data. The datasets generated during and analyzed during the current study 
are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request. FMRI T-maps are available at https://neu-
rovault.org/collections/3163/.
Results
Behavior. Inclusion of group into the behavioral model was significant, p(ΔChi2) = 0.002, ΔAIC = 9.1. The 
HC group showed a fixed effect of λ of 1.89, the AD group a λ of 1.23 and the PG group a λ of 1.09, (Fig. 2). HC’s 
LA was greater than that of both PG and AD (HC > PG, pboot = 0.014; HC > AD, pboot = 0.042). PG and AD did 
not differ in LA (PG > AD, pboot = 0.636). LA results stayed the same with age as covariate in the model. AD and 
PG patients showed a reduction in βloss compared to HC (pboot = 0.009; pboot = 0.019) (Fig. 2), robust against 
adjusting for age. Both groups did not differ from HC nor between each other in βgain. HC subjects did not change 
their reaction time with gains or losses. PG and AD subjects did so, with increasing gains decreasing their reac-
tion time and increasing losses increasing their reaction times (see Supplementary Information, Fig. S2).
No AD severity measure correlated with LA in AD subjects. In PG subjects log(λ) correlated significantly only 
with the GBQ score, r = −0.63, pboot,FDR = 0.03 (Fig. 2C). In exploratory analyses we found that this was driven 
by both the GBQ illusions subscale (r = −0.72, pboot = 0.004) and by the GBQ persistence subscale (r = −0.47, 
pboot = 0.03).
Brain response. Neither whole brain nor NOI SVC correction yielded significant peak voxels in neural gain 
sensitivity or neural loss sensitivity T-maps in any of the groups. We also explored T-maps at p < 0.001, cluster 
extent threshold k = 0. In HC subjects, with rising gains, BOLD activity increased in left middle frontal gyrus/left 
anterior orbital gyrus, medial superior frontal gyrus, left caudate. Decrease in BOLD activity with rising gains was 
non-existent in HC subjects. In HC subjects, BOLD activity decreased with rising losses in left cerebellum exte-
rior, left superior parietal lobule, left and medial postcentral gyrus, bilateral precuneus, left thalamus/left parahip-
pocampal gyrus/left hippocampus, right supamarginal/angular gyrus, right middle frontal gyrus. HC subjects did 
not show any BOLD increase with rising losses. PG subjects showed increasing activity in right superior frontal 
gyrus with rising losses and decreasing activity with rising losses in bilateral anterior cingulum, right caudate, left 
putamen, left insula, bilateral inferior frontal operculum, left rolandic operculum, bilateral diencephalon, right 
pre- and postcentral gyrus, right supramarginal gyrus, medial cerebellum. PG subjects showed activity increase 
in left hippocampus with rising gains. PG subjects showed activity decrease with rising gains in left superior 
parietal lobe, right precentral gyrus, left/right superior frontal gyrus, right supplementary cortex, left precentral/
supramarginal gyrus, occipital gyrus, cerebellum. AD subjects showed increasing BOLD activity in response 
to rising losses in right middle frontal and bilateral superior frontal gyrus, as well as in bilateral frontal opercu-
lum, and bilateral precentral gyrus. AD subjects did not show decreasing activity with rising losses. AD subjects 
showed neither increasing nor decreasing activity in any region with rising gains (see selection of slices in Fig. 3).
Comparing the groups, main effect of group (ME) F-Test for the neural sensitivity to loss maps yielded after 
NOI SVC correction two significant peak voxels: [48,49,5], DLPFC (middle frontal gyrus, BA46), pFWE = 0.012, 
and [59,14,16] (VLPFC, opercular part of the inferior frontal gyrus, BA44/BA45), pFWE = 0.026.
Post-hoc T-Tests revealed: 1) a significant group comparison stable against adjusting for age and local gray 
matter density (using rBPM) for the HC < AD contrast at [48, 49, 5]. With rising losses, HC subjects showed in 
right DLPFC a stronger reduction of activity than AD patients, pFWE = 0.001, t = 5.47, p < 0.001, pFWE(rBPM) = 0.040 
(in rBPM slight shift of peak voxel to [48, 46, 12] and [52, 42, 16], both DLPFC, BA46), k = 713 (Fig. 4). 2) a sig-
nificant group comparison stable against adjusting for age and local gray matter density (using rBPM) for the 
HC < AD contrast at [59, 14, 16]. With rising losses, HC subjects showed in right VLPFC a stronger reduc-
tion of activity than AD patients, pFWE = 0.025, t = 4.53, p < 0.001 (slight shift to [55, 14, 12], VLPFC, BA44), 
seed target ROIs contrast of interest number of one-sided T-tests3)
ANDREA27 network model
VS ACC [gain, loss] 12
DLPFC1) ACC [loss] 12 (per BA)
dorsal raphe 
nucleus (DRN) DLPFC
1), amygdala [loss] 60
VTA/midbrain amygdala [gain] 12
ACC DLPFC1), amygdala [gain, loss], [loss] 60
amygdala OFC2) [gain, loss] 48
OFC DRN, VTA [loss], [gain] 12 (per OFC sub area)
Basten30 connectivity model
VS VMPFC [gain] 12
amygdala VMPFC [loss] 12
Table 2. Exploratory functional connectivity analyses. 1BA 8, 9, 10, 46 within MFG considered separately. 
2Anterior, lateral, medial, posterior orbital gyrus considered separately. 3All T-tests done separately for left/right 
of seed and target ipsilaterally and contralaterally.
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Figure 2. Behavioral results by group. (A) Pathological gamblers (PG) and alcohol dependent (AD) patients 
show similarly reduced loss aversion (LA, 𝜆𝜆). AD and PG subjects show significantly reduced behavioral loss 
sensitivity (βloss). (B) Differences in LA as seen in probability of gamble acceptance (PoA) maps. PoA was 
calculated within each subject and for each gamble cell based on the frequency of gamble acceptance divided by 
number of gamble presentations. Then a mean PoA map was calculated for each group. Light grey indicates high 
PoA and dark grey indicates low PoA. Note that AD and PG subjects change their acceptance rate less strongly 
with respect to changing magnitude of losses, compared to healthy controls (HC), i.e. show reduced behavioral 
loss sensitivity. (C) Correlation of behavioral loss aversion with GBQ (Gambler’s Beliefs Questionnaire) in PG 
subjects. In GBQ high values code for high cognitive distortions.
Figure 3. Effects of task in HC, PG, AD. T-Test maps of correlation of BOLD activity with gain or absolute 
value of loss superimposed on canonical SPM12 T1-image, thresholded at p < 0.001, uncorrected, extent 
threshold k = 0. HC: healthy controls; PG: pathological gamblers; AD: alcohol dependent patients; stg +: 
positive correlation of gain with BOLD activity; stg −: negative correlation of gain with BOLD activity; stl +: 
positive correlation of absolute loss with BOLD activity; stl −: negative correlation of absolute loss with BOLD 
activity.
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pFWE(rBPM) = 0.021 (slight shift to [62,14,19], VLPFC, BA45) (Fig. 4). Post-hoc T-Tests comparing HC and PG, as 
well as PG and AD, yielded no correctable results at points of significant ME group. Whole brain FWE correction 
of the ME group F-map for neural loss sensitivity yielded no significant voxels (trend at [48,49,5], pFWE = 0.058). 
There were no significant group differences in neural gain sensitivity, neither when using our NOI, nor when 
using the whole brain FWE correction.
Results of exploratory analyses. Functional connectivity. PG > HC: We found PG subjects show-
ing a stronger gain-related functional connectivity from left amygdala to left posterior OFC, [−29 14–20], 
pFWE = 0.017, k = 12 (Fig. S2-A), meaning that with rising gains correlation of the BOLD signal between amyg-
dala and OFC increased in PG subjects more strongly than in HC subjects. PG subjects also showed this from 
right amygdala to left post. OFC, [−29 18–20], pFWE = 0.004, k = 35, (Fig. S4-B). HC > PG: In PG subjects we 
found that loss-related functional connectivity from left amygdala to VMPFC is weaker in PG subjects than in HC 
subjects, [−1 56–6], pFWE = 0.024, k = 44, (Fig. S4-C), meaning that with rising losses correlation of the BOLD 
signal between amygdala and VMPFC increased in HC subjects more strongly than in PG subjects. The same was 
true for functional connectivity between left posterior OFC and DRN/brain stem, [−1, −32, −13], pFWE = 0.018 
(Fig. S4-D).
Correlations of neural LA parameters with symptom severity scores. There were no correlations of neural sensitiv-
ity to gain/neural sensitivity to loss/nLA with symptom severity scores within PG nor AD using our NOI for SVC.
Discussion
Impaired value-based decision-making is a hallmark of both substance-related disorders and pathological gam-
bling59,60. We have further probed the neuro-behavioral factors associated with impaired decision making in both 
PG and AD focusing on group differences in LA. We observed that both PG and AD subjects show reduced LA 
compared to HC. This is in line with PG and SUD research. Reduced LA has been found before in slot machine 
gamblers61. In our PG cohort 17 of 19 subjects indicated slot machines as their primary gamble. So the behavioral 
part of our study may be seen as a replication of that study. Another study observed no mean difference in LA 
between PG and HC, but instead some PG subjects with very high and some with very low LA14. The PG group 
in that study had already undergone PG treatment while our PG subjects were active gamblers with little to no 
treatment. This may be the reason why in our sample LA in PG is significantly lower than in the HC sample. Also 
the study by Gelskov et al.26 have found only a trend in LA difference between PG and HC subjects. Yet, also their 
PG subjects had undergone PG treatment. Also the study by Giorgetta et al.13 has found an increase in LA with 
amount treatment received, while Brevers et al.12 have observed significantly reduced LA in active gamblers who 
Figure 4. Neural loss sensitivity group differences, HC < AD. Heatmaps show significant activation at 
p < 0.001, k = 0, uncorrected. (A,E) Main effect (ME) of group F-map. (B,F) T-map for contrast HC < AD 
for the neural loss sensitivity contrast. (C,G) rBPM analysis. I.e. HC < AD T-Test adjusted for age and local 
gray matter density. (D,H) Unadjusted means of neural loss sensitivity per group (effect of interest, EOI). 
For illustration coherence, panels A-D are focused on the significant peak voxel of the main effect of group at 
[48,49,5] in right DLPFC (BA46 in right middle frontal gyrus) and (E–H) at [59,14,16] in VLPFC (BA44/BA45 
in inferior frontal gyrus).
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had not received treatment. These results indicate that PG treatment may lead to a normalization of LA in PG 
subjects.
Both PG and AD patients showed reduced LA due to reduced behavioral loss sensitivity while behavioral gain 
sensitivity was not different compared to HC subjects in both groups. To our knowledge, our study is the first to 
report reduced LA in AD patients, comparable to reduced LA in PG subjects. Further, our study seems to be the 
first reporting on the basis for reduced LA, namely reduced behavioral loss sensitivity, concurrently in both a 
SUD sample and a PG sample. Previous LA studies in PG have made no statements on differences in behavioral 
gain and loss sensitivity to try to explain reduced LA in PG subjects.
We further hypothesized that LA would be correlated with symptom severity. We saw within PG subjects 
that the higher their LA, the lower they scored on the GBQ, i.e. gamblers’ beliefs. The correlation with the GBQ 
suggests that low LA in PG subjects is related to higher cognitive distortions, such as illusions of control (“I can 
control the outcome of the gamble”) and beliefs of persistence (“If I lose I should keep gambling to not miss out on 
any wins.”). However, within AD patients, we did not find a correlation with any AD severity score. This may indi-
cate that the LA task is better suited for severity assessment in PG than in AD subjects. One reason for this may be 
that the LA task itself is a gambling task capturing core features of the addictive behavior and its consequences for 
PG subjects (e.g. relative immediacy of losses in the financial domain) but less so for AD subjects.
With respect to neural loss sensitivity we expected stronger DLPFC deactivation in response to rising losses in 
HC subjects compared to both clinical groups. We indeed observed this in AD subjects. However, the significant 
HC < AD contrast was also due to the fact that AD subjects showed a widespread increase in lateral prefrontal 
activity with rising losses. Hence it seemed that AD subjects with rising losses actually recruited increasing cog-
nitive resources in DLPFC, while HC subjects stayed put or even decreased activity. Also reaction times pointed 
into that direction: AD subjects became slower with rising losses while HC subjects did not change their reaction 
times. PG subjects did not significantly differ in their DLPFC activity in the face of rising losses. In that sense AD 
and PG seem to differ. However, direct comparison of PG and AD subjects failed to reach significance. Future 
studies should readdress this direct comparison with larger sample sizes.
AD subjects also showed larger activity increase with rising losses in VLPFC. This effect may stem from the 
task structure, which had a speedy reaction component and, since responses were always mapped to the same 
buttons, also an inhibition component. With DLPFC and VLPFC activating despite high losses, AD subjects thus 
may have employed more working-memory62,63 and cognitive control40,41,64,65 compared to HC subjects when high 
losses were at stake. PG subjects seemed not to differ from HC subjects, but also not clearly from AD subjects. 
However, note that like AD subjects also PG subjects increased response speed with rising gains and reduced it 
with rising losses. And the study by Gelskov et al. (2016) has shown higher DLPFC activity during unfavorable 
gambles in PG subjects in a similar decision-making task26. This points to increased employment of cognitive 
resources despite high losses similar to AD subjects. Alterations in working memory have been linked before to 
alterations in decision-making in SUD cohorts66. Further, higher DLPFC and parietal activity has been associated 
with higher risk taking in binge drinkers vs. HC67, and dysfunctions of the DLPFC may lead to cognitive inertia68.
Our study was guided by network models also offering neural connectivity explanations for inter-individual 
differences in LA27,30. Using these models as hypothesis generators we explored functional connectivity differ-
ences between the groups, because they may well be an additional basis to explain group differences in LA. Only 
PG subjects showed reliable altered functional connectivity. They showed a stronger gain-related functional con-
nectivity from amygdala to posterior OFC compared to HC. According to the ANDREA model27, this may mean 
that amygdala enhances the representation of gain values in the OFC. This may lead to decreased LA because 
losses are becoming less salient with rising gains. We further saw that the functional loss-related connectiv-
ity between amygdala and VMPFC30 was stronger in HC subjects than in PG subjects. This perhaps points to 
decreased production of loss-related salience signals in PG subjects, possibly disturbing proper cost-benefit eval-
uation. Similarly, PG subjects’ functional connectivity from OFC to DRN was weaker compared to HC subjects. 
Since DRN is hypothesized to code for negative time difference prediction errors by receiving value signals from 
OFC27,69,70, this may mean that PG subjects forward loss signals less efficiently compared to HC subjects. Our 
results support the notion that pathological gambling might be associated with changes in task-relevant commu-
nication between brain areas of the reward system71,72.
Limitations. Our study must be interpreted with caution. Small sample sizes and a large NOI limited sta-
tistical power. Our exploratory analyses have to be backed by greater sample sizes and completely controlled for 
multiple testing in the future. However, our study is innovative because we have directly compared an SUD and 
a behavioral addictive disorder and we have used an extensive set of tools to investigate the neural correlates of 
reduced LA in PG and AD. Disentangling the psychological from the neurotoxic factors of addiction is one of the 
great challenges of current neurobehavioral research73. Further comparative and transdiagnostical studies like 
ours are needed to find neurobehavioral markers for etiology research, for better diagnosis and better measure-
ment of treatment success3,74–77. Good matching is key to such studies. Our matching was imperfect with respect 
to age, however we checked all our results for stability of results by statistical adjustment procedures. Further, PG 
and AD subjects with no comorbidities may hamper generalizability. However, we were interested in isolating 
basic neurobiological mechanisms. Hence, isolating the disorder in question and not allowing additional diagno-
ses introduce more variance was apt here. Debt is an integral part of PG disorder78 and it co-varied with LA (see 
Supplementary Information). Future studies could focus on this issue and associate financial decisions, LA, debt 
and gambling symptoms79,80. We have further only considered male PG and male AD subjects. A bias for male 
subjects is common in the gambling literature8. Female PG subjects are less prevalent81. Further, sex differences 
in LA are known82. Here, we wanted to limit variance and thus focused on only one gender. Future studies should 
address sex differences in impaired decision-making in PG subjects. Moreover, the current study is not designed 
to disentangle differences in loss aversion completely from differences in risk aversion. Future studies should 
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
9SCIeNtIFIC RepoRts | 7: 16306  | DOI:10.1038/s41598-017-16433-y
address this, e.g. by orthogonalizing variance and expected value, by varying probability of gains and losses and 
by introducing gain and loss-only trials.
Conclusions
We have observed reduced LA in both PG and AD subjects. In both groups, this reduction was due to reduced 
behavioral loss sensitivity. AD subjects showed altered loss-related DLPFC and VLPFC reactivity. It was unclear 
whether PG subjects differed in this regard from AD subjects or HC subjects. In exploratory analyses PG sub-
jects showed enhanced gain-related amygdala-OFC connectivity, reduced loss-related amygdala-VMPFC and 
OFC-DRN connectivity. The neural differences to HC subjects might reflect disturbed cost-benefit calculations 
when assessing gambles in both PG and AD subjects. However, the neural processes leading to this reduction 
in LA in both PG and AD might be different. LA correlated with symptom severity only within PG subjects. 
Accordingly, the increase of LA has been related to PG therapy12,13. The LA task and its neural correlates may thus 
prove valuable for diagnosis and treatment of PG. The LA task may be remodeled into a training tool to augment 
behavioral therapy83. Such a computerized application could teach to properly anticipate losses and to disengage 
from gambling if losses hit a certain threshold regardless of possible gains. This may be paired with learning to 
feel rewarded by successful loss avoidance84.
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1 Supplementary methods 
1.1 Administered questionnaires 
PG subjects were diagnosed using the German short questionnaire for gambling behavior 
questionnaire (Kurzfragebogen Spielsucht, KFG) (cutoff ≥ 16) (Petry and Baulig, 1996), 
internal consistency, i.e. Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.79, retest reliability 2 weeks = 0.80 (Petry, 
1996). According to the KFG 4 subjects displayed mild, 14 subjects medium and 1 subject 
severe PG. Otherwise, any known history of a neurological disorder or a current psychological 
disorder (except substance abuse and tobacco dependence) as assessed by the screening of the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-I) (First et al, 2002) lead to 
exclusion from the study. For matching purposes subjects completed the Wechsler Intelligence 
Test for Adults (WAIS) matrices test (Wechsler, 1997) and they were asked to indicate age, 
smoking status, amount of personal debt and monthly personal income. Furthermore, they were 
asked to indicate their level of education and handedness (Oldfield, 1971). For further 
characterization of the three groups subjects also completed Beck's Depression Inventory (BDI-
II) (Beck et al, 1996) and the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale Version 10 (BIS-10) (Patton et al, 
1995). 
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1.2 Reaction times 
Reaction times were submitted into a linear mixed effects model with random effects (Bates et 
al, 2015b), where centralized gain, centralized loss, absolute Euclidean distance were fixed 
effects and also allowed to vary randomly per subject, using the lmer function in lme4 in R. In 
a second model fixed effects of gain and loss were modulated by group. Both models were 
compared using the anova function in R performing a Chi-Square-Difference test. Post-hoc t-
tests were performed using Satterthwate's approximations implemented in lmerTest 
(Kuznetsova et al, 2016). 
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1.3 The behavioral model 
Several models (within subject) were considered to model the behavioral data. The model by 
(Tom et al, 2007) but with Euclidean distance (lae, 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 ∗ 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 +  𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∗
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑒𝑑), the original model by (Tom et al, 2007) used in the current study (la, 
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 ∗ 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 +  𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠), the ratio model (Gelskov et al, 2016) (lar, 
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) and the De Martino/Charpentier model (Charpentier et al, 
2015; De Martino et al, 2010) (lac, 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =  1 ∗ 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 +  𝜆 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠). Value was subjected to a 
two-options softmax function 𝑃(𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 =  1) = (1 + exp(−𝜇 ∗ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒))−1 (Charpentier et 
al, 2015; Sutton, 1998) with 𝜇 = 1 (logistic function) or with 𝜇 as a free parameter (choice 
consistency, i.e. for model lac). Note that lac’s value function can be rewritten as 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =  𝜇 ∗
𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 +  𝜇 ∗ 𝜆 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠, which then is submitted to the logistic function without any free 
parameter. Lac is hence a logistic regression like la but without an intercept 𝛽0, with 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 =
 𝜇 and 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 =  𝜇 ∗ 𝜆 (hence 𝜆 =  𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠/ 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛). Inversely, in la, lae 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 may be seen as 
𝜇 because one can write for la (and accordingly for lae) 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = (𝛽0 + 1 ∗ 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 +  𝜆 ∗
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠) ∗ 𝜇 , from which follows 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 =  𝜇 and 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 =  𝜆 ∗ 𝜇 and hence again 𝜆 =  𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠/ 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛. 
To perform model comparison we estimated each model using the glmer function in lme4 (Bates 
et al, 2015b) in each group separately or with all groups together using group as a between 
subject fixed effect, respectively. From the glmer models we could simply note down the 
Aikaike Information Criterion (AIC) values and computed mean AIC values, so that all reported 
AIC values are always “mean AIC per subject” values. Only this way AIC values can be 
compared between groups, because the groups have different sizes (Table S1). 
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The la model had the lowest mean group AIC value (i.e. best model), also reflected in the 
likelihood ratio tests comparing all models to lae (Table S1). We thus chose for the analyses in 
the main text the la model. We used mixed effects modeling because it yields more robust 
single-subject parameter estimates and also mixed effects modeling is designed to estimate 
group fixed effects (Bates et al, 2015a). 
We computed 𝜆′𝑠 per model and correlated them. The lambdas of la correlated well with 𝜆’s of 
all other considered models (Table S2). We also computed mean 𝜆 values per group and model 
and performed group comparisons. For this we extracted the fixed effects and random effects 
and added them and computed one 𝜆 values per subject and model. Note that this is a different 
but very fast method to estimate the fixed effect of loss aversion (𝜆) and get standard errors of 
the parameters. This method was only used here, not in our main analysis, where we 
bootstrapped parametrically the p-values for group comparisons of fixed effects of 𝜆. Note that 
all models yielded the same expected group differences (Table S3). 
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Table S1: AIC values of different LA models split by group 
Model df HC PG AD mean of group AICs 
complete 
model AIC 
Likelihood ratio test against 
lae 
lae 22 91.7 103.1 127.9 107.5 106.81 - 
la 15 91.5 102.6 127.8 107.3 106.78 ΔLL = -6.2, Δdf = -7, 0.084 
lar 9 99.4 107.2 134.1 113.6 112.63 ΔLL = 161.4, Δdf = -13, p<0.001 
lac 12 140.0 132.1 152.1 141.4 135.09 ΔLL = 1421, Δdf = -20, p<0.001 
ΔLL is difference in log-likelihood, negative values mean it is a better fitting model than lae, positive 
values mean it is a worse fitting model; df is degrees of freedom of complete model; Δdf is the 
difference in degrees of freedom, i.e. difference in estimated parameters;  
Table S2: Spearman correlation coefficients of 𝜆 estimates of different models across all groups. 
λ lae la lar lac 
lae 1 0.99 0.6 0.95 
la 1 0.53 0.98 
lar 1 0.43 
lac 1 
0 means n.s. Spearman correlation 
Table S3: Mean 𝜆 values per group and model. 
HC PG AD p(HC > PG) p(HC > AD) p(PG > AD) 
lae 2.33 1.09 1.16 0.020 0.030 0.789 
la 2.29 1.15 1.21 0.028 0.040 0.804 
lar 2.04 1.64 1.62 0.018 0.012 0.905 
lac 2.19 1.19 1.26 0.032 0.049 0.761 
p’s are p-values of two-sample t-tests 
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1.4 MRI data acquisition and preprocessing 
Scanning was performed with a 3-Tesla clinical whole-body magnetic resonance tomograph 
(MR Magnetom Tim Trio, Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) equipped with a standard 12-channel 
phased-array head coil at Charité – Universitätsmedizin Berlin. In the T2*-sensitive Gradient-
Echo Echo-Planar Imaging (GE-EPI) sequence used during the loss aversion (LA) task, 39 
slices covering the whole brain were acquired in an interleaved order and ascending acquisition 
direction (TR=2.5s, 3mm thickness, 0.5mm inter-slice gap, TE: 35ms, flip angle: 80°, in-plane 
resolution: 64 x 64 pixels, voxel size: 3.5mm x 3.5mm x 3.0mm). Before the GE-EPI sequence, 
a T1-weighted 3D structural image for anatomical referencing (Magnetization Prepared Rapid 
Gradient Echo, MPRAGE, voxel size: 1mm x 1mm x 1mm) and a B0 fieldmap for image 
distortion correction were recorded. Imaging data were processed with Statistical Parametric 
Mapping (SPM12, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/, Wellcome Department of Imaging 
Neuroscience, London, UK) running on MATLAB (version: R2014a, Mathworks, Sherborn, 
MA, USA). The GE-EPI images of every subject were corrected for differences in slice 
acquisition time. GE-EPI images were registered to the mean GE-EPI image. Fieldmaps were 
used to unwarp non-linear image distortions caused by B0 inhomogenities (Andersson et al, 
2001). The T1 image was co-registered to the unwarped mean GE-EPI image using affine 
spatial transformation. The T1 image was then segmented into tissue classes and transformed 
into the Montreal Neurological Institute-standard space (MNI). This process yielded linear and 
non-linear parameters for the transformation between individual and standard space, which 
were applied to all unwarped EPI images. EPI images were resampled to a voxel size of 3.5mm 
x 3.5mm x 3.5mm. Finally, these images were spatially smoothed with an isotropic Gaussian 
9 
kernel (full-width-at-half maximum 8mm). Additionally, we used the VBM8 toolbox (Kurth et 
al, 2010) to segment T1 images into tissue classes. Gray matter tissue probability maps (TPMs) 
were than warped into standard space, spatially smoothed and down sampled to a voxel size of 
3.5mm x 3.5mm x 3.5mm to match the resolution of our functional images. These gray matter 
TPMs then represent local gray matter volume or local gray matter density (GMD) (Good et al, 
2002), irrespective of overall brain size, and lend themselves for BPM analysis. 
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1.5 The fMRI single-subject model 
Additionally, the head motion parameters obtained during motion correction were entered into 
the model to account for signal fluctuations caused by the interaction of movement and 
susceptibility (Morgan, Dawant, Li, & Pickens, 2007). After high pass filtering (cut off 
frequency = 1/128 Hz) and the elimination of high frequency noise by autoregressive (AR(1)) 
modeling, the General Linear Model (GLM) was fit to the preprocessed EPIs using a restricted 
maximum likelihood algorithm. Only gray matter voxels according to the SPM12 gray matter 
template (p > 0.2) were considered. 
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1.6 The network of interest (NOI) 
Our NOI consisted of cortical and limbic areas derived from relevant LA and related studies 
(Aron et al, 2014; Basten et al, 2010; Canessa et al, 2013; De Martino et al, 2010; Gelskov et 
al, 2016; Levy and Wagner, 2011; Litt et al, 2008; Sokol-Hessner et al, 2013; Tom et al, 2007; 
Venkatraman et al, 2011). Specifically, the NOI included caudate, putamen, accumbens region, 
VLPFC, medial frontal cortex for ventral medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), orbital gyrus, 
amygdala, anterior cingulate, insula, DLPFC, ventral tegmental area/midbrain (VTA), dorsal 
raphe nucleus (DRN). The NOI was created using labels according to the SPM12’s 
Neuromorphometrics Inc. atlas (see Table S5). 
Table S4: Overview of SPM12 ROIs used for NOI. 
SPM12’s atlas label Also referred to as 
Right Accumbens Area ventral striatum (VS) 
Left Accumbens Area ventral striatum (VS) 
Right Putamen 
Left Putamen 
Right Caudate 
Left Caudate 
Right ACgG anterior cingulate gyrus 
Left ACgG anterior cingulate gyrus 
Right Amygdala 
Left Amygdala 
Right AOrG anterior orbital gyrus 
Left AOrG anterior orbital gyrus 
Right LOrG lateral orbital gyrus 
Left LOrG lateral orbital gyrus 
Right MOrG medial orbital gyrus 
Left MOrG medial orbital gyrus 
Right POrG posterior orbital gyrus 
Left POrG posterior orbital gyrus 
Right MFC medial frontal cortex ventral medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) 
Left MFC medial frontal cortex ventral medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) 
Right AIns anterior insula 
Left AIns anterior insula 
Right PIns posterior insula 
Left PIns posterior insula 
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For VTA we used a probabilistic ROI of the midbrain (Murty et al, 2014). These authors 
constructed a midbrain mask based on hand-drawn VTA-substantia-nigra-midbrain masks of 
50 healthy subjects. For DRN we used an 8mm radius sphere around the MNI coordinate [-2, -
32, -16] (Pedroni et al, 2011). Note that both areas are quite large with respect to the actual size 
of the mentioned nuclei to account for inter-individual differences. These masks for VTA and 
DRN were chosen because these areas are not part of the SPM12 atlas, nor the AAL atlas. For 
DLPFC we used the WFU pick atlas to select Brodman areas (BA) 8,9,10 and 46 (dilated in 2D, 
i.e. in-plane, by 1 voxel) (Collins, 2001; Draganski et al, 2008; Maldjian et al, 2003) within the 
middle frontal gyrus according to the AAL atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al, 2002). For VLPFC we 
used BA 44, 45, 47 (dilated in 2D, i.e. in-plane, by 1 voxel) within the inferior frontal gyrus 
(Badre and Wagner, 2007; Danker et al, 2008; Gold et al, 2006) (Figure S1). The complete 
NOI can be found as .nii file in the Supplementary Online Material. 
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Figure S1: Network of interest (NOI). Mask (red) superimposed on mean of normalized structural T1-images of 
all subjects. Slices are shown from y = +60 to y = -40 in steps of -4 (top to bottom). Regions were taken from 
SPM12 Neuromorphometrics atlas, as well as AAL and BA atlas within the wfu pick atlas (DLPFC and VLPFC), as 
well as external sources (midbrain, DRN). Regions were selected based on literature sources reporting on the 
neural correlates of inter-individual differences in loss aversion tasks. This NOI mask was used for small volume 
correction in group comparisons of neural gain and loss sensitivity as well as for other exploratory analyses. 
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1.7 The rBPM analysis 
Robust biological parametric mapping (rBPM in toolbox BPMe) was used running on SPM5 
(Casanova et al, 2007; Yang et al, 2011) and results were evaluated in SPM8. Note that BPMe 
is only available for SPM5 but results may be evaluated in SPM8 but not in SPM12. 
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1.8 Functional connectivity 
We fit new single subject models. Specifically, for every seed region we expanded the standard 
single subject model by interaction terms multiplying the time series of the respective seed 
region and each parametric modulator (McLaren et al, 2012). All the other terms in the single 
subject model, including motion parameters as covariates of no interest, stayed the same. We 
then submitted the contrast images pertaining to the interaction terms for gain and loss to 
second-level T-tests comparing PG and AD to HC, respectively.  
In the ANDREA model (Fig. S2), when LA exists, the amygdala sends a salience signal to OFC 
which is stronger for losses than for gains. This enhances the represented loss value over the 
represented gain value in OFC. Lack of LA may thus emerge from a more efficacious 
transmission of the amygdala salience signal for gains. We thus expected a functional 
connectivity which grows more strongly for increasing gains in both PG and AD subjects 
compared to HC subjects. 
According to (Basten et al, 2010) (Fig. S2), the VMPFC is said to be a comparator region 
integrating cost signals from amygdala and gain signals from VS. We hence computed a gPPI 
analysis on single subject level with amygdala as seed region and used the VMPFC ROI for 
small volume correction and expected HC to show stronger functional connectivity from 
amygdala to VMPFC with respect to growing losses than both PG and AD subjects. 
Found group differences in functional connectivity were checked for stability against adjusting 
for age using ancova analysis in SPM. Only results are reported which survived adjustment for 
age. 
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Figure S2: Network models for gPPI analyses. The ANDREA model (left, adapted from (Litt et al, 2008)) and the 
model by Basten et al. (right, adapted from (Basten et al, 2010). The network models were used as hypotheses 
generators regarding differences in functional connectivity between PG, AD and HC subjects. The arrows mean 
functional connections. Next to the arrows it is stated whether the connection processes gain or loss signals. 
  
17 
2 Supplementary results 
2.1 Reaction times 
Inclusion of group into the behavioral model was significant, Δdf = 6, p(ΔChi2) = 0.023, ΔAIC 
= 2. The HC group showed a mean reaction time (rt) of 1.27s, the AD group of 1.54s and the 
PG group of 1.39s. HC’s rt was shorter than that of AD subjects (HC < AD, p = 0.030). AD 
patients showed a stronger increase in rt with growing losses than HC subjects (β = 0.019, p = 
0.019), also PG subjects showed this (β = 0.018, p = 0.018). With increasing gains, PG subjects 
showed a stronger decrease in rt compared to HC (β = -0.011, p = 0.033) (Figure S3). Adjusting 
for age by allowing age to impact the fixed intercept and the rt within each group, yielded the 
same results, except the overall mean difference in rt of HC vs. AD and HC vs. PG was rendered 
insignificant. 
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Figure S3: Reaction times. Depicted are mean reaction times (time until decision is made) per group and 
condition in seconds with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. MeanRT is the mean reaction time at 
presentation of mean gain and mean loss in the proposed gamble. Bygain shows how this meanRT changes when 
gain increases by 5 euros. Byloss shows how reaction time changes when losses increase by 5 euros. Note that 
PG and AD subjects change their reaction times as a function of gain and loss but not HC subjects. 
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2.2 Debt 
We have checked the relationship of debt (yes/no) (28 yes, 19 no, 4 NA) and loss aversion. The 
median LA for no debt was 1.64 and for debt 0.97. This difference was significant (Kruskall-
Wallis test, p = 0.02). We fit our original model (group explaining behavioral gain and loss 
sensitivity) and the alternative model (debt (yes/no) explaining behavioral gain and loss 
sensitivity), while excluding in both cases the 4 subjects which did not provide information on 
their debt. Model comparison showed that the group model was still slightly better than the debt 
model: Δdf = 4, Chi2 = 11.4, p = 0.022, ΔAIC = 3.5 (AIC of group model better than that of 
debt model). We could not usefully correlate the amount of debt with behavioral LA because 
we had too many missings (15 NA) in the variable “amount of debt”. This is because 15 subjects 
declined to answer this question. 
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2.3 Functional connectivity 
 
Figure S4: Functional connectivity group differences. A,B: PG subjects show a stronger functional connectivity 
from Amygdala to posterior OFC with regards to growing gains. It seems they transmit the amygdala signal with 
respect to gains more and more efficaciously to OFC, when gains increase, while HC subjects do so less or even 
do the reverse. C: With growing losses HC subjects show stronger connectivity increase from left amygdala to 
VMPFC than PG subjects. It seems they transmit the amygdala signal with respect to losses more and more 
efficaciously to OFC, when losses increase, while HC subjects do so less. D: The same is true for the functional 
connectivity from left posterior OFC to DRN.  
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2.4 Voxel-based morphometry 
We checked functional results for stability against adjusting for local gray matter density 
(GMD) and age. Here we contrast GMD maps (adjusted for age) to display the GMD differences 
between clinical groups (PG, AD) and HC. We look at contrasts HC > PG, HC < PG, HC > 
AD, HC < AD, PG > AD, AD < PG, with the latter two masked by the F-conjunction HC <> 
PG, HC<>AD, PG<>AD (Figure S5). We explore at p < 0.001, uncorrected, k = 10, apply 
small volume correction using our NOI at pSVC = 0.05, and apply whole brain FWE correction 
at pFWE = 0.05. 
HC > PG yielded no suprathreshold voxels. SVC and whole brain correction yielded no results. 
HC < PG yielded three major clusters: at left parietal operculum / supramarginal gyrus, [-54, -
42, 23], at DLPFC, i.e. left middle frontal gyrus [-26, 49, 16] and at ACC [3, 32, 19]. SVC NOI 
and whole brain FWE correction yielded no significant peak voxels. HC < AD yielded no 
suprathreshold voxels, SVC NOI and whole brain FWE correction yielded no significant voxels. 
HC > AD yielded major clusters at right precentral gyrus [27, 25, 58], right medial orbital gyrus 
[13, 32, -30] and right supramarginal gyrus [48, -28, 44] and right cerebellum [38, -49, -34]. 
SVC NOI and whole brain FWE correction yielded no sig. voxels. PG > AD (masked by F- 
conjunction) yielded a cluster in right middle cingulate gyrus, [6,15,37], and right precentral 
gyrus [40,-19,37]. SVC NOI and whole brain FWE correction yielded no sig. voxels. PG < AD 
(masked by F- conjunction) yielded no significant voxels, neither when applying whole brain 
and SVC NOI correction, nor on exploratory level. 
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Figure S5: Voxel-based morphometry (VBM) analysis. Results of one-way ANOVA adjusted for age. First line of 
images shows VBM contrast of PG > HC at p < 0.001, k = 0. Second line of images shows VBM contrast of HC > AD 
at p < 0.001, k = 0. Third line of images shows VBM contrast of PG > AD at p < 0.001, k = 0.  
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Abstract
While an increased impact of cues on decision‐making has been associated with sub-
stance dependence, it is yet unclear whether this is also a phenotype of non‐
substance‐related addictive disorders, such as gambling disorder (GD). To better
understand the basic mechanisms of impaired decision‐making in addiction, we inves-
tigated whether cue‐induced changes in decision‐making could distinguish GD from
healthy control (HC) subjects. We expected that cue‐induced changes in gamble
acceptance and specifically in loss aversion would distinguish GD from HC subjects.
Thirty GD subjects and 30 matched HC subjects completed a mixed gambles task
where gambling and other emotional cues were shown in the background. We used
machine learning to carve out the importance of cue dependency of decision‐
making and of loss aversion for distinguishing GD from HC subjects.
Cross‐validated classification yielded an area under the receiver operating curve
(AUC‐ROC) of 68.9% (p = .002). Applying the classifier to an independent sample
yielded an AUC‐ROC of 65.0% (p = .047). As expected, the classifier used cue‐
induced changes in gamble acceptance to distinguish GD from HC. Especially,
increased gambling during the presentation of gambling cues characterized GD sub-
jects. However, cue‐induced changes in loss aversion were irrelevant for
distinguishing GD from HC subjects. To our knowledge, this is the first study to inves-
tigate the classificatory power of addiction‐relevant behavioral task parameters when
distinguishing GD from HC subjects. The results indicate that cue‐induced changes in
decision‐making are a characteristic feature of addictive disorders, independent of a
substance of abuse
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Gambling disorder (GD) is characterized by continued gambling for
money despite severe negative consequences.1 Burdens of GD
include financial ruin, loss of social structures, as well as development
of psychiatric comorbidities.2 In line with this clinical picture of
impaired decision making, GD subjects have also displayed impaired
decision making in laboratory experiments.3,4
Besides impaired decision making, cue reactivity has been a cru-
cial concept in understanding addictive disorders including GD.5,6
Through Pavlovian conditioning, any neutral stimulus can become a
conditioned stimulus (i.e. a cue) if it has been paired with the effects
of the addictive behavior.7 In addictive disorders, including GD, cues
may induce attentional bias, arousal, and craving for the addictive
behavior in periods of abstinence.8,9 Treatment of addictive disor-
ders may focus on identifying and coping with individual cues that
induce craving for addictive behavior.10 If we understood better
how cues exert control over instrumental behavior and decision‐
making, we would be able to improve treatment tools and even pub-
lic health policy for GD and perhaps other addictive disorders. In the
present study we were thus interested in broadening our under-
standing of the basic mechanisms of impaired decision making in
addictions, especially with respect to cue‐induced effects on value‐
based decision making.
The effect of cues exhibiting a facilitating or inhibiting influence on
instrumental behavior and decision making is known as Pavlovian‐to‐
instrumental transfer (PIT).11 PIT experiments usually have three
phases: a first phase where subjects learn an instrumental behavior
to gain rewards or avoid punishments, a second phase where subjects
learn about the value of arbitrary stimuli through classical condition-
ing, and a third phase (the PIT phase), where subjects are supposed
to perform the instrumental task, while stimuli from the second phase
(changing from trial to trial) are presented in the background. The PIT
phase measures the effect of value‐charged cues on instrumental
behavior despite the fact that the background cues have no objective
relation to the instrumental task in the foreground. For instance, cer-
tain cues could increase the likelihood of gamble acceptance or the
sensitivity to the gain offered in the gamble. In the current study we
focus only on the PIT phase. PIT has recently drawn attention in the
study of substance use disorders (SUDs).12 This is because PIT effects
can persist even when the outcome of the instrumental behavior has
been devalued,13 and because increased PIT has been associated
with a marker for impulsivity14 and with decreased model‐based
behavior.15 Lastly, PIT effects tend to be stronger in subjects with a
SUD than in healthy subjects,12,16 and increased PIT has been associ-
ated with the probability of relapse.12
Increased PIT effects are based on Pavlovian and instrumental con-
ditioning and on their interaction. This highlights how addictive disor-
ders rely on learning mechanisms.17 GD is an addictive disorder
independent of any influence of a neurotropic substance of abuse.
The study of PIT in GD may thus further shed light on whether
increased PIT in addictive disorders is a result of learning, independent
of any substance of abuse, or even a congenital vulnerability.18
We are aware of three studies that have observed in GD subjects
increased cue‐induced effects on decision‐making and instrumental
behavior, comparable with increased PIT effects. In two single‐group
studies, GD subjects have shown higher delay discounting (preferring
immediate rewards over rewards in the future) in response to a casino
environment versus a laboratory environment19 and to high‐craving
versus low‐craving gambling cues.20 In a third study, GD subjects have
been more influenced than HC subjects by gambling stimuli in a
response inhibition task.21 To our knowledge, however, there are no
studies yet that have investigated the effect of cue reactivity on loss
aversion in GD as a possibly relevant PIT effect in GD.
Loss aversion (LA) is, besides delay discounting, another facet of
value‐based decision‐making. It is the phenomenon wherein people
assign a greater value to potential losses than to an equal amount of
possible gains.22 For example, healthy subjects tend to agree to a coin
toss gamble (win/loss probability of 0.5) only if the amount of possible
gain is at least twice the amount of possible loss. In GD subjects, LA
seems to be reduced,23,24 but there are also studies that have found
no difference in LA between GD and HC subjects.25
High LA protects against disadvantageous gambling decisions.
However, it has been observed that LA can be transiently modulated
by experimentally controlled cues26 and that this LA modulation varies
considerably across subjects.27 In GD subjects, loss aversion might be
particularly cue‐dependent leading to reckless gambling especially in
casino contexts or at slot machines. In the current study, we thus
hypothesized that GD subjects should show stronger PIT effects than
HC subjects in their gambling decisions and especially stronger drops
in LA when e.g. gambling‐related cues are present (i.e. higher “loss
aversion PIT”).
So far, we have mentioned studies that have used group‐mean dif-
ference analyses to investigate decision making or cue reactivity in
addictive disorders. This approach is faithful to the desire to explain
human behavior rather than predict it.28 However, this may lead to
overly complicated (i.e. overfitted) models, which do not correctly pre-
dict human behavior in new samples.28 Thus, in the current study we
wanted to avoid overfitting and isolate a model with not only explan-
atory but also predictive value.28 We did so by disentangling the spe-
cific benefits of “loss aversion PIT” parameters when distinguishing
GD from HC subjects. Hence, we used machine learning methods in
addition to classical mean‐difference statistics to test our hypotheses.
This approach has drawn increasing attention in the field of clinical
psychology and psychiatry.29 In particular, we built and tested an algo-
rithm that decides between various loss aversion models and different
models with and without PIT to classify subjects into HC versus GD
groups. Importantly, to avoid overfitting, we used out‐of‐sample clas-
sification.30-32 Our results allowed us to disentangle which PIT effects
are relevant to distinguish GD from HC subjects.
When selecting cues for this study, we aimed at expanding on existing
studies investigating cue‐effects in GD.19-21 Besides gambling‐related
cues, we thus selected additional cues from different motivational and
emotional categories12 related to GD. These categories comprised
images used in gambling advertisements as well as for advertisement of
GD therapy and prevention (positive and negative cues).
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We expected that our classifier would select models that incorpo-
rate the modulation of loss aversion by gambling and other emotional
cues (“loss aversion PIT”) to distinguish between HC and GD subjects.
2 | MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1 | Samples
GD subjects were diagnosed using the German short questionnaire for
gambling behavior questionnaire (KFG).33 The KFG diagnoses subjects
according to DSM‐IV criteria for pathological gambling. Scoring 16
points and over means “likely suffering from pathological gambling”.
However, here we use the DSM‐5 term “gambling disorder” inter-
changeably, because the DSM‐IV and DSM‐5 criteria largely overlap.
The GD group were active gamblers and not in therapy. The HC group
consisted of subjects that had no to little experience with gambling,
reflecting the healthy general population as in other addiction stud-
ies.5 For further information on the sample, see Table 1 and Supple-
ment 1.1. GD and HC were matched on relevant variables
(education, net personal income, age, alcohol use), except for smoking
severity. We thus included smoking severity in the classifier and
tested it against classifying based only on smoking severity. For final
validation of the fitted classifier we used a sample from another study
where subjects performed the affective mixed gambles task in a func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner (see Table S2).34
2.2 | Procedure and data acquisition
Subjects completed the task at theGeneral Psychology behavioral lab of
the Department of Psychology of Humboldt‐Universität zu Berlin. They
were sitting upright in front of a computer screen using their dominant
hand's fingers to indicate choices on a keyboard. Subjects were
attached five passive facial electrodes, two above musculus corrugator,
two above musculus zygomaticus, and one on the upper forehead. We
recorded electrodermal activity (EDA) from the non‐dominant hand.
Subjects of the validation sample completed the task in an fMRI envi-
ronment (head‐first supine in a 3‐Tesla SIEMENS TrioMRI at the BCAN
‐ Berlin Center of Advanced Neuroimaging). Results of the fMRI and
peripheral‐physiological recordings will be reported elsewhere.
2.3 | Affective mixed gambles task
We were inspired by established tasks to measure general LA and LA
under the influence of affective cues.27,35 Subjects were each given 20€
for wagering. On every trial, subjects saw a cue that theywere instructed
tomemorize for a paid recognition task after the actual experiment. After
4s (jittered), a mixed gamble, involving a possible gain and a possible loss,
with probability P = .5 each, was superimposed on the cue. Subjects had
to choose how willing they were to accept the gamble (Figure 1A) on a
4‐point Likert‐scale to ensure task engagement.35 Subjects of an inde-
pendent validation sample completed the task in an fMRI scanner and
TABLE 1 Sample characteristics, means and P values calculated by two‐sided permutation test
Variable HC group SE GD group SE P perm test
Year in school 10.87 0.22 10.77 0.22 .837
Vocational school 2.47 0.24 2.77 0.26 .464
Net personal income 1207.37 118.12 1419.67 174.51 .272
Personal debt 7166.67 2277.95 36166.67 11242.95 <.001
Fagerström 1.53 0.41 2.77 0.55 .081
Age 39.30 1.89 41.40 2.33 .477
AUDIT 4.77 0.86 5.30 1.17 .755
BDI‐II 5.94 0.95 12.83 1.88 .003
SOGS 1.87 0.54 9.17 0.57 <.001
KFG 3.70 1.05 28.47 1.54 <.001
BIS‐15 32.40 1.15 33.60 1.10 .468
GBQ persistence 2.18 0.21 3.24 0.20 .001
GBQ illusions 3.18 0.26 3.52 0.22 .334
Ratio female 0.30 ‐ 0.23 ‐ 1.000*
Ratio unemployed 0.10 ‐ 0.30 ‐ .217*
Ratio smokers 0.53 ‐ 0.67 ‐ .299*
Ratio right‐handed 0.93 ‐ 0.93 ‐ 1.000*
*Chi‐square test used; se: bootstrapped standard errors; years in school: years in primary and secondary school; vocational school: vocational school and/or
university; Fagerström: smoking severity. AUDIT: alcohol use severity; BDI II: depressive symptoms, SOGS: South Oaks Gambling Screen to check for
pathological gambling; KFG: Kurzfragebogen zum Glücksspielverhalten, Short Questionnaire Pathological Gambling, German diagnostic tool and severity
measure based on the DSM‐IV; BIS: Barratt Impulsiveness Scale for impulsivity; GBQ persistence and GBQ illusions: from the Gamblers’ Beliefs Question-
naire, collecting gambling related cognitive distortions (Supplement 1.1).
GENAUCK ET AL. 3 of 10
had an additional wait period to decide on the gamble (Figure 1B).
Gambles were created by randomly drawing with replacement from a
matrix with possible gambles consisting of 12 levels of gains (14, 16, … ,
36) and 12 levels of losses (‐7, ‐8, … , ‐18). This matrix is apt to elicit LA
in healthy subjects.23,35 Outcomes of the gambles were never presented
during the task but subjects were informed that after the experiment five
of their gamble decisions with ratings of “somewhat yes” or “yes” would
be randomly chosen and played for real money. As affective cues, four
sets of images were assembled: 1) 67 gambling images, showing a variety
of gambling scenes, and paraphernalia (gambling cues) 2) 31 images
representing negative consequences of gambling (negative cues) 3) 31
images representing positive effects of abstinence fromgambling (positive
cues): 4) 24 neutral IAPS images (neutral cues). For further information on
validation of the cue categories and on access to the stimuli, please see
Supplement 1.2. We presented cues of all categories in random
order and each gambling cue once. For negative, positive, and neutral
cue categories, we randomly drew images from each pool until we had
presented 45 images of each category and each image at least once.
Hence, we ran 202 trials in each subject. Gambles were matched on
average across cue categories according to expected value, variance,
gamble simplicity, as well as mean and variance of gain and loss, respec-
tively. Gamble simplicity is defined as Euclidean distance from diagonal
of gamble matrix (ed).35 HC showed on average 1.00 missed trial, GD
1.05 (no significant group difference, F = 0.022, P = .882). In fMRI
validation study, HC: 3.13, GD: 4.10, (no significant group difference, F
= 0.557, P = .457).
2.4 | Subjective cue ratings
After the task, subjects rated all cues using the Self‐Assessment Man-
ikin (SAM) assessment36 (reporting on valence: happy vs. unhappy,
arousal: energized vs. sleepy, dominance: in control vs. being con-
trolled) and additional visual analogue scales: 1) “How strongly does
this image trigger craving for gambling?” 2) “How appropriately does
this image represent one or more gambling games?” 3) “How appropri-
ately does this image represent possible negative effects of gambling?”
4) “How appropriately does this image represent possible positive
effects of gambling abstinence?”. All scales were operated via a slider
from 0 to 100.
All cue ratings were z‐standardized within subject. Ratings were
analyzed one‐by‐one using linear mixed‐effects regression, using lmer
from the lme4 package in R,37 where cue category (and clinical group)
denoted the fixed effects and subjects and cues denoted the sources
of random effects.
2.5 | Estimating subject‐specific parameters from
behavioral choice data
We modeled each subject's behavioral data by submitting dichoto-
mized choices (somewhat no, no: 0; somewhat yes, yes: 1) into logistic
regressions. We dichotomized choices to increase the precision when
estimating behavioral parameters, in line with previous studies using
the mixed gambles task.23,35 Regressors for subject‐wise logistic
FIGURE 1 The affective mixed gambles task. One trial is depicted. A, behavioral sample. B, fMRI validation sample. Subjects first saw a fixation
cross with varying inter‐trial‐interval (ITI, 2.5s to 5.5s, up to 8s in fMRI version; not displayed here). Subjects then saw a cue with different
affective content (67 of 67 gambling related, 45 of 31 with positive consequences of abstinence, 45 of 31 with negative consequences of
gambling, 45 of 24 neutral images) for about 4s. Subjects were instructed to remember the cue for a paid recognition task after all trials. Then a
gamble involving a possible gain and a possible loss was superimposed on the cue. Subjects were instructed to shift their attention at this point to
the proposed gamble and evaluate it. In the current example, a coin toss gamble was offered, where the subject could win 32 Euros or lose 11
Euros (50/50 probability). Position of gain and loss was counterbalanced (left/right). Gain was indicated by a '+' sign and loss by a '‐' sign. In the
behavioral sample, subjects had 4s to make a choice between four levels of acceptance (yes, somewhat yes, somewhat no, no; here translated
from German version that used “ja, eher ja, eher nein, nein”). In the fMRI sample, subjects had to wait 4s (jittered) before the response options
were shown. Direction of options (from left to right or vice versa) was random. Directly after decision, the ITI started. If subjects failed to make a
decision within 4s, ITI started and trial was counted as missing. ca.: circa, RT: reaction time
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regressions were gain (mean‐centered) and absolute loss (mean‐
centered) from the mixed gamble, as well as gamble simplicity (ed),
loss‐gain ratio and cue category of the stimulus in the background of
the mixed gamble. We defined different logistic regressions by using
different trial‐based definitions of gamble value (Q) (see Table S1),
submitted to the logistic function:
P gamble acceptanceð Þ ¼ 1= 1þ exp −Qð Þð Þ (1)
Different trial‐based definitions of gamble value (Q) reflected two
things:
1) Different ways of modeling LA may be adequate to distinguish a
GD from a HC subject23,25,27,35 (Table S1).
2) Different ways of incorporating cue effects on decision‐making
(PIT effects) may be adequate to distinguish a GD from a HC sub-
ject. For example, the model lac assumes
Q lacð Þ ¼ Q lað Þ þ cT*βc (2)
where
Q lað Þ ¼ β0 þ xgain*βgain þ xloss*βloss (3)
where β0 is the intercept, xgain the objective gain value of the gamble,
βgain the regression weight for xgain (same holds for xloss and βloss,
respectively), and c the dummy‐coded column vector indicating the
category of the current cue and βc a column vector holding the regres-
sion weights for the categories. Lac thus is a weighted linear combina-
tion of objective gain, objective loss with an additive influence of cue
category. That is, some influence of cue category on decision‐making
(PIT) is modeled. Note that we have multiple PIT effects here, because
βc is a vector of length three, reflecting the three affective categories
(gambling, negative, positive) different from neutral. There were also
models that did not incorporate any influence of loss aversion or
category (intercept‐only, a), or just of category (ac), or just of loss aver-
sion (la) or of their interaction (laci):
Q lacið Þ ¼ Q lað Þ þ cT*βc þ xgain*cT*βgain;c þ xloss*cT*βloss;c (4)
A model selection procedure could thus choose whether cue‐
induced effects on loss aversion (“loss aversion PIT”, i.e. the lacimodel)
were important or not to distinguish between GD and HC subjects.
Logistic regressions were fit using maximum likelihood estimation
within the glm function in R.38 Resulting regression parameters were
extracted per model (e.g. β0, βgain, βloss for model la) and subject. We
appended the loss aversion parameter (λ) to the estimated coefficients
by computing for each subject and pair of βgain, βloss:
λ ¼ −βloss
βgain
(5)
Models with names incorporating a “c” (e.g. lac or laci) are those that
assume some influence of the cues (i.e. PIT effects). Models laCh, laChci
are from.27 Note that per model each subject thus had a characteristic
parameter vector (the estimated regression weights, plus, in the
expanded case, the loss aversion coefficients) and all subjects’ parame-
ter vectors belonging to a certain model constituted the model's param-
eter set. There were 13 different ways (i.e. models) to extract the
behavioral parameters per subject plus 8 expansions by computing the
loss aversion parameters after model estimation (Table S1), i.e. 21
parameter sets. In a separate analysis, the models were estimated with
adjustment for cue repetition (using one additional two‐level factor in
each single‐subject model) and by randomly selecting 45 gambling cues
out of 67, to equalize the number of trials per cue category.
2.6 | Classification
Our machine learning approach is based on regularized regression
and cross‐validation as used in other machine learning studies in
addiction and psychological research.30,31,39
2.6.1 | Overall reasoning in building the classifier
The main interest of our study was to assess whether cue‐induced
changes in decision‐making during an affective mixed gambles task
can be used to distinguish GD from HC subjects. We hypothesized
that shifts in loss aversion that depend on what cues are shown in
the background (“loss aversion PIT”) should best distinguish between
GD and HC subjects. This means, the laci model's parameter set
should have been the most effective in distinguishing between GD
and HC subjects. To test this hypothesis, we used a machine learning
algorithm based on regularized logistic regression that selected among
various competing parameter sets (from the 21 different models, la,
lac, laci, etc.) the set that best distinguished HC and GD subjects.
To assess the generalizability of the resultant classifier, we used
cross‐validation (CV).30,32,39,40 Generalizability estimates the predictive
power, and hence replicability, of a classifier in new samples.28 Note
that machine learning algorithms are designed to generalize well to
new samples by inherently avoiding overfitting to the training data.41
We computed a P value of the algorithm denoting the probability that
its classification performance was achieved under a baseline model
(predicting using only smoking severity as predictor variable).
Beyond cross‐validation, which uses only one data set (splitting it
repeatedly into training and test data set), validation of a classifier
on a completely independent sample is the gold‐standard in machine
learning to assess the quality of an estimated model.28 Hence, we
estimated the generalization performance also via application of
our classifier to a completely independent sample of HC and GD
subjects, who had performed a slightly adapted version of the task
in an fMRI scanner. A P value was computed, as above, with random
classification as the baseline model. For detailed information on esti-
mating the classifier, please see Supplement 1.4 and Figure S1. For
classical analyses of group comparisons regarding gamble acceptance
rate and loss aversion parameters, please see Supplement 1.6. In a
separate analysis, we ran the classification with the model parame-
ters adjusted for cue repetition and with equalized number of trials
per cue category.
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2.7 | Ethics
Subjects gave written informed consent. The study was conducted in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the
ethics committee of Charité – Universitätsmedizin Berlin.
3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Cue ratings
Gambling cues were seen as more appropriately representing one or
more gambling games than any other cue category: gambling > neutral
(β = 1.589, P < .001), gambling > negative (β = 1.197, P < .001), gam-
bling > positive (β = 1.472, P < .001). They elicited more craving in GD
subjects (β = 0.71, P < .001). Negative cues were seen as evoking more
negative feelings in both groups (β = ‐0.775, P < .001) and were seen
as representing negative effects of gambling, more than any other cat-
egory (Supplement 2.1). Positive cues were indeed seen as more rep-
resentative for positive effects of gamble abstinence than any other
category (Figure S2).
3.2 | Prediction of group using behavioral data
The classification algorithm yielded an AUC‐ROC of 68.9% (under 0‐
hypothesis, i.e. with only smoking as predictor: 55.1%, P = .002) (Fig-
ures 2B and S4). The most often selected model was the “acceptance
rate per category” (ac) model (90.7% of the rounds). Combined with
the models laec, lac in 95.8% of the rounds a model was used that
incorporated PIT, i.e. an effect of cue category on decisions (Figure
S5). In only 9.3% of the rounds a model was selected that incorporated
loss aversion (i.e. gain and loss sensitivities). Validating the estimated
classifier in the independent sample, the classifier yielded an AUC‐
ROC of 65.0% (under random classification: 55.3%, P = .047) (Figure
2C). Adjusting for cue repetition and equalizing the number of trials
across cue categories lead to very similar AUR‐ROC scores, the ac
model was still the most often chosen model (42%), otherwise laec_LA
and lac were chosen very often (Supplement 2.4).
3.3 | Inspection of classifier
Inspecting the classifier's logistic regression weights, we saw that the
classifier places most importance on the shift in gambling acceptance
during gambling cues (see Figure 2D). Note further that the classifier
places also some importance on the sensitivity to the negative cues
but deselects the sensitivity to positive cues.
3.4 | Acceptance rate and loss aversion under cue
conditions
Overall acceptance rate between groups was not significantly differ-
ent (HC: 53%, GD: 58%, P = .169, ΔAIC = 0). Across all subjects there
was a significant effect of cue category on acceptance rate (P < .001,
ΔAIC = 648), driven by the effect of positive and negative cues. There
FIGURE 2 Behavioral results. A, Empirical mean acceptance rate with 95% CI's. Means were computed over subjects’ means in the categories.
Mean acceptance rate was significantly higher in GD subjects during gambling stimuli (p = 0.004). CIs are bootstrapped from category means of
subjects. B, Assessment of AUC‐ROC of classifier: Plot shows density estimates of the area under the receiver‐operating curve when running the
baseline classifier (red) /the full classifier (turquoise) 1000 times to predict the class label of 60 subjects. The green line shows the mean AUC
performance of the estimated classifier across CV rounds. C, Classifier validation on fMRI sample. Plot shows the estimated density of AUC‐ROC
under random classification. The green line shows the performance of the combined 1000 classifiers on the fMRI data set. D, Winning model for
classification. Standardized regression parameters and their confidence intervals (percentiles across cross‐validation rounds). The algorithm mainly
used the shift in acceptance rate in response to gambling cues in order to detect GD subjects
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Abstract
While an increased impact of cues on decision‐making has been associated with sub-
stance dependence, it is yet unclear whether this is also a phenotype of non‐
substance‐related addictive disorders, such as gambling disorder (GD). To better
understand the basic mechanisms of impaired decision‐making in addiction, we inves-
tigated whether cue‐induced changes in decision‐making could distinguish GD from
healthy control (HC) subjects. We expected that cue‐induced changes in gamble
acceptance and specifically in loss aversion would distinguish GD from HC subjects.
Thirty GD subjects and 30 matched HC subjects completed a mixed gambles task
where gambling and other emotional cues were shown in the background. We used
machine learning to carve out the importance of cue dependency of decision‐
making and of loss aversion for distinguishing GD from HC subjects.
Cross‐validated classification yielded an area under the receiver operating curve
(AUC‐ROC) of 68.9% (p = .002). Applying the classifier to an independent sample
yielded an AUC‐ROC of 65.0% (p = .047). As expected, the classifier used cue‐
induced changes in gamble acceptance to distinguish GD from HC. Especially,
increased gambling during the presentation of gambling cues characterized GD sub-
jects. However, cue‐induced changes in loss aversion were irrelevant for
distinguishing GD from HC subjects. To our knowledge, this is the first study to inves-
tigate the classificatory power of addiction‐relevant behavioral task parameters when
distinguishing GD from HC subjects. The results indicate that cue‐induced changes in
decision‐making are a characteristic feature of addictive disorders, independent of a
substance of abuse
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discriminating features, such as personality profiles and scores from
other decision‐making tasks. Further, our results invite more in‐depth
scrutiny of decision‐making in GD subjects during the presence of
cues, e.g. on neural level.34 Moreover, the above machine learning
studies did not use an independent validation sample to corroborate
their results. Our independent validation yielded an AUC‐ROC of
0.65. This supports the validity of our findings of increased PIT in GD.
5 | STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS
When carving out the relevance of PIT, we did notmatch for depression
score (BDI) because, epidemiologically, GD is associated with high
depression scores,46 meaning it could be seen as a feature of GD. Fur-
ther, the evidence on the association of PIT and depression is inconclu-
sive.47,48 However, PITmight play some role in depression and thus also
in GD subjects. Future studies should thus address the modulatory
effect of depressive symptoms in GD on PIT.49
The current classifier was slightly less effective in the independent
validation sample than estimated using cross‐validation (AUC = 65.4%
vs. 68.0%). This might have occurred due to the use of an fMRI version
of the affective mixed gambles task in the validation sample. It
included an additional decision‐making period, during which subjects
could not yet answer. This may have led to slight changes in responses
with respect to the cue categories. However, this could be seen as a
strength since our classifier still performed better than chance. And
classifiers that are robust against slight changes in the experimental
set‐up allow arguably more general conclusions than classifiers that
only work with data from the same experimental set‐up. Future stud-
ies should also use validation samples.40
Cues were repeated and trial numbers were not perfectly balanced
across categories. We adjusted for this in our analyses and results
were stable. Here, model selection geared also towards reduced loss
aversion additionally characterizing GD, in line with.23,24
6 | CONCLUSION
Our results propose that GD subjects’ acceptance of mixed gambles is
cue‐dependent and that this cue‐dependency even lends itself to
distinguishing GD from HC subjects in out‐of‐sample data. However,
we did not observe that cues specifically shift loss aversion, neither
on average, nor in a way relevant to classification. We saw that espe-
cially gambling cues lead to increased gambling GD subjects. Observ-
ing increased PIT in GD suggests that PIT related to an addictive
disorder might not depend on the direct effect of a substance of
abuse, but on related learning processes17 or on innate traits.18 The
here reported effects should be explored further in larger, more
diverse and longitudinal GD samples as they could inform diagnostics,
therapy50 and public health policy.
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1 Supplementary methods 
1.1 Sample 
We recruited GD subjects via eBay classifieds, and notices in Berlin casinos and gambling halls. 
Any known history of a neurological disorder or a current psychological disorder (except 
tobacco dependence) as assessed by the Screening of the Structured Clinical Interview for 
DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-I) (First et al., 2002) lead to exclusion from the study. There 
were five subject dropouts (two technical error, one rejected all gambles, two to improve 
matching). The final sample consisted of 30 GD and 30 HC subjects (Tab. 1). According to the 
South Oaks Gambling Screen (Lesieur and Blume, 1987; Stinchfield, 2002) (3-point Likert 
scales), GD subjects differed in gambling habits to HC mainly in frequency of playing slot 
machines (most frequent answer of GD: “3: once a week or more”, HC: “1: not at all”) (t = 7.30, 
p < 0.001) and casinos (most frequent answer of GD: “3: once a week or more”, HC: “1: not at 
all”) (t = 3.99, p = 0.001). 21 GD indicated “3: once a week or more” for slot machines, 12 
indicated that answer for casinos and 6 for sports betting. Further these questionnaires were 
used: Fagerström: smoking severity (Heatherton et al., 1991); AUDIT: alcohol use disorders 
identification test to test alcohol use severity (Dybek et al., 2006); BDI II: Beck’s Depression 
Inventory to check for depressive symptoms (Beck et al., 1996), KFG: Kurzfragebogen zum 
Glücksspielverhalten, Short Questionnaire Pathological Gambling, German diagnostic tool and 
severity measure based on the DSM-IV (Petry and Baulig, 1996); BIS: Barratt Impulsiveness 
Scale for impulsivity (Meule et al., 2011); GBQ persistence and GBQ illusions: from the 
Gamblers’ Beliefs Questionnaire, collecting gambling related cognitive distortions (Steenbergh 
et al., 2002) 
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1.2 Cue selection 
For the purposes of this study four sets of images were assembled: 1) 67 gambling images, 
showing a variety of gambling scenes, situations and cues: 36 showing different kinds of slot 
machines, 12 showing poker, 13 showing roulette, 3 featuring money, 3 featuring dice; 2) 31 
images showing negative consequences of gambling (as of now referred to as negative images): 
7 showing depression / sadness, 4 depicting poverty, 4 depicting debt, 3 showing a quarrel 
between people, 2 showing family problems, 2 showing the lack of money, 2 symbolizing 
suicide, 2 showing money burning; 3) 31 images showing positive effects of abstinence from 
gambling (as of now referred to as positive images): 6 showing family, 4 showing relationships, 
4 showing friendships, 3 depicting success, 3 depicting freedom, 3 showing joy, 2 showing 
saved money; 4) 24 neutral images showing objects: 6 kitchen utensils, 8 showing other 
household objects, 2 showing tools, 2 showing abstract paintings. None of the neutral pictures 
showed humans or faces. 
Images were obtained from the internet, sought purposefully to fit the defined categories 
(positive, gambling, neutral). Online search for images was performed using popular image 
search engines. Groups of selected images were matched for content as follows: a) percent of 
images showing a social stimulus (i.e. a person) as opposed to images without persons (gam: 
88.2%, pos: 77.4%, neg: 90.3%; Chi2 = 1.123, df = 2, p = 0.570); b) percent of images showing 
a face as opposed to people with their face turned away or just hands (gam: 35.3%, pos: 38.7%, 
neg: 51.6%; Chi2 = 3.530, df = 2, p = 0.171); c) percent of images showing males (gam: 67.6%, 
pos: 64.5%, neg: 77.4%; Chi2 = 1.300, df = 2, p = 0.523).  
All images were cropped to fit the aspect ratio optimized to minimize the loss of image area 
(3:2). Each image was cropped individually making sure that no content was lost. All the images 
were resized to the resolution of the lowest image in the set (450 x 300 pixels), ensuring that 
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the image dimensions and quality are the same across all images. The images can be acquired 
with the corresponding author for scientific purposes upon reasonable request. Due to copyright 
issues they cannot be shared publicly. 
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1.3 Behavioral models 
Table S1: Definition of gambling value. 
name definition of value in each trial np nep 
a 𝑄(𝑎)  =   𝛽0 1 - 
lar 𝑄(𝑙𝑎𝑟)  =   𝛽0 + 𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∙ 𝛽𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜  2 - 
laCh 𝑄(𝑙𝑎𝐶ℎ)  =   𝑥𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 ∙ 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 + 𝑥𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∙ 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 2 3 
la 𝑄(𝑙𝑎)  =   𝛽0 + 𝑥𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 ∙ 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 + 𝑥𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∙ 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 3 4 
ac 𝑄(𝑎𝑐)  =   𝑐𝑇 ∙ 𝛽𝑐 4 - 
lae 𝑄(𝑙𝑎𝑒)  =   𝑄(𝑙𝑎) + 𝑒𝑑 ∙ 𝛽𝑒𝑑 4 5 
larc 𝑄(𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑐)  =   𝑄(𝑙𝑎𝑟) + 𝑐𝑇 ∙ 𝛽𝑐 5 - 
lac 𝑄(𝑙𝑎𝑐)  =   𝑄(𝑙𝑎) + 𝑐𝑇 ∙ 𝛽𝑐 6 7 
laec 𝑄(𝑙𝑎𝑒𝑐)  =   𝑄(𝑙𝑎) + 𝑒𝑑 ∙ 𝛽𝑒𝑑 + 𝑐𝑇 ∙ 𝛽𝑐 7 8 
larci 𝑄(𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑖)  =   𝑄(𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑐) + 𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∙ 𝑐𝑇 ∙ 𝛽𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜,𝑐 8 - 
laChci 𝑄(𝑙𝑎𝐶ℎ𝑐𝑖)  =   𝑄(𝑙𝑎𝐶ℎ) + 𝑥𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 ∙ 𝑐𝑇 ∙ 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛,𝑐 + 𝑥𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∙ 𝑐𝑇 ∙ 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑐 8 12 
laci 𝑄(𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑖)  =   𝑄(𝑙𝑎) + 𝑐𝑇 ∙ 𝛽𝑐 + 𝑥𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 ∙ 𝑐𝑇 ∙ 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛,𝑐 + 𝑥𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∙ 𝑐𝑇 ∙ 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑐 12 16 
laeci 𝑄(𝑙𝑎𝑒𝑐𝑖)  =   𝑄(𝑙𝑎) + 𝑒𝑑 ∙ 𝛽𝑒𝑑 + 𝑐𝑇 ∙ 𝛽𝑐 + 𝑥𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 ∙ 𝑐𝑇 ∙ 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛,𝑐 + 𝑥𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∙ 𝑐𝑇 ∙ 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑐 16 20 
xsub: independent variable; 𝛽𝑠𝑢𝑏: regression weight, i.e. free parameter of model c: dummy coded cue category variable 
as vector; T: transpose; np: number of parameters in model; nep: number of parameters if model parameters were 
expanded by post-hoc computation of loss aversion parameters; the collection of parameter vectors for all subjects for 
one model is the parameter set of that model; adding to the 13 “np” parameter sets the 8 “nep” parameter sets, we thus 
have 21 parameter sets; a: model with intercept only, i.e. mean acceptance over all trials, ac: acceptance rate per category; 
ed, Gamble simplicity is defined as Euclidean distance from diagonal of gamble matrix (ed) (Tom et al., 2007) 
Lar* models are ratio models where only predictor for gamble value is ratio = gain/loss for 
each trial (Gelskov et al., 2016). La model is the classical loss aversion model (Genauck et al., 
2017; Tom et al., 2007). Lae is the model when adding ed (gamble simplicity) as additional 
predictor model (Genauck et al., 2017; Tom et al., 2007). Lac adds the category as additional 
linear effect (modulation of intercept). Laci adds further an interaction of gain and loss 
sensitivity (and thus with loss aversion) with category. Laec and Laeci are the same expect 
they add gamble simplicity again. The model a only estimates the intercept and ac only the 
shift of intercept depending on cue category (gambles are ignored). laCh is the De 
Martino/Charpentier model (Charpentier et al., 2016; De Martino et al., 2010), Q(laCh) = 1∗𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 + 𝜆∗𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠), subjected to a two-options softmax function 𝑃(𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 = 1)=(1+exp(−𝜇∗𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒))−1 
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with 𝜇 as a free parameter (i.e. the general case of a logistic function). Note, however, that laCh’s 
value function can be rewritten as Q(laCh) = 𝜇∗𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 + 𝜇∗𝜆∗𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠, which then is submitted to the 
logistic function (i.e. two-option softmax function without any free parameter). laCh is hence a 
logistic regression like la but without an intercept 𝛽0, with 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛= 𝜇 and 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠= 𝜇∗𝜆 (hence 𝜆= 
𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠/ 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛). Hence, laChci (Charpentier et al., 2016) can be formed accordingly. 
1.4 Classification using behavioral data 
1.4.1 Detailed description of algorithm to build classifier 
From 21 different parameter sets (Tab. S1), representing different “loss aversion PIT” (e.g. the 
laci model) and respective control models, we wanted to find the best parameter set to build a 
classifier (here a logistic regression model) to distinguish between GD and HC subjects in out-
of-sample test data (Guggenmos et al., 2018; Whelan et al., 2014) (Fig. S3). We expected to 
see the laci model winning, because it assumes an interaction between loss aversion and cue 
categories. 
In a first step we used model selection based on cross-validation to find the parameter set that 
best distinguished between GD and HC (Arlot and Celisse, 2010; Bratu et al., 2008; Varma and 
Simon, 2006). Using cross-validation for model selection ensures that the selected model will 
be the one that best generalizes to out-of-sample data (and hence overfitting is avoided). The 
algorithm used the different parameter sets, one by one, to predict group membership of subjects 
using logistic ridge regression (Le Cessie and Van Houwelingen, 1992) (Section 1.5). Ridge 
regression has one hyperparameter that is tuned to optimize the cross-validated classification 
power of each parameter set according to the area under the receiver operating curve (AUC-
ROC) (Ahn et al., 2016; Ahn and Vassileva, 2016; Whelan et al., 2014; Zacharaki et al., 2009). 
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AUC-ROC ranges from 0.5 (chance) to 1 (perfect sensitivity and specificity) (Provost et al., 
1998). The parameter set with the highest cross-validated AUC-ROC was selected. 
In a second step, the classifier was completed. Smoking severity was not entirely matched 
between the groups. This is why the algorithm added smoking severity to the parameter set with 
the best cross-validated AUC-ROC score from the first step to logistic elastic net regression 
(Zou and Hastie, 2005) (Section 1.5), optimizing the AUC-ROC by tuning its two hyper-
parameters (Whelan et al., 2014), again via cross-validation (Fig. S3). We did not use elastic 
net regression during model selection because it can force regression parameters to zero (sparse 
models) (Zou and Hastie, 2005). This would have blurred the interpretable differences between 
the behavioral models. However, we used elastic net regression in the last step of classifier 
building, because we were interested whether the algorithm would force parameters of the 
winning model from the first model selection step to zero, e.g. because a parameter does not 
add any more information to classification. 
We assessed the generalizability of the above algorithm 1000 times via 10-fold cross-validation 
(Arlot and Celisse, 2010), which yielded a distribution of classifiers and thus of AUC-ROC’s. 
Note that the cross-validation to estimate generalizability lead to the cross-validations used in 
the machine learning (for tuning of hyperparameters) of the first and second step to become 
nested, which is necessary to avoid contamination between training and test data (Arlot and 
Celisse, 2010; Bratu et al., 2008; Varma and Simon, 2006; Whelan et al., 2014). We computed 
the mean of the obtained AUC-ROC’s and estimated its p-value by performing the exact same 
1000 CV rounds but each time with only smoking severity as predictor (baseline classifier). We 
then subtracted the AUC-ROC’s of the baseline classifiers one-by-one from the 1000 AUC-
ROC’s of the full classifiers. This yielded a distribution of classification improvement (i.e., 
improvement of AUC-ROC due to using the full classifier instead of the baseline classifier). 
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We tested this distribution against the value of classification improvement under the null-
hypothesis (i.e. zero improvement) to obtain a p-value of significance of classification 
improvement. 
To build the final interpretable and reportable classifier, one would usually apply the algorithm 
once to the complete data set. Since the application to the complete data set still entails cross 
validation for tuning of the ridge and elastic net regressions’ hyperparameters leading to slightly 
varying classifiers, the algorithm was not run once but 1000 times on the complete data set. We 
plotted the ensuing distribution of selected parameter sets and the distribution of the respective 
regression weights as per-parameter means with 95% percentile bounds. For a graphical 
illustration of the algorithm see Fig. S3. For the R code and the data please see 
https://github.com/pransito/PIT_GD_bv_release. 
1.4.2 Validating the classifier on an independent sample 
We applied all 1000 classifiers estimated on the full data set to each of the 60 subjects of the 
validation sample, yielding 1000 decision values per subject (real-valued scalars). To 
incorporate the complete distribution of the classifiers, we summed up, for each subject, the 
decision responses of all 1000 estimated classifiers, yielding one decision value per subject. 
Using the known true labels of all subjects, the decision values of all subjects were used to 
compute the AUC-ROC. We compared this obtained AUC-ROC to its distribution under a null-
model (10,000 repetitions of random, i.e. coin-flip, classification), to compute a p-value. 
Alexander Genauck 10 
 
 
Figure S1: Classification algorithm (in green) and its cross-validation (in blue). 10-fold-cross-validation of the 
algorithm that builds a classifier to predict the group (i.e. label) of each subject (healthy control vs. subjects with 
gambling disorder) based on behavioral data. On each fold, data was split into training and test set. Training had 
90% (54), test had 10% (6) data points. As preparation, all subjects have their behavioral choice data modeled 
according to the 21 candidate models, leading to 21 parameter sets. Step 1: All parameter sets are one-by-one 
used to predict group membership using logistic ridge regression. Performance is assessed using nested 5-fold 
cross-validation (CV), i.e. training has 72% (43) data points and test has 18% (11) data points. Logistic ridge 
regression is performed over a range of values of the penalty parameter to get optimal nested CV performance 
per parameter set. The best performing parameter set is declared winner. If there are ties, the simpler parameter 
set is declared winner. For stability, this step is repeated 10 times and the most often winning model is forwarded. 
Step 2: The winning parameter set plus covariate “smoking severity” is subjected to a logistic elastic net 
regression optimizing for its two hyper-parameters using nested 10-fold CV (training: 81%, 49 data points; test: 
9%, 5 data points). This gets repeated 10 times for stability and from 10 models a mean model is computed. This 
yields a classifier, i.e. here a logistic regression model, which is applied to the initial 10% test data points. The 
procedure is repeated until all data points have been test data once and decision-values could be collected for 
all 60 subjects. The area under curve (AUC) under the receiver-operating (ROC) curve is then computed as CV 
score of interest. To account for the multiple possibilities of slicing the data into training and test for 10-fold CV 
and to compute a p-value the whole procedure was repeated 1000 planned times: a) running all steps described 
above; b) running only step 2 with only smoking severity as predictor (baseline model). All data splits ensured 
balanced labels (50/50) in training and test sets.  
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1.5 Logistic elastic net regression 
Logistic elastic net regression expands normal logistic regression by penalizing complicated 
regression solutions (large regression weights). How much it penalizes is governed by two 
hyper-paramters: λ and α, introduced in its expanded error (or cost) function (i.e. the 
measurement of how far off the fitted model’s predictions are from the real data’s labels): 
𝐿 = 𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇(ℎ(𝑥), 𝑦) + 𝜆[(1 − 𝛼)|𝛽|22/2 + 𝛼|𝛽|1] 
...where COST is the cross-entropy function (i.e. in short the negative log-likelihood of the 
model, (Bishop, 2006, 205ff.) exact equation of which is not relevant here. Further, h(x) is the 
model yielding a decision-value/a prediction, and x is the vector of predictors.  
The model h(x) is a regression equation that can be written as 𝜃(𝛽𝑇𝑥), where 𝛽𝑇𝑥 is the scalar 
product of the regression weights stored in vector 𝛽and the predictor vector x, and 𝜃is the 
logistic transfer function. The regularization term +𝜆[. . . ]adds the size of the vector beta to the 
cost because it is a measure of complexity. Elastic net regression uses two measures, the L1-
norm (|𝛽|1) and the L2-norm (|𝛽|2) and mixes them depending on the two hyperparameters 𝜆 
and 𝛼. Upon estimation of 𝛽, L is minimized given λ and α (Zou and Hastie, 2005). Which 
hyperparameters to choose is a matter of tuning, e.g. via nested cross-validation. Ridge 
regression is a special case of elastic net regression, namely when α = 0. 
1.6 Group comparisons regarding acceptance rate and loss aversion parameters 
To provide a fuller overview of the data, we also performed classical mean-differences analyses 
to analyze the choice data. We explored the effect of the independent variables “cue category” 
and “group” onto the dichotomized dependent variable “choice”. We thus fitted logistic linear 
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mixed effects models using R’s lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) with “cue category” and 
“group” as sources of fixed effects and “subject” and “cue” as sources of random effects. 
Concerning LA, we explored the effect of the independent variables “gain” and “loss” onto the 
dependent variable “choice”. We thus fitted a logistic linear mixed effects model with “gain” 
and “loss” as sources of fixed effects and “subject”, “cue” and “cue category” as sources of 
random effects. We tested for significance of the effects of independent variables using nested-
models chi-square-difference tests (i.e. likelihood-ratio tests) and ΔAIC (with positive ΔAIC 
meaning an improvement in model fit). We performed further model comparisons with models 
successively incorporating higher-order interactions of the independent variables ((“gain” +  
“loss”) X “cue category”).  
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1.7 Validation sample 
Table S2: Sample characteristics, means and p-values calculated by two-sided permutation test. 
Variable HC (N = 
30) 
se PG (N = 
30) 
se pooled se p perm test 
years in school 10.87 0.19 10.13 0.24 0.21 0.031 
vocational school 2.73 0.29 2.07 0.25 0.27 0.108 
net personal income 1029 92.27 1106 138.93 115.6 0.667 
personal debt 8500 3397 24000 9590 6494 0.097 
Fagerström 1.97 0.43 3.03 0.51 0.47 0.138 
age 35.37 1.66 37.37 2.01 1.84 0.459 
AUDIT 4.8 0.59 4.87 1.05 0.82 1 
BDI-II 5.1 1.03 11.57 1.72 1.38 0.002 
SOGS 1.73 0.47 8.8 0.67 0.57  < 0.001 
KFG 2.37 0.74 35 1.64 1.19  < 0.001 
BIS-15 31.8 0.99 36.33 1.08 1.03 0.004 
GBQ persistence 1.96 0.2 3.28 0.19 0.2  < 0.001 
GBQ illusions 2.41 0.24 3.73 0.22 0.23  < 0.001 
ratio female 0.20 - 0.20 - - 1.000 
ratio unemployed 0.17 - 0.20 - - 1.000 
ratio smokers 0.60 - 0.77 - - 0.262 
ratio right-handed 0.97 - 0.84 - - 0.204 
*chi-square test used; se: bootstrapped standard errors; years in school: years in primary and secondary school; vocational
school: vocational school and/or university; Fagerström: smoking severity (Heatherton et al., 1991); AUDIT: alcohol use 
disorders identification test to test alcohol use severity (Dybek et al., 2006); BDI II: Beck’s Depression Inventory to check for 
depressive symptoms (Beck et al., 1996), SOGS: South Oaks Gambling Screen to check for pathological gambling according to 
DSM-III (Lesieur and Blume, 1987); KFG: Kurzfragebogen zum Glücksspielverhalten, Short Questionnaire Pathological 
Gambling, German diagnostic tool and severity measure based on the DSM-IV (Petry and Baulig, 1996); BIS: Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale for impulsivity (Meule et al., 2011); GBQ persistence and GBQ illusions: from the Gamblers’ Beliefs 
Questionnaire, collecting gambling related cognitive distortions (Steenbergh et al., 2002) 
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2 Supplementary results 
2.1 Cue ratings 
 
Figure S2: Means and bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals of rating variables. GD: subjects with gambling 
disorder, HC: healthy controls. Plot facets report from top to bottom on ratings of neutral category cues, 
gambling, negative and positive category cues. Neutral cues were indeed rated as neutral in valence and as 
eliciting low arousal (Lang et al., 1993) 
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2.1.1 Valence 
As expected, image category affected valence ratings (ΔChi2 = 1513, Δdf = 11, p < 0.001), 
where negative images were rated as lower than neutral images in valence (β = -0.760, p < 
0.001), the positive category was rated higher in valence than neutral images (β = 0.782, p < 
0.001). 
Beyond image category group had a modulatory influence on valence ratings (ΔChi2 = 11, Δdf 
= 4, p < 0.024). PG subjects showed a trend in rating gambling pictures higher than HC subjects 
(β = 0.268, p = 0.086). 
2.1.2 Arousal 
As expected, image category affected arousal ratings (ΔChi2 = 2067, Δdf = 11, p < 0.001), where 
neutral images were rated as lower than 0 in arousal (β = -0.694, p < 0.001). All other categories 
were rated as more arousing than neutral images (βs ranging from 0.428 to 0.698, all p’s < 
0.001). Gambling images were slightly more arousing than positive images (β = 0.175, p = 
0.023). Negative images were slightly more arousing than positive images (β = 0.270, p = 
0.012). 
Beyond image category group had some modulatory influence on arousal ratings (ΔChi2 = 10, 
Δdf = 4, p = 0.048). PG subjects did not find gambling pictures more arousing than HC. 
2.1.3 Dominance 
As expected, image category affected dominance ratings (ΔChi2 = 1963, Δdf = 11, p < 0.001), 
where the positive (β = 0.552, p < 0.001) and gambling (β = 0.456, p < 0.001) images were both 
rated higher than 0. Negative images (β = -0.236, p = 0.013) and neutral images (β = -0.179, p 
= 0.023) were rated as lower than 0 in dominance. 
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Beyond image category group did not have an influence on dominance ratings. (ΔChi2 = 4, Δdf 
= 4, p = 0.352) 
2.1.4 Craving inducing  
As expected, image category affected craving ratings when both groups were combined (ΔChi2 
= 3430, Δdf = 11, p < 0.001), respectively. Gambling pictures induced more craving for 
gambling than any other image category: gambling > neutral (β = 0.999 p < 0.001), gambling > 
negative (β = 0.881, p < 0.001), gambling > positive (β = 0.901, p < 0.001). 
Beyond image category group had a significant influence on craving ratings. (ΔChi2 = 20, Δdf 
= 4, p < 0.001). PG subjects showed higher ratings for craving on gambling pictures (β = 0.707, 
p < 0.001) compared to HC subjects. 
2.1.5 Representativeness for gambling  
As expected, image category affected gambling representativeness ratings (ΔChi2 = 684, Δdf = 
11, p < 0.001). Gambling category images were more representative of gambling than any other 
category: gambling > neutral (β = 1.606, p < 0.001), gambling > negative (β = 1.209, p < 0.001), 
gambling > positive (β = 1.482, p < 0.001). Beyond image category group had no modulatory 
influence. 
2.1.6 Representativeness for negative effects of gambling  
As expected, image category affected ratings of representativeness for negative effects of 
gambling (ΔChi2 = 1952, Δdf = 11, p < 0.001).  
Negative image category was more representative of negative effects of gambling than any other 
group: negative > gambling (β = 1.049, p < 0.001), negative > positive (β = 1.471, p < 0.001), 
negative > neutral (β = 1.514, p < 0.001). Beyond image category group did not have an 
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influence on ratings of representativeness for negative effects of gambling (ΔChi2 = 2, Δdf = 4, 
p = 0.971). 
2.1.7 Representativeness for positive effects of gambling abstinence 
As expected, image category affected ratings of representativeness for positive effects of 
gambling abstinence (ΔChi2 = 2590, Δdf = 11, p < 0.001, both groups combined). The positive 
category was more representative of positive effects of abstinence from gambling than any other 
category: positive > neutral (β = 0.889, p < 0.001), positive > negative (β = 0.590, p < 0.001) 
and positive > gambling (β = 0.605, p < 0.001). Beyond image category group did not have an 
influence on ratings of representativeness for positive effects of gambling abstinence (ΔChi2 = 
1, Δdf = 4, p = 0.836). 
2.1.8 How much do you question your gambling when seeing this image 
This question was only answered by gamblers. As expected, image category affected the 
motivation of questioning the own gambling behavior (ΔChi2 = 1514, Δdf = 11, p < 0.001), 
where the negative images were rated higher than any other image category: negative > neutral 
(β = 1.121, p < 0.001), negative > positive (β = 0.535, p < 0.001) and negative images were also 
rated higher than gambling images (β = 0.514, p = 0.003). One subject did not answer these 
questions and hence was not included in this analysis. 
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2.2 Group comparisons loss aversion models 
Gain and loss had a significant influence on gamble choice in all subjects (p < 0.001, ΔAIC = 
4414). There was a significant fixed effect interaction with group that improved model fit (p < 
0.001, ΔAIC = 93). Gain, absolute loss sensitivity, and LA over all trials for HC (0.26, 0.42, 
and 1.64) was descriptively larger than for GD (0.19, 0.22, and 1.13) (Fig. S3), with only 
sensitivity to loss being significantly larger in HC than in GD (pWaldApprox = 0.011). LA was 
significantly smaller in GD than in HC (pperm < 0.001). 
 
 
Figure S3: Fixed effects loss aversion, gain sensitivity, loss sensitivity, and intercept per group. The fixed effects 
and their non-parametrically bootstrapped CIs (many repetitions of lme fits with resampled subjects within 
groups) are displayed. var: variable, la: loss aversion, gain: gain sensitivity, loss: loss sensitivity, intercept: 
intercept of the logistic regression, i.e. the general acceptance rate at mean gain and loss 
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Adding the simple effect of category with group interaction lead to a significant improvement 
of the model (p < 0.001, ΔAIC = 691). Here, we saw a significantly higher acceptance during 
gambling cues for GD subjects compared to HC (pWaldApprox < 0.001). The additional triple-
interaction “group X (gain, loss) X category” did not improve the model (p = 1, ΔAIC = -196). 
2.3 Additional results graphs classifier 
Figure S4: Mean receiver-operating curve for behavioral classifier. Describes how classifier fares concerning 
sensitivity and specificity when asked to distinguish GD subjects from HC subjects in independent subjects. Blue 
shows the ROC for the classifier (mean over 1000 rounds of the algorithm). Red is the ROC of the CV scheme with 
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only smoking as predictor (0-hypothesis). Black is the theoretical 0-hypothesis. The classifier fares better than 
expected under the 0-hypothesis. 
 
Figure S5: Frequency of behavioral models selected. The classification algorithm chose the “acceptance rate by 
category” model (ac) the most often in 1000 rounds of running the classification algorithm on the complete data. 
Models ending in “LA” are the models which have loss aversion (λ) parameters appended to the parameter set. 
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2.4 Classifier results adjusted for cue repetition and with equal number of trials 
We ran the algorithm by adding a factor “repeated_vs_novel” in each single-subject model as a 
covariate of no-interest, in order to adjust the estimation of all other parameters for that factor. 
In each trial, it was 0, if image was shown for the first time, else 1. We extracted all parameters 
per model and subject, as before, adjusted for “repeated_vs_novel”. We also randomly selected 
45 out of 67 gambling images to equalize the number of trials per cue category (now 45 in all 
categories). The results did not change meaningfully: AUC = 65.1, p = 0.016. On the validation 
set: AUC = 67.5, p = 0.017. The most often-picked model was still ac and its regression weights 
looked as before (Fig. 2). However, the selection of models was more varied now (Fig. S6 
compared to Fig. S5). When only adjusting for novelty and not cutting the gambling stimuli to 
45, then the results were again like the original ones, and the distribution of selected models 
was very similar to Fig. S5 (AUC: 64.5, p = 0.021, AUC on validation sample: 66.5%, p = 
0.025. Thus, the cutting from 67 to 45 seems to make the difference in model selection, perhaps 
because 67 gamble trials just lead to stronger signal in the cue-dependent signal and thus the 
classifier uses also other models from time to time. However, note that still almost all models 
selected include the “c”, i.e. the influence of category plays a role everywhere (on acceptance 
rate), just in some more models gain and loss sensitivity and loss aversion play a role 
additionally. In all analyses, cues have no relevant influence on gain and loss sensitivity (no 
interaction effect, laci model was not picked). 
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Figure S6: Frequency of model selection in 1000 rounds of applying the algorithm. Using only 45 gambling cues and adjusting for repeated presentation of cues. 
 
Figure S7: Frequency of model selection in 1000 rounds of applying the algorithm. Single-subject models adjusted for repeated vs. novel cues. 
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ABSTRACT 1 
In addiction, there are few human studies on the neural basis of cue-induced changes in value-2 
based decision-making (Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer, PIT). It is especially unclear 3 
whether neural alterations related to PIT are due to the physiological effects of substance abuse, 4 
or rather related to learning processes and/or other etiological factors related to addiction. We 5 
have thus investigated whether neural activation patterns during a PIT task help to distinguish 6 
subjects with gambling disorder (GD), i.e. a non-substance-based addiction, from healthy 7 
controls (HC). 8 
30 GD and 30 HC subjects completed an affective decision-making task in a functional 9 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner. Gambling associated and other emotional cues 10 
were shown in the background during the task. Data collection and feature modeling focused 11 
on a network of NAcc, amygdala and OFC (derived from PIT and SUD studies). We built and 12 
tested a linear classifier based on these multivariate neural PIT signatures. 13 
GD subjects showed stronger PIT than HC subjects. Classification based on neural PIT 14 
signatures yielded a significant AUC-ROC (0.70, p = 0.013). GD subjects showed stronger PIT-15 
related functional connectivity between NAcc and amygdala elicited by gambling cues, as well 16 
as between amygdala and OFC elicited by negative and positive cues. 17 
HC and GD subjects were thus distinguishable by PIT-related neural signatures including 18 
amygdala-NAcc-OFC functional connectivity. Neural PIT alterations in addictive disorders 19 
might not depend on the physiological effect of a substance of abuse, but on related learning 20 
processes or even innate neural traits.  21 
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INTRODUCTION 1 
In addictive disorders, a cue can be any formerly neutral stimulus that has been repeatedly paired 2 
with the effects of the addictive behavior [1]. The effect of increased responsivity towards 3 
addiction-related cues is termed cue reactivity and is pivotal in explaining a range of behaviors 4 
related to addictive disorders, such as arousal, attentional bias, craving, and relapse [1,2,3]. 5 
In line with this, subjects suffering from gambling disorder (GD) display increased neural 6 
activity elicited by addiction-related cues and a reduced neural response towards stimuli 7 
signaling natural rewards [4,5], just like patients suffering from substance-use disorders (SUDs) 8 
[2,3]. 9 
Besides cue reactivity, and again just like in SUDs, GD subjects display impaired value-based 10 
decision-making. For example, GD subjects show increased risk taking, higher discounting of 11 
delayed rewards (delay discounting) and reduced loss aversion [6,7,8,9,10]. 12 
Impaired value-based decision-making in addiction may partly be explained, or even further 13 
exacerbated, by cues that modulate decision-making processes. The modulating influence of 14 
conditioned cues on instrumental behavior (e.g. cue-related increase of vigor with which a 15 
behavior is displayed or increase of likelihood of choosing a certain option) has been termed 16 
Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT) [11,12]. Interestingly, PIT effects can persist even 17 
when the outcome of the instrumental behavior has been devalued [13,14], and a stronger PIT 18 
has been associated with heightened impulsivity [15] and with reduced model-based behavior 19 
[16]. Therefore, PIT has gained considerable attention in addiction research. Increased PIT has 20 
been associated with SUDs in animal studies [17,18] and in human studies [19,20]. It is 21 
especially important to know whether these effects are related to substance abuse or also present 22 
in behavioral addictions, such as GD. 23 
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Indeed there is evidence that delay discounting is increased under the influence of high-craving 1 
gambling cues vs. low-craving gambling cues [21,22]. Further, Genauck et al. [23] used a 2 
mixed-gambles task coupled with emotional and gambling-related cues (affective mixed-3 
gambles task) to estimate subject-specific behavioral PIT parameters with regards to loss 4 
aversion. The authors found that gambling-cue related shifts in general gamble acceptance 5 
especially contributed to distinguishing GD subjects from HC subjects. Cue-induced changes 6 
in loss-aversion, however, did not contribute. In the present study, subjects performed a very 7 
similar affective mixed-gambles task in a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 8 
scanner. Genauck et al. [23] successfully used the behavioral data of the present study as an 9 
independent sample to validate their HC-GD classifier. However, it remains to be elucidated 10 
which neural correlates of PIT distinguish GD from HC. 11 
If there are neural PIT signatures associated with GD then this would be additional evidence for 12 
functional brain changes related to addictive disorders independent of a substance of abuse 13 
[5,24,25]. Our study is the first to investigate functional brain changes in GD compared to HC 14 
related to cue-induced changes in value-based decision making. We expected that neural PIT 15 
signatures derived from SUD studies should underlie behavioral PIT increase also in GD, and 16 
thus lend themselves to distinguish GD from HC subjects. 17 
At the neural level, PIT depends on the functions of amygdala and the ventral striatum 18 
(VS/Nucleus Accumbens/NAcc) [12,26]. Garbusow et al. [19] distinguished alcohol dependent 19 
relapsers from abstainers using a NAcc PIT signal, reaching an accuracy of 71% in leave-one-20 
out cross-validation. Note that cue reactivity, which PIT arguably is based upon, is also 21 
associated with altered activity of amygdala and NAcc in addictive disorders [3]. 22 
In addition to possible activity differences in limbic regions being associated with PIT NAcc-23 
amygdala connectivity plays a role in decision-making changes due to emotional cues [27]. 24 
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Other authors have argued that Pavlovian influence on instrumental behavior require the 1 
modulation of ongoing processes in the striatum by the amygdala [28]. Bi-directional NAcc-2 
amygdala connectivity could thus be enhanced in GD subjects during presentation of addiction-3 
relevant cues. Holmes et al. [29] further suggest a contribution of the orbital frontal cortex in 4 
integrating information about Pavlovian and instrumental processes, together with the striatum 5 
and amygdala. The ANDREA (affective neuroscience of decision through reward-based 6 
evaluation of alternatives) model makes similar predictions when explaining transient changes 7 
in gamble acceptance in decision-making tasks [30] (Fig. S3). In particular, the ANDREA 8 
model suggests that the evaluation of a gamble involving possible gains and losses leads to a 9 
subjective value signal in the OFC. Amygdala inputs to OFC can modulate those subjective 10 
value representations when positively valued or salient stimuli (e.g. gambling cues) are shown 11 
in the background. Since there is some evidence that GD subjects show cue-induced changes in 12 
instrumental behavior and decision-making in response to gambling cues, putatively related to 13 
stronger behavioral PIT effects [21,22,23], this could mean that gambling cues increase the 14 
subjective gamble value represented in OFC via amygdala projections. We thus expected that 15 
stronger gambling-cue PIT-related functional connectivity from amygdala to OFC should help 16 
distinguish GD from HC. 17 
In summary, we hypothesized that a neural PIT signature made up of several PIT-related fMRI 18 
contrasts could distinguish GD from HC subjects. We therefore compiled per subject a feature 19 
vector comprised of cue reactivity and PIT-related contrasts in amygdala and NAcc, and of 20 
functional connectivity parameters in a network of NAcc, amygdala and OFC. Hence the feature 21 
vector represented each subject’s neural PIT signature, in the form of multiple functional 22 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) aggregates [31,32]. We used all subjects’ neural PIT 23 
signatures to estimate a classifier which would distinguish GD from HC subjects. We expected 24 
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that PIT-related predictors would be found among the most important ones followed by the cue-1 
reactivity predictors. Using cross-validation we assessed the generalizability of this classifier to 2 
new samples. Classifying GD and HC subjects using multivariate patterns aims to bring us 3 
closer to a clinically relevant characterization of the neural disturbances related to GD, 4 
especially when there are many relevant variables involved [31,33,34,35]. To our knowledge, 5 
our study is the first one to use fMRI-based classification for investigating GD and its neural 6 
basis of increased PIT.  7 
Alexander Genauck 9 
METHODS AND MATERIALS 1 
Sample 2 
The GD group consisted of subjects who were active gamblers (mainly slot machine), while the 3 
HC group consisted of subjects that had none or little experience in gambling. We recruited GD 4 
subjects via eBay classifieds, and notices in Berlin casinos and gambling halls. GD subjects 5 
were diagnosed using the German short questionnaire for gambling behavior (KFG) (cutoff  ≥ 6 
16) [36]. The KFG classifies subjects according to DSM-IV criteria for pathological gambling. 7 
However, in the following we use the DSM-5 term “gambling disorder” interchangeably, 8 
because the criteria largely overlap. For further information on administered questionnaires, see 9 
Supplements 1.1. There were 13 subject dropouts due to technical errors, positive drug 10 
screenings, incidental cerebral anatomical findings or MRI contraindications. We dropped five 11 
more subjects to improve the matching of the groups on covariates of no interest (age, smoking 12 
severity, education, and see Tab. 1). The final sample consisted of 30 GD and 30 HC subjects 13 
(Tab. 1). GD and HC were matched on relevant variables (net personal income, age, alcohol 14 
use), except for years in school (primary and secondary). We thus tested for stability of our 15 
classifier by adjusting for years in school. 16 
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Table 1: Sample characteristics, means and p-values calculated by two-sided permutation test. 1 
variable HC (30) se GD (30) se pooled se p perm test 
years in school 10.87 0.19 10.13 0.24 0.21 0.031 
vocational school 2.73 0.29 2.07 0.25 0.27 0.108 
net personal income 1028.61 92.27 1105.89 138.93 115.6 0.667 
personal debt 8500 3396.88 24000 9590.36 6493.62 0.097 
Fagerström 1.97 0.43 3.03 0.51 0.47 0.138 
age 35.37 1.66 37.37 2.01 1.84 0.459 
AUDIT 4.8 0.59 4.87 1.05 0.82 1 
BDI-II 5.1 1.03 11.57 1.72 1.38 0.002 
SOGS 1.73 0.47 8.8 0.67 0.57 <0.001 
KFG 2.37 0.74 35 1.64 1.19 <0.001 
BIS-15 31.8 0.99 36.33 1.08 1.03 0.004 
GBQ persistence 1.96 0.2 3.28 0.19 0.2 <0.001 
GBQ illusions 2.41 0.24 3.73 0.22 0.23 <0.001 
ratio female 0.20 - 0.20 - - 1.000 
ratio unemployed 0.17 - 0.20 - - 1.000 
ratio smokers 0.60 - 0.77 - - 0.262 
ratio right-handed 0.97 - 0.84 - - 0.204 
*chi-square test used; se: bootstrapped standard errors; years in school: years in primary and secondary school; vocational 2 
school is vocational school and university; Fagerström: smoking severity; AUDIT: alcohol use disorders identification test; BDI 3 
II: Beck’s Depression Inventory, SOGS: South Oaks Gambling Screen; KFG: Kurzfragebogen zum Glückspielverhalten, Short 4 
Questionnaire Pathological Gambling, German diagnostic tool and severity measure based on the DSM-IV; BIS-15: short 5 
version of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale for impulsivity; GBQ persistence and GBQ illusions: from the Gamblers’ Beliefs 6 
Questionnaire (for sources of questionnaires, see Supplements 1.1) 7 
  8 
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Procedure and data acquisition 1 
Before scanning, all subjects underwent urine drug testing to exclude any influence of cannabis, 2 
amphetamines, cocaine, methamphetamines, opiates, or benzodiazepines. They then were 3 
instructed on the task and completed the affective mixed gamble task in a 3-Tesla SIEMENS 4 
Trio MRI (2 runs of about 23 minutes). EPI scans were acquired, as well as structural MRI. For 5 
further details on MRI sequences see Supplements 1.5. 6 
Affective mixed-gambles task 7 
We built on established mixed-gambles tasks [10,37] and cued mixed-gambles task [23,27]. As 8 
affective cues, four sets of images were assembled: 1) 67 gambling images, showing a variety 9 
of gambling scenes, and paraphernalia (gambling cues); 2) 31 images showing negative 10 
consequences of gambling (negative cues); 3) 31 images showing positive effects of abstinence 11 
from gambling (positive cues); 4) 24 neutral IAPS images (neutral cues). For a detailed 12 
description of the images and their categories see Supplements 1.2. Subjects were each given 13 
20€ for wagering during the task (Fig. 1). Gambles were created by randomly drawing with 14 
replacement from a matrix with possible gambles consisting of 12 levels of gains (14, 16, …, 15 
36) and 12 levels of losses (-7, -8, …, -18) [10,37,38]. In every subject, we stratified gambles 16 
according to mean and variance of gain, loss, gamble variance, and Euclidean distance from 17 
gamble matrix diagonal (ed, i.e. gamble difficulty). We informed subjects that after completing 18 
the experiment five of their gamble decisions with ratings of “somewhat yes” or “yes” would 19 
be randomly chosen and played for real money. 20 
------------------------------- PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE ---------------------------------  21 
Alexander Genauck 12 
 
Cue ratings 1 
After the task, subjects rated all cues using the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) assessment 2 
technique (valence, arousal, dominance) [39] and additional visual analogue scales. Additional 3 
questions were: 1) “How strongly does this image trigger craving for gambling?”; 2) “How 4 
appropriately does this image represent one or more gambles?”; 3) “How appropriately does 5 
this image represent possible negative effects of gambling?”; 4) “How appropriately does this 6 
image represent possible positive effects of gambling abstinence?”. All cue ratings were z-7 
standardized within subject. Cue ratings were analyzed one-by-one using linear mixed-effects 8 
regression, using lmer from the lme4 package in R [40], where cue category (and, in the 9 
respective models, clinical group) denoted the fixed effects and subjects and cues denoted the 10 
sources of random effects. Model comparisons were used to test for the effect of cue category 11 
and group and their interaction using χ2-square difference tests. We report relevant contrast-β’s 12 
only if the overall effect of the relevant factor (group, category, groupXcategory) was 13 
significant. For significance testing of those contrast-β’s, we use Wald z-tests as implemented 14 
in lme4. 15 
Behavioral data 16 
Choice data was modeled within each subject’s behavioral data by submitting dichotomized 17 
choices (somewhat no & no: 0; somewhat yes & yes: 1) into logistic regression. We 18 
dichotomized choices to increase the precision when estimating behavioral parameters, in line 19 
with previous studies [10,23,37]. Predictors were centralized values of gain, centralized 20 
absolute values of loss, Euclidean distance (ed) from gamble matrix as indicator of gamble 21 
simplicity (see Fig. S1) [37], and cue category (c). 12 steps of gain (14, 16, 18, …, 36) and 12 22 
steps of loss (-7, -8, -9, …, -18) formed a 12-by-12 gamble matrix, which was aggregated to 4-23 
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by-4 (e.g. gain steps 14, 16, 18 were all denoted as 16 and loss steps -18, -17, -16 were denoted 1 
as -17) as done in previous fMRI versions of this task [10,37]. We defined the gamble value (𝑄𝑄) 2 
on single-trial level as: 3 
        𝑄𝑄 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 ∗ 𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 + 𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ∗ 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 ∙ 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐  ȏͳȐ4 
We call this model the laec model. Here 𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇is a transposed column vector, denoting the dummy 5 
code of the cue’s category on any given trial and 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 is a column vector holding the regression 6 
weights describing the shift in gamble value with respect to the cue category. Hence, 𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 is 7 
a scalar product describing the additive effect of cue category. We fit the logistic regression 8 
based on Eq. [1] with… 9 
𝑃𝑃(𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒)  =  1/(1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎(−𝑄𝑄))   [2] 10 
within a generalized linear mixed-effects model, using glmer from the lme4 package in R [40]. 11 
Here, gain, loss, ed, cue category denoted the fixed effects and subjects and cues denoted the 12 
sources of random effects. To test if the groups differed in the parameters of the laec model, we 13 
expanded the model by an additional fixed effect of group modulating the effect of gain, loss, 14 
ed, and cue category (laecg). Statistical testing of the model comparison was performed using 15 
χ2-square difference tests, as well as the comparing the Akaike (and Bayeisan) information 16 
criterion of the baseline model (laec) with that of the full model (laecg). For statistical tests of 17 
single parameters in the laecg model, we used Wald z-tests as implemented in lme4. For more 18 
analyses of the behavioral data, please see Supplements (Sections 1.4, 2.1). 19 
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FMRI data 1 
Preprocessing and single-subject model of fMRI data 2 
Imaging analyses were performed in SPM12 running on Matlab (R2014a). Please see 3 
Supplements 1.5 for description of preprocessing of MRI data. We modeled the preprocessed 4 
fMRI single-subject data using three onset regressors (Cue, Cue plus gamble, Cue plus gamble 5 
plus response option). The first and second onset regressors, each with their parametric 6 
modulators, modeled cue reactivity and PIT, respectively (Supplements 1.6). 7 
Extracting fMRI features for classifier building 8 
We were interested whether PIT fMRI contrasts from certain brain regions (regions of interest, 9 
ROIs) could predict if a subject belongs to the HC or the GD group. We hence extracted the 10 
mean activity for cue reactivity (gambling, negative, positive; pmod(1-3) of onset regressor 1) 11 
and for the PIT contrasts (acceptXgambling, acceptXnegative, acceptXpositive; pmod(5-7) of 12 
onset regressor 2) using the within-subject means from the ROIs NAcc R/L and amygdala R/L. 13 
NAcc and amygdala ROIs were taken from the Neuromorphometrics SPM12 brain atlas. 14 
To keep in line with accounts of PIT depending on NAcc-Amy connectivity [27,28] and on 15 
amygdala-OFC connectivity [29,30] (Fig. S3), we also extracted functional connectivity 16 
(generalized psycho-physiological interaction, gPPI) [41] for the PIT contrasts. We used the 17 
seeds amygdala R/L and NAcc R/L (see Supplements 1.7). For the seeds amygdala R/L we 18 
extracted the mean from target ROIs OFC R/L (4 subregions on either side), and from target 19 
ROIs NAcc R/L. For the seeds NAcc R/L, we extracted from the target ROIs Amy R/L. 20 
Information from left medial OFC was not available due to signal loss in that region. Collecting 21 
all the extracts per subject, we had at this point for each subject a vector representing his or her 22 
specific neural PIT pattern. We z-standardized this vector for each subject. We then reduced the 23 
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dimensionality of this vector for each subject by computing within-subject means, collapsing 1 
for each ROI left and right (see Supplements 1.8). 2 
To check for overall task signal, we checked for PIT effects in amygdala and NAcc across 3 
groups and for cue reactivity difference between groups in amygdala, NAcc and OFC using 4 
years in school as a covariate of no interest in all cases.  5 
Building the classifier based on fMRI data 6 
The neural PIT vectors per subject were stacked into a data set. Since HC and GD were not 7 
perfectly matched on years in school, we added this variable to the data set, which was then 8 
submitted to logistic elastic net regression, with group as dependent variable. Elastic net 9 
regression is well suited for cases where there are few observations and many predictor variables 10 
that may contain groups of correlated variables [32,33,42] (see Supplements 1.9). Using tuning 11 
of its two hyper-parameters [42] it is also well suited to produce models that do not over-fit but 12 
generalize well to new data. The algorithm tuned for optimal generalization performance on 13 
out-of-sample data using the area under the receiver-operating curve, AUC-ROC, [32,33]. 14 
AUC-ROC ranges from 0.5 (chance) to 1 (perfect sensitivity and specificity).  15 
We assessed the generalizability of the above algorithm 1000 times via 10-fold cross-validation 16 
which yielded a distribution of classifiers and thus of AUC-ROC’s. Note that the cross-17 
validation to estimate generalizability led to the cross-validations used in the elastic net 18 
regression to become nested [32]. For a graphical illustration of the algorithm with cross-19 
validation to estimate the generalization performance, see Fig. 2. The data and R Code can be 20 
found here: https://github.com/pransito/PIT_GD_MRI_release. To compute a p-value denoting 21 
the significance of classification improvement (full model vs. baseline model, i.e. model with 22 
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only years of education as predictor), we compared the sampled distributions of classification 1 
performance under the full model vs. under the baseline model [23], Supplements 1.10. 2 
After assessing the generalizability of the model by cross-validation, we fit the model to the 3 
entire data set (no splitting in training and test data) in order to build the final interpretable and 4 
reportable classifier. Since the modelling is probabilistic, we repeated this 1000 times. We 5 
plotted the ensuing distribution of regression weight vectors as per-parameter means with 95% 6 
percentile bounds. 7 
----------------------------------  PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE ------------------------------ 8 
Inspecting the classifier based on fMRI data 9 
In order to interpret the final classifier’s regression weights as an activation pattern (a), i.e. to 10 
know how greatly each predictor contributed to distinguishing GD from HC subjects in the 11 
classifier, we calculated: 12 
𝒂𝒂 = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑋𝑋)  ∗   𝑤𝑤      ȏ͵Ȑ13 
[43], where 𝑤𝑤 is the regression weight vector (a column vector), or in other words, the classifier. 14 
𝑋𝑋 is the matrix of predictors for all subjects and cov(𝑋𝑋) is the covariance matrix of 𝑋𝑋. 15 
Additionally, we calculated between-group t-tests (HC vs. GD) for all predictors.16 
Ethics 17 
Subjects gave written informed consent. The study was conducted in accordance with the World 18 
Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the ethics committee of Charité 19 
- Universitätsmedizin Berlin.  20 
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RESULTS 1 
Cue ratings 2 
Subjects perceived cues as intended and similar to a previous sample of HC and GD subjects 3 
[23], Supplements 2.2. Gambling cues elicited more craving compared to neutral in GD 4 
subjects than in HC subjects (GD gambling > neutral: β = 1.749, HC gambling > neutral: β = 5 
0.719, p(GD>HC) < 0.001). 6 
Behavioral choice data 7 
Comparing the laecg to the laec model, we observed a significant χ2 difference test result (χ2 = 8 
26.6, df = 7, p < 0.001; with ΔAIC = 12.6, ΔBIC = -39.0). Inspecting the estimated parameters 9 
of the laecg model, we observed that acceptance rate during neutral images with all other 10 
parameters at zero (i.e. at their mean, except for ed, actually zero) was for HC: 59.0% and for 11 
GD: 38.8%, pWald = 0.155. Gambling cues were associated with stronger increase in gamble 12 
acceptance in GD subjects (∆% = 44) than in HC subjects (∆% = -8, pWald = 0.003). The same 13 
was true for negative (GD: ∆% = 23, HC: ∆% = -16, pWald = 0.049) and positive cues (GD: ∆% 14 
= 23, HC: ∆% = 0, pWald = 0.030) (Fig. S4). For further behavioral results, please see 15 
Supplements 2.1. 16 
Neural effects, prediction of group using fMRI data 17 
Across groups and in line with previous findings [12,19,26,28], there was for gambling-cues 18 
PIT a significant effect in right amygdala: [15 -6 -15], pSVC = 0.027, puncor = 0.003, k = 17. 19 
Further, there was for the cue reactivity contrast HC > GD (positive cues) a significant effect in 20 
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left NAcc: [-6 6 -6], pSVC = 0.033, puncor = 0.005, k = 4, and in right NAcc: [6 9 -6], pSVC = 1 
0.035, puncor = 0.007, k = 4. 2 
The mean AUC-ROC of the full classifier using neural PIT signatures was 70.0% (mean for the 3 
baseline classifier, i.e. covariate-only classifier: 61.5%, p = 0.013) (Fig. S6). 4 
Inspecting the final classifier’s logistic regression weights (see Fig. 3) (after transformation to 5 
predictor importance, see Eq. 3, and according to t-tests), we saw that the top predictor was 6 
negative-cues-PIT-related functional connectivity from amygdala to anterior OFC, with a 7 
negative sign (Fig. 3). This means that the stronger not accepting a gamble was associated with 8 
increase in correlation between amygdala and anterior OFC, the less likely the subject was a 9 
GD person (and rather a HC subject). In other words, GD subjects showed lower such functional 10 
connectivity than HC. The next top three predictors were gambling-cues-related functional 11 
connectivity from NAcc to amygdala (positive sign), positive-cues-related functional 12 
connectivity from amygdala to lateral OFC (positive sign), and years in school (negative sign) 13 
(see Fig. 3). 14 
------------------------ PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE -----------------------------------------  15 
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DISCUSSION 1 
The influence of cues onto value-based decision-making may be regarded as a form of 2 
Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer (PIT), the increase of which has been associated with 3 
addictive disorders in general [17,19,20]. 4 
We hypothesized that GD subjects should be distinguishable by neural PIT signatures based on 5 
fMRI contrasts recorded during an affective mixed-gambles task. We therefore built a classifier 6 
using fMRI PIT contrasts to distinguish GD from HC subjects focusing on brain structures 7 
known to be relevant in PIT, like amygdala and NAcc. We also incorporated amygdala’s 8 
connectivity to OFC, and amygdala’s and NAcc’s connectivity to each other. We further 9 
included neural cue reactivity contrasts as predictors. These predictors yielded a neural PIT 10 
signature per subject which could be used to classify subjects into the GD or HC group. 11 
Our results support our first hypothesis, showing that neural PIT signatures based on fMRI data 12 
gathered from the affective mixed-gambles task may successfully classify out-of-sample 13 
subjects into GD and HC, with a cross-validated mean AUC-ROC of 70.0% (p = 0.013). This 14 
performance on out-of-sample data is similar to other studies using MRI data for classification 15 
in the field of addictive disorders [31,32,35]. To our knowledge, however, the present study is 16 
the first one to use fMRI classification for investigating a behavioral addiction, namely GD, and 17 
the neural basis of increased PIT. This means that it is possible to characterize a non-substance 18 
related addiction to a considerable degree by a distinct neuro-functional signature, namely a 19 
neural PIT signature in a network of amygdala, NAcc and OFC, derived from PIT and SUD 20 
literature. This further implies that addictive disorders, in general, may be associated with PIT-21 
related neural changes, independent of a substance of abuse, which means that neural PIT 22 
changes may be a product of addiction-related learning [44:113ff.] and neural plasticity or even 23 
of an innate trait [45]. 24 
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Concerning the predictors in the classifier, we hypothesized that gambling-cue PIT-related 1 
functional connectivity from amygdala to OFC should be increased. We found that multiple 2 
PIT-related functional connectivities from amygdala to OFC were significant predictors in the 3 
classifier. For example, gambling-cues PIT-related functional connectivity from amygdala to 4 
OFC was increased in GD compared to HC subjects, in line with the above hypothesis and in 5 
line with the hypothesis that in GD subjects amygdala modulates the value computation in OFC, 6 
when addiction-related cues are presented in the background [29,30]. Furthermore, the top 7 
predictor in the classifier was PIT-related functional connectivity from amygdala to anterior 8 
OFC in trials with a negative cue, with a negative predictor weight. This means that the stronger 9 
the rejection of a gamble during the presentation of negative cues was associated with an 10 
increase in correlation between amygdala and anterior OFC, the less likely the subject was a 11 
GD person (and rather a HC subject). In other words, GD subjects showed weaker such 12 
functional connectivity than HC. GD subjects, compared to HC subjects, showed significantly 13 
more gambling during the presentation of negative cues than during the presentation of neutral 14 
cues. HC subjects may not show this effect because of stronger signal transmission related to 15 
negative cues from amygdala to OFC. Similarly, it has been found that reduced loss aversion in 16 
GD subjects was associated with reduced loss-related functional connectivity from amygdala to 17 
ventral medial prefrontal cortex in a pure mixed-gambles task [10]. This highlights that 18 
impaired decision-making in GD during a pure mixed-gambles task, as well as during an 19 
affective mixed-gambles task, may draw from the same functional neural substrate. 20 
Exploratively, we looked at the next two top predictors expecting that PIT-related (as opposed 21 
to purely cue reactivity related) neural predictors should be among these. Indeed, we found that 22 
the next top predictor was gambling-cues PIT-related functional connectivity from NAcc to 23 
amygdala (positive sign), a connectivity important for cue-induced effects in mixed-gambles 24 
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tasks [27]. This means that the more gamble acceptance during presentation of gambling cues 1 
was associated with an increase in correlation between NAcc and amygdala, the more likely the 2 
subject was a GD person. In other words, GD subjects showed stronger such functional 3 
connectivity than HC. NAcc is seen as encoding temporal difference prediction errors, i.e. it 4 
fires when an unexpected reward signal is perceived from one moment to the next [46]. GD 5 
subjects rated gambling pictures as more craving-inducing and reacted with significantly 6 
stronger gamble acceptance increase than HC when gambling-associated cues were shown in 7 
the background. We also saw an important regression weight given to gambling-cues PIT-8 
related functional connectivity from amygdala to OFC, in line with our initial hypothesis. 9 
Therefore, it may be that gambling cues elicit a prediction error in NAcc that modulates 10 
amygdala activity, which in turn modulates the value representation in OFC in such a way that 11 
GD subjects are more inclined than HC subjects to accept the gamble at hand. This is in line 12 
with a previous study, where it has been found that GD subjects display increased functional 13 
connectivity from amygdala to posterior OFC related to increasing possible gains in a pure 14 
mixed-gambles task [10]. This highlights again that impaired decision-making in GD during a 15 
pure mixed-gambles task, as well as during an affective mixed-gambles task may draw from the 16 
same functional neural substrate. Also, it has been observed before that NAcc and amygdala 17 
seem to hold relevant signal related to PIT in healthy subjects [26] and to increased PIT in 18 
addicted subjects [19]. Interestingly, previous studies [19,20] have observed that in recently 19 
detoxified treatment-seeking AD patients, images of alcoholic beverages in the background 20 
have a suppressing effect on the instrumental task in the foreground. Contrarily, we have seen 21 
that gambling cues elicit a stronger gamble acceptance increase in GD than in HC. This may be 22 
because we have included only active non-treatment-seeking gamblers, who perhaps work less 23 
against their automated response towards addiction-related cues.  24 
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The third top predictor was also PIT related, in line with our hypothesis that PIT-related 1 
predictors should be more important than cue reactivity predictors. It was positive-cues PIT-2 
related functional connectivity from amygdala to lateral OFC. This means that the stronger the 3 
acceptance of a gamble during the presentation of positive cues was associated with an increase 4 
in correlation between amygdala and OFC, the more likely the subject was a GD person. In 5 
other words, GD subjects showed stronger such functional connectivity than HC. This may be 6 
parallel to the finding on behavioral level that GD subjects react with more gambling increase 7 
to positive pictures than HC subjects. It seems that both positive cues and gambling cues lead 8 
to increased gambling and similarly increased connectivity between amygdala and OFC in GD 9 
subjects. Also, negative cues lead to increased gambling. This is surprising because one could 10 
have expected to see decreased gambling during negative and positive cues or no effect of those 11 
cue categories [23]. On the other hand, perhaps all three cue categories have special salience 12 
for GD subjects modulating the propensity to accept gambles. Future studies should further 13 
explore the effect of positive and negative stimuli on gambling in GD. 14 
Considering the predictor importance of all fMRI contrasts, cue reactivity predictor importance 15 
values are relatively small, and the classifier draws more on PIT-related variables (the top-three 16 
predictors were PIT related). This emphasizes the importance of PIT as a defining marker for 17 
addictive disorders beyond cue reactivity. 18 
We used the same cues as Genauck et al. (2019) in a new sample of GD and HC subjects and, 19 
in line with that study, we also observed that GD subjects rate the gambling cues as more craving 20 
inducing. Also, in the other categories cues were perceived as expected. The ratings and the 21 
result that neural PIT signatures successfully distinguish GD from HC subjects reinforce the 22 
notion that GD subjects’ cue reactivity facilitates riskier decision-making when addiction-23 
related cues are presented in the background of a gamble task. 24 
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Changes in NAcc’s structure [47] and function [22,25] related to GD have been observed in 1 
previous studies. The same is true for amygdala’s structure [48] and function [10], as well as 2 
for OFC’s structure [49] and function [5]. Our study adds to these findings by considering the 3 
functions of these structures concurrently and in a network. Our results support the notion that 4 
GD, similar to SUD, is characterized by neural incentive sensitization [4,5] such that in GD a 5 
network of amygdala, NAcc and OFC facilitate gambling decisions in the face of gambling 6 
cues. 7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
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STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS 1 
The main strength of our study is that we have used a classification approach to assess the 2 
usefulness of known neural PIT contrasts to characterize GD in out-of-sample data. Using this 3 
approach, we have estimated the single-subject relevance of these fMRI signals. Our results 4 
therefore have not only explanatory value in elucidating the basis of increased PIT in GD, but 5 
also predictive value, given that they are likely to be found in new samples of GD and matched 6 
HC subjects [34]. Furthermore, we are to our knowledge the first to address the neural 7 
underpinnings of PIT in a behavioral addiction using a machine learning approach. 8 
Unfortunately, we have no independent validation sample to externally validate our results 9 
[23,35]. Further studies are needed to collect such data. As we have laid out, there are multiple 10 
ways in which the brain may produce an overt PIT, involving at least amygdala, NAcc and OFC. 11 
To increase statistical power, we have omitted other conceptualization of PIT, e.g. as an 12 
interference task, and hence any limbic-dorso-lateral-prefrontal connectivity [50]. Future 13 
studies should explore this. In the current study we did not address the distinction between 14 
outcome-specific and general PIT [13,17,50]. This would be a valuable next step for future 15 
studies in GD.  16 
17 
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CONCLUSION 1 
We have observed that it is possible to classify HC and GD subjects based on the neural 2 
correlates of PIT in a network of NAcc, amygdala and OFC. Our findings further the 3 
understanding of GD and show that PIT is relevant for characterizing non-substance-related 4 
addictive disorders also on neural level. PIT alterations at the neural level related to an addictive 5 
disorder might thus not depend on the direct effect of a substance of abuse, but rather on related 6 
learning processes or even on innate traits. 7 
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ONLINE RESOURCES 1 
R code and data (stored in an .RData file which is loaded with the R code) to run the classifier 2 
estimation and cross-validation, as well as the classical hierarchical regression analyses can be 3 
found in the following link. Further you can find there also more detailed data concerning the 4 
MRI sequences, as well as the preprocessing of MRI data and the fMRI single subject design: 5 
https://github.com/pransito/PIT_GD_MRI_release  6 
7 
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Figure 1: The affective mixed-gambles task. One trial is depicted. Subjects first saw a fixation cross with variable 
inter-trial-interval (ITI, 4s to 8s). Then a cue with randomly chosen affective content (67 gambling related, 45 
drawn with replacement from 31 with positive consequences of abstinence, 45 drawn with replacement from 31 
with negative consequences of gambling, 45 drawn with replacement from 24 neutral images, i.e. 202 trials) was 
presented for about 4s. Subjects were instructed to remember the cue for a paid recognition task after all trials. 
Then a gamble involving a possible gain and a possible loss was superimposed on the cue (e.g. -11 and +32). 
Subjects were instructed to shift their attention at this point to the proposed gamble and evaluate it (decision 
phase). Position of gain and loss was counterbalanced (left/right). Gain was indicated by a '+' sign and loss by a 
'-' sign. After again 4s (jittered) the response options appeared and subjects were asked to indicate their 
willingness to accept the gamble between four levels of acceptance (yes, somewhat yes, somewhat no, no, [37]; 
here translated from German version which used “ja, eher ja, eher nein, nein”) (motor phase). Direction of 
options (from left to right or vice versa) and side of gain amount was random. Directly after decision, the ITI 
started. If subjects failed to respond within 2.5s, ITI started and trial was counted as missing. RT: reaction time. 
Figure 2: Classifier building algorithm with cross-validation (CV) to estimate generalization error. Nested CV 
was used for tuning the hyperparameters of the elastic net regression [42]. This was done repeatedly with 
different nested CV folds (10 times, 10-fold nested CV) to estimate a robust mean model within each repetition 
of classifier estimation.  
Figure 3: Estimated predictor importance. Points and quantiles are estimated predictor importance with 95%-
quantiles over 1000 classifier estimation rounds. The larger the absolute size of an importance value the stronger 
the predictor adds to distinguishing HC from GD in the classifier. Bars show t-values of simple between- group t-
tests. Significant t-tests are highlighted (Welch-test, p < 0.05, two-sided). Delimitations are at 1.96 and -1.96 to 
mark points of statistical significance for t-test. Importance values/t-values are grouped by the kind of fMRI 
predictor: cue reactivity related, PIT related, Psychological-physiological-interaction (i.e. PPI) related. PPIs are 
further grouped by seed region and target extraction (e.g. “to OFC”). PIT: pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer; 
OFC: orbital frontal cortex; AOFC, LOFC, POFC, MOFC: anterior, lateral, posterior, medial orbital frontal cortex; 
R: right 
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1 Supplementary methods 
1.1 Sample 
All subjects completed the Gamblers’ Beliefs Questionnaire containing subscales on gambling 
persistence and gambling illusions (GBQpers, GBQillus) (Steenbergh et al., 2002) and the 
South Oaks Gambling Questionnaire (SOGQ) (Lesieur and Blume, 1987; Stinchfield, 2002). 
For matching purposes subjects were asked to indicate age, amount of personal debt and 
monthly personal net income (Bergh and Kühlhorn, 1994; Ladouceur et al., 1994). They were 
asked if they were smokers and completed the Fagerström smoking questionnaire (Heatherton 
et al., 1991). Furthermore, they were asked to indicate their level of education which was 
translated into years spent in primary/secondary school and in tertiary (vocational 
school/university) education and their handedness. For further characterization of the two 
groups subjects also completed Beck's Depression Inventory (BDI-II) (Beck et al., 1996), the 
short version of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale Version 15 (BIS-15) (Patton et al., 1995; Meule 
et al., 2011), alcohol use disorders identification test (Dybek et al., 2006). According to the 
South Oaks Gambling Screen (Lesieur and Blume, 1987; Stinchfield, 2002) (3-point Likert 
scales), GD subjects differed in gambling habits to HC only in frequency of playing slot 
machines (most frequent answer of GD: “3: once a week or more”, HC: “1: not at all”) (t = 5.35, 
p < 0.001), casinos (most frequent answer of GD: “3: once a week or more”, HC: “1: not at all”) 
(t = 3.67, p = 0.001), and sports betting  (most frequent answer of GD: “2: less than once a 
week”, HC: “1: not at all”) (t = 2.84, p = 0.003). Any known history of a neurological disorder 
or a current psychological disorder (except tobacco dependence) as assessed by the Screening 
of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-I) (First et al., 2002) 
led to exclusion from the study. 
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1.2 Stimuli selection 
Four sets of images were assembled (Genauck et al., 2019): 1) 67 gambling images, showing a 
variety of gambling scenes, situations and cues: 36 showing different kinds of slot machines, 
12 showing poker, 13 showing roulette, 3 featuring money, 3 featuring dice; 2) 31 images 
showing negative consequences of gambling (as of now referred to as negative images): 7 
showing depression / sadness, 4 depicting poverty, 4 depicting debt, 3 showing a quarrel 
between people, 2 showing family problems, 2 showing the lack of money, 2 symbolizing 
suicide, 2 showing money burning; 3) 31 images showing positive effects of abstinence from 
gambling (as of now referred to as positive images): 6 showing family, 4 showing relationships, 
4 showing friendships, 3 depicting success, 3 depicting freedom, 3 showing joy, 2 showing 
saved money; 4) 24 neutral images showing objects: 6 kitchen utensils, 8 showing other 
household objects, 2 showing tools, 2 showing abstract paintings. None of the neutral pictures 
showed humans or faces. 
Images were obtained from the internet, sought purposefully to fit the defined categories 
(positive, gambling, neutral). Online search for images was performed using popular image 
search engines. Groups of selected images were matched for content as follows: a) percent of 
images showing a social stimulus (i.e. a person) as opposed to images without persons (gam: 
88.2%, pos: 77.4%, neg: 90.3%; Chi2 = 1.123, df = 2, p = 0.570); b) percent of images showing 
a face as opposed to people with their face turned away or just hands (gam: 35.3%, pos: 38.7%, 
neg: 51.6%; Chi2 = 3.530, df = 2, p = 0.171); c) percent of images showing males (gam: 67.6%, 
pos: 64.5%, neg: 77.4%; Chi2 = 1.300, df = 2, p = 0.523).  
All images were cropped to fit the aspect ratio optimized to minimize the loss of image area 
(3:2). Each image was cropped individually making sure that no content was lost. All the images 
were resized to the resolution of the lowest image in the set (450x300 pixels), ensuring that the 
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image dimensions and quality are the same across all images. Images are available for scientific 
use upon reasonable request from the first author. They cannot be made publicly available due 
to copyright. 
1.3 Gamble Simplicity 
Figure S1: Gamble simplicity. Each cell represents a gamble (combination of possible loss, possible gain). Color 
denotes euclidean distance from the diagonal. The closer to the diagonal a gamble, the less simple the gamble is 
according to prospect theory and empirical data, where normally subjects show a 50% acceptance rate for 
gambles along the 2:1 diagonal (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tom et al., 2007; Abdellaoui et al., 2008; Genauck 
et al., 2017). 
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1.4 Behavioral analyses 
In line with (Genauck et al., 2019), who used a very similar affective LA task, we used the la 
model to compare subjects in loss aversion, with… 
𝑄 = 𝛽0 + 𝑥𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 ∗ 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 + 𝑥𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 
Note that one can define 𝜆 =  −𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠/ 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 where 𝜆 is called loss aversion (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Tom et al., 2007; Genauck et al., 2017). Based on the equation defining Q we 
fit a logistic regression within a generalized linear mixed-effects model, using glmer from the 
lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2015). Here, gain, loss category denoted the fixed effects and 
subjects and cues and cue category denoted the sources of random effects. To test if the groups 
differed in the parameters of the la model, we expanded the model by an additional fixed effect 
of group modulating the effect of gain, loss, (lag). Statistical testing of the model comparison 
was performed using χ2-square difference tests, as well as the comparison of Akaike and 
Bayesian information criterion (AIC, BIC). For statistical tests of single parameters in the lag 
model, we used Wald z-test as implemented in lme4. 
Further, and in line with (Genauck et al., 2019), we also tested the lacg model based on … 
𝑄 = 𝛽0 + 𝑥𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 ∗ 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 + 𝑥𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝑐𝑇 ∗ 𝛽𝑐 
against the lacig model, which assumens separate 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛and 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠for each category 
(Charpentier et al., 2015).
1.5 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging data gathering and preprocessing 
Scanning was performed on a 3-Tesla clinical whole-body magnetic resonance tomograph (MR 
Magnetom Tim Trio, SIEMENS, Erlangen, Germany) equipped with a standard 12-channel 
phased-array head coil at the Berlin Center for Advanced Neuroimaging at Charité – 
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Universitätsmedizin Berlin. In the T2*-sensitive Gradient-Echo Echo-Planar Imaging (GE-EPI) 
sequence used during the affective loss aversion (LA) task, 33 slices covering the whole brain 
were acquired in descending order (TR=2.0s, 3mm thickness, 25% inter-slice gap, TE: 30ms, 
flip angle: 78°, in-plane resolution: 64 x 64 pixels, voxel size: 3.0mm x 3.0mm x 3.0mm), using 
SIEMENS automatic online motion correction. Slices were automatically tilted and aligned 
with the line from anterior to posterior commissure. Additionally, a T1-weighted 3D structural 
image for anatomical referencing (Magnetization Prepared Rapid Gradient Echo, MPRAGE, 
voxel size: 1mm x 1mm x 1mm) and a B0 fieldmap for image distortion correction were 
recorded. Imaging data were processed with Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM12, 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/, Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, 
UK) running on MATLAB (version: R2014a, Mathworks, Sherborn, MA, USA). The GE-EPI 
images of every subject were corrected for differences in slice acquisition time. GE-EPI images 
were registered to the mean GE-EPI image (motion correction). Fieldmaps were used to unwarp 
non-linear image distortions caused by B0 inhomogenities (Andersson et al., 2001). The T1 
image was co-registered to the unwarped mean GE-EPI image using affine spatial 
transformation. The T1 image was then segmented into tissue classes and transformed into the 
Montreal Neurological Institute-standard space (MNI). This process yielded linear and non-
linear parameters for the transformation between individual and standard space, which were 
applied to all unwarped EPI images. Finally, these images were spatially smoothed with an 
isotropic Gaussian kernel (full-width-at-half maximum 8mm). 
1.6 The fMRI single-subject model 
1) Onset “cue” from 0s, boxcar, denoting moments of cue presentation vs. none presentation (1
vs. 0, duration: 4s plus jitter, i.e. time for showing the cue and then cue plus gamble). This onset 
regressor had three parametric modulators (serially orthogonalized). pmod(1): gamble cue > 
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neutral cue, pmod(2): negative cue > neutral cue, pmod(3): positive cue > neutral cue (always 
coded 1 vs. -1). 
2) Onset “cue plus gamble” from 4s plus jitter, boxcar, modeled the time when gamble 
presentation was on (1 vs. 0, duration: 4s plus jitter, i.e. the time when cue and gamble were 
presented but no response options available yet). This onset regressor had seven parametric 
modulators (serially orthogonalized). pmod(1-3): gain, loss, ed, mean-centered aggregated from 
twelve to four steps, see behavioral analysis; pmod(4): acceptance of gamble > non-acceptance 
(1 vs. -1); pmod(5-7): PIT modulators for the three cue categories (Garbusow et al., 2016; Schad 
et al., 2018). For example, the PIT regressor “acceptXgambling”, pmod(5), modeled 
“acceptance during gambling cues vs. not accepting during gambling cues” > “accepting during 
neutral cues vs. not accepting during neutral cues”, i.e. (1 vs. -1) > (1 vs. -1). 
3) Onset “cue plus gamble plus response options” from 8s plus jitter, boxcar, modeled the time 
when motor response could be performed (1 vs. 0, duration: reaction time until response was 
made) 
Missing trials were modeled with a boxcar regressor (1 vs. 0), with duration set at length of 
trial. Regressors were convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function, 
downsampled to match the number of EPI scans and entered into a GLM (Fig. S2). 
Additionally, the head motion parameters obtained during SPM12 motion correction were 
entered into the model to account for signal fluctuations caused by the interaction of movement 
and susceptibility (Morgan et al., 2007). After high pass filtering (cut off frequency = 1/128 Hz) 
and the elimination of high frequency noise by autoregressive (AR(1)) modeling, the General 
Linear Model (GLM) was fit to the preprocessed EPIs using a restricted maximum likelihood 
algorithm. 
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Figure S2: Design matrix for the single-subject level. Subjects completed two runs of the affective loss aversion 
task. 
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1.7 Generalized physiological psychological interaction (gPPI) 
To extract relevant PIT functional connectivities (e.g. Fig. S3), four separate single-subject 
models were formulated. These single-subject models were like the original single-subject 
model (13 regressors of interest) but included additional regressors: the physiological regressor, 
i.e. the time series of the seed region (left/right NAcc or left/right Amygdala, hence 4 gPPI 
single-subject models) plus each of the 13 regressors of interest multiplied with the seed 
region’s time series. The four gPPI models only differed in which seed region was used. We 
were only interested in extracting the regression weights of the gPPI PIT contrasts for each 
subject (i.e. pmod(5-7) of onset regressor 2 multiplied with the seed region’s time series). 
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Figure S3: The ANDREA model. The model describes how loss aversion may arise in the brain during a mixed-
gambles task and in addition the model makes a specific prediction how contextual cues can influence the 
subjective representation of gain and loss (this part of the model is highlighted in red). Namely, the amygdala is 
encoding and forwarding the value signal of the contextual cue, thereby modulating the subjective value 
representation in OFC [30]. GD subjects should show a stronger functional connectivity from amygdala to OFC 
with respect to accepting gambles during presentation of e.g. gambling cues because this would increase the 
value of the gamble stored in OFC into positive direction and thus increase the likelihood of gamble acceptance.  
1.8 Extracting the neural PIT patterns from single-subject contrasts 
For cue reactivity: mean between respective left and right ROI; For functional connectivity: 
mean connectivity value between respective left and right ROI with respect to each PIT contrast, 
e.g. for the connectivity from NAcc to posterior OFC with respect to the PIT contrast
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“acceptXgambling” the mean of connectivity values from R NAcc to R posterior OFC, from L 
NAcc to R posterior OFC, from R NAcc to L posterior OFC, and from R NAcc to L posterior 
OFC. 
1.9 Logistic elastic net regression 
Logistic elastic net regression expands normal logistic regression by penalizing elaborate 
regression solutions (many and large regression weights). How much it penalizes is governed 
by two hyper-paramters: λ and α, introduced in its expanded error (or cost) function (i.e. the 
measurement of how far off the fitted model’s predictions are from the real data’s labels): 
𝐿 = 𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇(ℎ(𝑥), 𝑦) + 𝜆[(1 − 𝛼)|𝛽|22/2 + 𝛼|𝛽|1] 
...where COST is the cross entropy function (i.e. in short the negative log-likelihood of the 
model (Bishop, 2006, 205ff.). Further, h(x) is the model yielding a decision-value/a prediction, 
and x is the vector of predictors.  
The model h(x) is a regression equation that can be written as 𝜃(𝛽𝑇𝑥), where 𝛽𝑇𝑥 is the scalar 
product of the regression weights stored in vector 𝛽 and the predictor vector x, and 𝜃 is the 
logistic transfer function. The regularization term +𝜆[. . . ] adds the size of the vector beta to the 
cost because it is a measure of complexity. Elastic net regression uses two measures, the L1-
norm (|𝛽|1) and the L2-norm (|𝛽|2), and mixes them depending on the two hyperparameters 𝜆 
and 𝛼. Upon estimation of 𝛽, L is minimized given λ and α (Zou and Hastie, 2005). Which 
hyperparameters to choose is a matter of tuning, e.g. via nested cross-validation. 
1.10 Estimation of statistical significance (p-value) of classification improvement 
We computed the mean of the obtained AUC-ROC’s under the full model and estimated its p-
value by performing the exact same 1000 CV rounds but each time with only “years in school” 
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as predictor (baseline model). We then subtracted the AUC-ROC’s of the baseline classifiers 
one-by-one from the 1000 AUC-ROC’s of the full classifiers. This yielded a distribution of 
classification improvement (i.e., improvement of AUC-ROC due to using the full classifier 
instead of the baseline classifier). We tested this distribution against the value of classification 
improvement under the null-hypothesis (i.e. zero improvement) to obtain a p-value of 
significance of classification improvement. 
1.11 Online materials 
R code and data (stored in an .RData file which is loaded with the R code) to run the classifier 
estimation and cross-validation, as well as the classical hierarchical regression analyses can be 
found in the following link. Further you can find there also more detailed data concerning the 
MRI sequences, as well as the preprocessing of MRI data and the fMRI single subject design: 
https://github.com/pransito/PIT_GD_MRI_release  
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2 Supplementary results 
2.1 Behavioral data 
Exploring the la model (single-trial definition of gamble value:𝑄𝑙𝑎 = 𝛽0 + 𝑥𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 ∗ 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 +
𝑥𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝑒𝑑 ∙ 𝛽𝑒𝑑 + 𝑐𝑇 ∗ 𝛽𝑐), gain and loss had a significant influence on gamble choice 
in all subjects (p < 0.001, ΔAIC = 4696). There was no fixed effect interaction with group (lag 
vs. la) that improved model fit (p = 1, Δχ2 = 0, ΔAIC = -114). Same holds for comparison of the 
lae vs. the laeg model. In the la model, gain, absolute loss sensitivity, and LA over all trials for 
all subjects were 0.25, 0.38, and 1.50. 
Adding the simple effect of category with group interaction (lacg) lead to a significant 
improvement of the model (p < 0.001, Δχ2 = 964, ΔAIC = 921). Here, we saw a significantly 
higher acceptance during gambling (pWaldApprox < 0.001), negative (pWaldApprox = 0.016), and 
positive cues (pWaldApprox = 0.013) for GD subjects compared to HC. The additional triple-
interaction “group X (gain, loss) X category” (lacig) improved the model (p < 0.001, Δχ2 = 
120, ΔAIC = 6), however none of the additional fixed effects parameters (shifts in gain and loss 
sensitivity by group) were significant. 
Alexander Genauck 15 
Figure S4: Shift in acceptance rate during gambles per category and group. Based on the laecg model. GD 
subjects show stronger increase in gamble acceptance (compared to neutral) in comparison to HC subjects during 
the presentation of all three cue categories in the background. CIs based on standard errors of parameter 
estimates. Stars denote significant post-hoc contrasts. 
2.2 Cue ratings 
Gambling cues were seen as more appropriately representing one or more gambling games than 
any other cue category: gambling > neutral (β = 1.509, p < 0.001), gambling > negative (β = 
1.142, p < 0.001), gambling > positive (β = 1.459, p < 0.001). HC subjects indicated 
significantly more craving in response to gambling cues compared to neutral cues (p < 0.001). 
GD subjects did not rate gambling cues as more positively valenced than HC: GD > HC (β = -
0.055, p < 0.712). GD subjects did not rate gambling cues as more arousal-inducing compared 
to HC subjects (GD gambling > neutral: 0.142, HC gambling > neutral: 0.047, p = 0.525). HC 
subjects did not rate gambling cues as more arousal inducing than neutral cues (p = 0.662). 
Gambling cues lead to higher dominance ratings overall: gambling > neutral (β = 0.368, p < 
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0.001). GD subjects rated gambling cues as more dominance inducing than HC subjects: GD > 
HC (β = 0.328, p = 0.021). 
Negatively valenced cues were seen as evoking smaller valence ratings than all other categories: 
negative < neutral (β = 0.651, p < 0.001), negative < positive (β = 1.538, p < 0.001), negative < 
gambling (β = 0.977, p < 0.001). Negative cues lead to lower dominance ratings (β = -0.297, p 
< 0.001). There were no group differences on any rating scale with regards to the negative cues. 
Negative cues were more representative of negative effects of gambling than any other group: 
negative > neutral (β = 1.398, p < 0.001), negative > positive (β = 1.388, p < 0.001), negative > 
gambling (β = 0.826, p < 0.001). GD subjects perceived negative cues as less representative for 
negative consequences of gambling than HC subjects (HC: 2.03, GD: 1.388, p < 0.001). Positive 
cues were more representative of positive effects of abstinence from gambling than any other 
category: positive > neutral (β = 0.970, p < 0.001), positive > negative (β = 0.848, p < 0.001) 
and positive > gambling (β = 0.639, p < 0.001), and rated as more positive (valence) than any 
other category: positive > neutral (β = 0.886, p < 0.001), positive > negative (β = 1.538, p < 
0.001) and positive > gambling (β = 0.561, p < 0.001). Positive cues lead to higher dominance 
ratings: positive > neutral (β = 0.683, p < 0.001). There were no group differences on any rating 
scale with regards to the positive cues. (Fig. S3). 
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Figure S5: Means and bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) of rating variables. GD: subjects with 
gambling disorder, HC: healthy controls. Facets report from top to bottom on ratings of neutral category cues, 
gambling, negative and positive category cues. 
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2.3 Classifcation performance, regression weights of the fMRI classifier 
 
Figure S6: Classification performance of classifier using fMRI neural PIT signatures. Blue is the density plot of 
1000 AUC-ROCs obtained from running 1000 repetitions of cross validation of the full classifier using neural PIT 
signatures. The green line shows the mean of these 1000 AUC-ROCs. In red you see the same density estimate 
for the baseline classifier, i.e. the covariate-only classifier, as a control condition. The full classifier performs 
significantly better (p = 0.013). 
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Figure S7: Estimated regression weights of the classifier when estimated on whole data set. Plots show 
regression weights with quantiles (95%) over 1000 rounds of classifier estimation. Note that these regression 
weights cannot be interpreted as predictor importances since they act as a filter which deals with discarding noise 
and with covariances between variables (Haufe et al., 2014). Regression weights are grouped by the kind of fMRI 
predictor: cue reactivity related, PIT related, PPI-related. PPI’s are further grouped according to seed region and 
target extraction (e.g. “to OFC”). PIT: pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer; OFC: orbital frontal cortex; AOFC, LOFC, 
POFC, MOFC: anterior, lateral, posterior, medial orbital frontal cortex; R: right 
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